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 Americans have increasingly segregated themselves over the last 40 
years by wealth and political orientation.  I argue that this segregation affects the 
way communities react to school tax ballot issues, which are ostensibly non-
partisan matters.  Using a database containing 232 school tax elections that took 
place during 2011 in 10 states, I show that in affluent communities that favor 
Democrats, high levels of educational attainment make it more likely that a 
community will adopt a tax increase.  By contrast, in downscale communities that 
favor Democrats, economic concerns play an important role in election outcome; 
large percentages of homeowners decrease the likelihood of passage while large 
percentages of renters and poor people make tax increases more likely.  In 
downscale Republican leaning communities, a sense of attachment to the 
community, indicated by large percentages of households with members who are 
at least 60 years of age, small community sizes and long tenures in the same 
house, make it more likely that the community will adopt a school tax increase.  
Finally, in affluent Republican oriented communities, school tax increases are 
extremely difficult to pass and become more so as community size increases.  
High levels of educational attainment tend to moderate the impact of Republican 
anti-tax ideology and high population sizes to make school tax increases more 
likely. 
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 2011 was a difficult year for school districts all over the country.  At least 
three years past the beginning of the “Great Recession,” many school districts 
were seeing streams of cash previously provided to them though dedicated 
sources and by higher levels of government begin to dry up.1  School tax 
revenues based on the value of real estate were down because the bursting of 
the housing bubble had reduced real estate values significantly.  Riding a wave 
of outrage at what they had convinced voters in 2010 were state and national 
governments overreaching their powers, Republican politicians had captured 
state legislatures and governors’ mansions throughout the country after 
campaigning on promises of lower taxing and lower spending.2  They had also 
taken back the U.S. House of Representatives and promised a showdown with 
the Democratic Senate and the President over taxes, spending and government 
debt, all during the worst economic slump since the Great Depression.  It 
seemed clear, at least in the states where the Tea Party had made serious 
                                            
1 http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=4213 







inroads, that spending on government services was going to be cut in order to 
pay for reductions in taxes.3 
 While school districts do receive some funding from the national 
government, the bulk of what they spend on personnel costs, supplies and other 
day-to-day needs comes from state income taxes, sales taxes and local property 
taxes.  School districts have no control over how much money the national 
government will give them, particularly when the funding is channeled through 
their states.  Because they have no direct claim on any state or federal funds, 
each school district must wait with all of the other school districts in the state to 
receive a share of whatever state and federal funds may be available, regardless 
of need and regardless of any pre-recession commitments made to teachers, 
parents and students. 
 When available funds do not suffice, school districts must either make 
what are often painful cuts in staffing and programming or ask for more money 
from those responsible for providing the schools with operating funds.  School 
districts typically obtain operating funds from taxpayers, either indirectly, through 
an appropriation adopted by a more general governing body such as a city or 
county council, or directly, as the result of a school tax election pursuant to which 
voters decide whether the community should bear a heavier tax burden in order 
to give the school district additional funds. 
                                            
3 Wisconsin is a case in point.  There, the successful gubernatorial candidate, 
Scott Walker, promised to cut pay for Wisconsin state employs to pay for a cut in 
the capital gains tax. http://dailyreporter.com/2009/11/13/walker-targets-wages-
and-benefits/.  
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This was the position in which hundreds of school systems found 
themselves in 2011.  Though we might expect voters to reject additional taxes in 
tough economic times, a fair number of school districts around the country 
succeeded in persuading voters to adopt school tax increases.  I found examples 
of these school districts in populous, relatively affluent, Democratically oriented 
places such as Portland, Oregon, as well as in small, downscale Republican 
oriented settings such as Advance, Missouri.   
Why would school districts such as those in Portland and Advance have 
chosen to accept these additional tax burdens, while other school districts, in 
2011, have rejected them?  The answer to this question depends on the interplay 
between two factors that are beginning to define many American communities: 
affluence and political orientation (Bishop, 2009; Moretti, 2013).  These two 
factors are not independent of one another or of other factors, and they shape 
the way other important community characteristics influence the outcome of 
school tax elections. 
With respect to wealth, Warren and Tyagi (Warren & Tyagi, 2004) have 
shown that school districts are becoming increasingly distinct economically.  In 
The Two Income Trap, Warren and Tyagi observed that during the late 1990s, 
two paycheck families with high earning spouses took advantage of low interest 
rates to compete for housing in the best school districts.  This drove up 
residential real estate prices, making some neighborhoods exclusive in ways 
they had not been before.  Having dedicated a large chunk of their income to 
housing in top school districts, people living in these areas would have had a 
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large incentive to maintain the quality of the school district, if for no other reason 
than to protect the value of the investment they had made in their homes, 
regardless of whether they had children in the school system (Fischel, 2001).    
School districts that are distinct because of their level of wealth are often 
distinct for another reason that tends to have a high correlation with wealth.  
According to Moretti, the correlation between wealth and education has been 
strengthening in places like Portland for the last 40 years (Moretti, 2013).    
People who can afford to live in places that have high home values are generally 
highly educated.  As Moretti argues, over the last 40 years, sophisticated 
businesses—and particularly those in high-tech and knowledge-based 
industries—have begun to locate themselves in or near communities with highly 
educated people who can meet the demands of those businesses (Moretti, 2013). 
To keep these highly educated employees and to attract a pool of others, these 
businesses have not been shy in paying them top dollar.  Not only does this 
dynamic make highly educated communities more prosperous4, but it also results 
in a geographic divergence of values, lifestyles and culture (Miller, 2014):  Of this, 
Moretti writes: 
While the divide is first and foremost economic, it is now beginning to 
affect cultural identity, health, family stability, and even politics.  The 
sorting of highly educated Americans into some communities and less 
educated Americans into others tends to magnify and exacerbate all other 
                                            
4 “Workers in cities at the top of the list [of cities ranked by labor productivity] 
make about two to three times more than identical workers in cities at the bottom, 
and the gap keeps growing.”(Moretti, 2013, p. 4)   
 5
socioeconomic differences. . . . These trends are reshaping the very fabric 
of our society  (Moretti, 2013, p. 5).  
 Driven by prosperity, this divergence of values, lifestyles and culture has 
given rise to wealthy communities that should be particularly well disposed to 
vote for school tax increases because (i) prosperity makes it more likely that 
modest tax increases of the type that are usually requested by school districts 
will not unduly affect an affluent voter’s ability to consume or otherwise use and 
enjoy his or her financial resources; and (ii) having benefited economically from 
good education, people living in these kinds of communities, regardless of 
whether they have school age children, are likely to appreciate the opportunities 
good education will provide to the next generation and to the nation at large.
 But prosperity is not the sole determinant.  Just as our communities have 
become more economically homogeneous over the last 40 years, they have 
become more politically homogeneous as well.  Bishop has observed that when 
people leave one locale for another, either because a better economic 
opportunity beckons or because life circumstances allow or compel a change in 
living arrangements, they often select neighborhoods that are populated by 
people who are educationally, economically and politically most like themselves 
(Bishop, 2009).  Before about 1970, race, ethnicity and religion were among the 
key factors people considered when deciding where to live.  According to Bishop, 
over the last 40 years, political orientation has become increasingly salient; the 
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kinds of politicians a community favors has begun to supplant other 
considerations for people making home location decisions.5  Thus, Edsall notes:  
Over the past three-and-a-half decades these mutually reinforcing trends 
have resulted in a surge in “landslide” counties, meaning counties in which 
one of the [presidential] candidates won by 20 points or more, a trend 
documented by Bishop and Cushing.  At the time of the 1976 presidential 
election, 26.8 percent of Americans lived in landslide counties; by 2000, 
that had grown to 45.3 percent. By 2012, the percentage of people living 
in landslide counties shot up further still to 52 percent. (Edsall, 2013) 
 Bishop relies on data from counties, but his argument should apply to 
smaller communities as well.  People don’t move to states or counties; instead, 
they move to neighborhoods where they feel comfortable.   While not 
synonymous with neighborhoods, school districts—and particularly small school 
districts—can be thought of as collections of neighborhoods because school 
district boundaries usually encompass neighborhoods that are geographically 
close to existing schools, often without regard to other municipal boundaries.6  If 
people are moving to neighborhoods where they feel comfortable politically, then 
given the fierce opposition to higher taxes that has been the hallmark of the 
                                            
5 Recent research on the salience of political identity in other settings confirms 
Bishop’s observation. Klofstad, McDermott and Hatemi, using a sample of 
internet dating profiles, found that both liberals and conservatives sought to date 
others who shared their political views and orientations. (Klofstad, McDermott, & 
Hatemi, 2013) while Alford, Hatemi, Hibbing, Martin and Eaves found that 
“political attitudes display interspousal correlations that are among the strongest 
of all social and biometric traits.”(Alford, Hatemi, Hibbing, Martin, & Eaves, 2011)  
6 Because they depend on housing patterns, it is not unusual for school districts 
to span multiple counties. 
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Republican Party since at least the Reagan administration, we should expect it to 
be much harder for a school district in a Republican area to win a tax increase 
from voters than its counterpart in a Democratic area.  To the extent that the 
parties have polarized at the mass level—a contentious issue in itself 
(Abramowitz, 2012; Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Abrams & Fiorina, 2012; 
Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2010; Sussell, 2014)—the effect of partisanship on 
school funding choices should be magnified. 
 Though affluence and political orientation play an important role in 
explaining why some types of school districts passed tax increases at higher 
rates than others, I do not argue here that all we need to know about a 
community to predict whether it is likely to adopt a tax increase is whether it 
prefers Democratic politicians to Republican ones and whether it is relatively rich 
or poor.  There is a significant amount of variability among districts with the same 
political orientation and general level of affluence, and so something more 
nuanced is required.   
 I argue, instead, that different levels of wealth combine with a Republican 
or a Democratic political orientation to affect the way a number of other factors 
influence school tax elections.  Affluent Democratic communities respond to 
factors that downscale Democratic and all Republican communities do not.  
Likewise, downscale Republican communities are unlike communities populated 
by Democrats and more affluent Republicans in the things that sway school tax 
elections.    
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 By beginning with the recognition that school districts like Portland and 
Advance are economically and politically different from each other, it becomes 
easier to understand that we should not expect the factors that influenced voters 
to adopt the tax increase in Portland to have been equally influential in Advance.  
Looking through lenses colored jointly by wealth and political orientation enable 
us to see the factors that maximize the likelihood that school districts will behave 
like the Portland School District and the Advance School District did by adopting 
tax increases during tough economic times. 
 It is important to note that I am focusing on the characteristics of the 
places willing to pass tax increases and not on the characteristics of voters who 
are willing to vote to increase school taxes.  The distinction, though subtle, is 
important because, for the most part, I do not have the individual level data that 
would enable me to say that people with particular demographic characteristics 
tend to vote in a particular way in school tax elections.  This is because, for the 
most part, that kind of data, on a school district by school district basis is 
extremely expensive and difficult to collect, and, for that reason, does not exist 
anywhere.7  A researcher is on solid ground in describing the characteristics of a 
place’s population but commits the ecological fallacy when he or she attempts to 
impute those characteristics to individuals who live in the place he or she is 
describing. 
 
                                            
7 This is why, in Ten Thousand Democracies: Politics and Public Opinion in 
America’s School Districts, Berkman and Plutzer used simulated instead of 
actual public opinion data to study democratic responsiveness to public opinion.   
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Paradigms and Premises, Past and Present 
All scholars stand on the shoulders of those who came before them, and I 
am no exception.  As I will discuss more thoroughly in Chapter 2, a vast literature 
regarding the factors that influence school tax elections has developed since the 
1950s.  While that literature provides many of the building blocks required for 
solving the puzzle of school tax elections, it suffers from three basic problems.  
First, school districts are often too small to be the subject of carefully 
constructed public opinion surveys, and so scholars looking for data on school 
tax elections have relied heavily on case studies in which particular school 
districts or even small groups of school districts have been the focus of 
investigation.   Research of this nature can tell us in great detail about the forces 
that shaped a tax election in one community or even in one group of communities, 
but there is no way to be sure that the community or communities studied are 
representative of any meaningful larger group of school districts.  As Gimpel and 
Schuknecht point out, local politics is often steeped in context, (Gimpel & 
Schuknecht, 2004) and so studies that are geographically focused may turn on 
factors that are unique to the setting being studied.     
Second, many of the studies are old and based on data from the 
prosperous 1950s and 1960s when baby boomers were flooding into school 
systems; those conditions no longer prevail (Lentz, 1999).  Today, there are 
fewer children, the economy is growing slower than it did at the time many of the 
studies were published and family income growth has been stagnant through 
much of the last thirty years.  Over the time period in question, Americans have 
not been consistent about how they have wanted from their governments to 
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respond to the prevailing economic and social conditions.  At times, they have 
wanted a powerful and active government exemplified by Lyndon Johnson’s 
administration while at other times, they’ve wanted the smaller government 
championed by Ronald Reagan.  Levels of trust in government have varied over 
the era as well (Hetherington, 2006).  All of this could have influenced the 
willingness of voters to pay more in taxes that scholars have captured in their 
research.  Factors important in one part of the era could therefore have little 
applicability at another point in time. 
Finally, and perhaps more importantly for present purposes, is the basic 
premise that underlies much of the research.  That premise was simply that the 
people in all of the school districts studied represented a cross-section of public 
opinion on the matter (See, e.g. Berkman & Plutzer, 2005).  In other words, the 
research assumed that attributes such as school district wealth, the percentage 
of homeowners, parents, homeowners, African-Americans, senior citizens, 
college graduates and other groups were independent of each other in their 
impact on school tax elections, and that the impact of these attributes would be 
constant across settings; school tax elections would turn on the relative presence 
of these community attributes.   Parents with school-age children, for example, 
could be counted on to want more public spending for their children, and so 
higher percentages of households with children in a school district would improve 
the likelihood that a tax increase would pass (See, e.g. Piele & Hall, 1973, pp. 
100–101).  
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I take issue with this premise.  What if the impact of high levels of 
education on school tax elections depends on whether the community prefers 
Democratic politicians to Republican ones?  What if the level of educational 
attainment makes more difference in affluent Democratic communities than in 
affluent Republican ones?  A failure to account for these conditional effects 
would be a serious obstacle to an accurate understanding of community 
decisions on school tax issues.   As communities become increasingly 
homogeneous—as they have over the past 40 years (Bishop, 2009; Sussell, 
2014) –then the impact of these conditional effects would become even more 
important.  It could be that the failure to take these conditional effects into 
account explains why scholars have found that many of the factors they claimed 
were important in explaining the outcomes of school tax elections in some places 
had little or no effect in others. 
 Addressing this possibility, Corliss Lentz proposed a new paradigm or 
understanding of school tax elections (Lentz, 1999).  She argued that in order to 
understand school tax elections, one must recognize that the character of a 
community depends on the fact that people prefer to live in communities 
composed of like-minded people.  This self-segregation would produce distinctive 
kinds of communities that would react to school tax elections in distinctive ways.  
In her study of Illinois school district referenda, she grouped school districts by 
the land use categories applicable to the real estate upon which the school 
districts were located.  She showed that that the explanatory power of the 
variables in her model varied by land use type and that she was able to explain 
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more of the variation between districts when she grouped her school districts by 
land use type8 than when she applied her model to all of the school districts in 
her dataset at the same time.  She concluded that: 
This study dispels the notion that one theory of school finance applies to 
all districts.  Using a local typology provides more predictive power than a 
statewide analysis and identifies referenda predictors that are more useful 
in some jurisdictional types than in others. 
Though, for reasons I will provide in Chapter 3, I do not believe that 
Lentz’s land use based categories are practical or useful for this study, I agree 
with Lentz, in principle, and that is why I will argue that to understand the factors 
that shape a school tax election, one must first classify school districts by type 
and then analyze school districts election outcomes within the group to which 
those school districts have been assigned.  Lentz used a classification system 
based on five land use categories for school districts located in Illinois, reasoning 
that property owners with the same class of land would have similar attitudes 
about taxes levied on that class of land (Lentz, 1999).  As I have already 
explained, demographic changes in the United States over the last 40 years have 
created communities that are defined by their political orientations and their 
levels of wealth.  Recognition of this fact will allow me to use an even more 
parsimonious classification system based on those dimensions.   
                                            
8 Lentz’s typology included the following categories:  i) small rural jurisdiction; ii) 
residential suburbs; iii) mixed rural residential; iv) older growing jurisdiction; v) 
small cities.  
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 I apply this framework to a group of 232 school districts that considered 
tax increases in 2011. After sorting these school districts by partisan orientation 
and affluence, I suggest, for each group of districts, a theory to distinguish the 
districts in the group that adopted tax increases (the “Adopter districts”) from 
those that rejected them (the “Rejecter” districts). To test my theories, I apply a 
general-purpose logistic regression model that includes variables representing 
my theories as well as alternative ones suggested by the literature.  I conclude 
each chapter with case studies of Adopter and Rejecter districts to illustrate and 
extend the statistical analysis. 
Dissertation Roadmap  
 This dissertation proceeds as follows: 
 In the next chapter, I provide a brief discussion of the existing literature on 
school tax elections.  The chapter has two purposes.  The first is to introduce the 
main theories scholars have advanced over the last 50 years to explain why 
some communities adopt school tax increases while others do not.  The general-
purpose logistic regression model I develop in Chapter 3 depends on these 
theories.  
 The second purpose is to show how existing scholarship in the field is in 
conflict and to lay the groundwork for my thesis that understanding school tax 
elections requires us to group our cases by political orientation and affluence.  To 
bring some order to the discussion, I rely on a theoretical framework provided by 
Clark and Wilson that classifies these theories as “material benefit” theories, 
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“solidary benefit” theories and “purposive benefit” theories (P. B. Clark & Wilson, 
1961).  
 In Chapter 3, I introduce the dataset to be analyzed and the method of 
analysis, and I present evidence that the four-cell classification system I propose 
to use provides a meaningful and powerful way of analyzing the data.  I also 
provide an overview of the demographic characteristics of the districts in each 
group of districts.  Finally, I specify a general-purpose logistic regression model I 
will use to analyze the school districts assigned to each group.  
 In Chapter 4, I include all of the Democratic leaning school districts where 
median home values are above the dataset median.  I call these the “Googleplex” 
districts.9  The Googleplex group is composed of two types of communities:  
“brain hubs” where people earn their livings through creative or intellectual 
activities that generally require a college education, and “servants’ quarters” 
where people who provide services to the brain hubs or do work that does not 
require college education live.   
 School districts in brain hubs such as the Portland, Oregon School District 
1J (the “Portland school district”), of which I provide a case study, owe their 
prosperity to the presence of a large number of highly educated people who 
make their livings in knowledge-based and high-tech industries.  Democratic 
brain hubs are the most likely type of community to adopt a tax increases for two 
reasons.  First, high levels of education tend to lead to wealth, and high levels of 
                                            
9 By referring to them as the “Googleplex districts,” I also mean to evoke the idea 
that not only do these districts tend to be heavily dependent on cutting edge 
thinking, but they are also highly cosmopolitan and diverse as is the population of  
Google’s Mountainview, California headquarters campus. 
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wealth make modest tax increases more affordable.  Second, Democrats tend to 
believe that education is a social good in and of itself, (Haidt, 2013) and so, when 
tax increases are affordable, highly educated Democrats tend to prioritize 
education.  
 Servants’ quarters districts such as Oregon’s St. Helens School District 
502 (the “St. Helens school district), of which I also provide a case study, are not 
as highly educated as the Adopter districts in the group and are less willing to 
adopt tax increases.  Lower levels of educational attainment lead to lower levels 
of wealth, and with lower levels of wealth, a school tax increase was not as 
affordable in the St. Helens school district as it was in the Portland school district.  
For servants’ quarters districts, tax increases pose a much greater threat to 
family budgets than they do in brain hubs. 
 In Chapter 5, I include all of the remaining Democratically oriented districts.  
These tend to be downscale communities, and because they tend to favor 
somewhat more centrist politicians such as Bill and Hillary Clinton, I refer to them 
as the “Clintonland” districts.  Personal economic factors, such as home 
ownership and poverty, matter in this group of districts.  Though school tax 
increases eventually affect everyone in a community, large percentages of 
downscale homeowners tend to bode ill for school tax increases in this group 
because these hard-pressed homeowners are likely to feel the impact of 
increases in the school tax more directly, well before renters and poor people do.  
As an illustration of the kind of Clintonland school districts that were able to pass 
tax increases in 2011, I profile the Parma City School District in Ohio (the “Parma 
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school district”); as an illustration of the kind of Clintonland school district that 
could not pass a tax increase in 2011, I profile the Amherst Exempted Village, 
Ohio School District (the “Amherst school district”). 
 Chapter 6 focuses on the downscale, Republican oriented districts.  I call 
these the “Smallville” districts because they tend to be rural and have small, 
sparse populations.10  As Republican oriented communities, they tend to be 
skeptical of tax increases. The people who live in these districts are less mobile 
than their counterparts in the groups of districts discussed in Chapters 4, 5, and 7, 
preferring to live or remain in places where a feeling of connection to the 
community is crucial for adopting higher school taxes.  In places where there is 
little transience and where the residents have occupied the same homes for 
extended periods, I argue that community attachment makes it easier to get a tax 
increase passed.  I profile Missouri’s Advance R-IV School District (the “Advance 
school district”) as an example of a community that overcame what I call the 
“Republican Headwind,” a standing predilection to oppose increased taxation, in 
order to pass a school tax increase.  I also profile Ohio’s Fairborn City School 
District (the “Fairborn school district”) as an example of a community that could 
not overcome the Republican Headwind. 
 And finally, I collect all of the Republican oriented school districts that 
have median home values higher than the dataset median in a group I call the 
                                            
10 By referring to them as the Smallville districts, I also mean to evoke the idea of 
small-town, rural America. 
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“Goldwater Country” districts.11   I discuss these districts in Chapter 7.   Like the 
districts in the Googleplex group, they tend to have highly educated populations.  
While residents in the Goldwater Country districts appreciate the value of high 
quality education just as their highly educated peers in the brain hubs of the 
Googleplex group do, their high levels of educational attainment tend to make 
their voters more partisan and ideological.  I argue that this makes those voters 
more sensitive to national Republican messages about government waste and 
incompetence.  That message extends not just to national institutions, but to local 
ones such as public school districts as well.  Being highly skeptical and 
demanding of government, they “reward” school districts by sometimes 
approving school tax increase requests when those districts competently provide 
the educational services residents expect.  Chapter 7 concludes with case 
studies of Ohio’s Madeira City School District (the “Madeira school district”), 
which voters “rewarded” with a tax increase, and Arizona’s Cave Creek Unified 
School District #93 (the “Cave Creek school district”), which voters “punished” by 
rejecting the requested tax increase. 
 Chapter 8 sums up the project with a brief discussion of my general 
results, an assessment of the limitations of my analysis, and suggestions for 
future research.  Chapter 9 raises some final thoughts about the broader 
meaning of my research. 
 
                                            
11By referring to these districts as the Goldwater Country districts, I mean to 





Understanding School Tax Elections: The State of The Literature 
 
 Over the last 50 years, scholars have advanced a number of hypotheses 
to explain the results of school tax elections.  While scholars have approached 
the question from different angles, each perspective flows from a 
conceptualization of benefits.  For the purposes of organization, I discuss these 
hypotheses in terms of the benefits people expect to receive for agreeing to 
increase their tax burdens. 
 Previous research has reached a number of different conclusions about 
the factors that influence school tax elections.  This is not to say that 50 years 
worth of research on school tax elections has been for naught.  Each theory 
previously advanced provides a piece of the puzzle.  In this chapter, I describe 
the major theories developed in the field.  I do this for two reasons.  First, I wish 
to provide a convenient way of referring to concepts to which I will return.  
Second, my analysis requires the creation of a statistical model that can pit these 
major theories against each other in different settings.  For purposes of 
organization I discuss these theories in terms of the benefits people receive for 
agreeing to take on additional burdens. 
 People choose to assume the burdens of collective action, such as 
agreeing to pay additional taxes, because they expect to receive one or more of 
three basic kinds of benefits: material benefits, solidary benefits and/or purposive 
benefits (P. B. Clark & Wilson, 1961).  When people act with the expectation of 
 19 
material benefit, they expect that the rewards will exceed the sacrifices they 
make.  Such a benefit can be either a short-term gain or one that appears after 
the passage of time.  This does not mean or imply that the only beneficiaries of 
the act in question are the actors.  Action taken for the benefit of the actor can 
also result in positive externalities that benefit others, such as when a parent 
votes for a school tax increase.  In attempting to secure a first class education for 
his or her children, the parent may reason that voting for a tax increase is less 
expensive than enrolling his or her children in private school.  Though the parent 
benefits through lower education costs compared to private school tuition, 
children, teachers, school system employees and other parents in the community 
may benefit as well.    
 People seek a solidary benefit when they act, not to receive a material 
benefit, but to receive the internal satisfaction that comes from “socializing, 
congeniality, the sense of group membership and identification, the status 
resulting from membership, fun and conviviality, the maintenance of social 
distinctions and so on” (P. B. Clark & Wilson, 1961, pp. 134–135).  People seek 
purposive benefits when they act pursuant to “ideological or issue-oriented goals 
“(Berry, 1989, p. 47) or  for the purpose of “having contributed to a worthy cause” 
(Mahood, 1990, p. 12)  without expecting a reciprocal material benefit of any kind 
at any time in the future.  In both of these cases, the reward for taking the action 
is intrinsic to the person or the actor.  A gift to a medical charity that seeks to 
eliminate a particular type of disease would be made in pursuit of a solidary 
benefit if (i) neither the giver nor any of his or her friends or family suffer from the 
 20 
disease (and do not expect to do so in the future) and  (ii) the giver expects to 
receive recognition by others whose opinion and good favor he or she seeks or 
values.   A person would be acting in pursuit of a purposive benefit if (i) neither 
the giver nor the friends and family of the giver suffer from the disease (and do 
not expect to do so in the future) and (ii) the giver sees the gift as a contribution 
to a social good.   
Hypotheses Focused on Material Benefits 
The Homeowner Hypothesis 
 People sometimes vote to adopt or reject additional taxes for the benefit of 
their school districts because they hope to receive material benefits.  Since 
school taxes are generally levied against real property, one explanation of the 
behavior focuses on homeownership.  Thus, for example, Fischel’s The 
Homevoter Hypothesis holds that much of local politics is driven by self-
interested homeowners who make political decisions based on the impact those 
decisions will have on home values (Fischel, 2001).  Because “homevoters” 
recognize that a key determinant of home value is the presence of high quality 
local amenities, such as good elementary and secondary public schools, when 
confronted with a political choice, they take the action most likely to maintain or 
increase the values of their homes.   
 Following this logic, the “Homeowner Hypothesis” holds that a community 
with a large number of homeowners or homes with high values will be likely to 
adopt a tax increase out of self-interest if its homeowners believe that the 
proposed tax increase will help them profit when it comes time sell their homes.  
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This is why, for example, Bradbury, Mayer and Case found that home prices 
performed worse in communities that had slower increases in school spending 
and that increases in school spending have a strong positive effect on home 
prices (Bradbury, Mayer, & Case, 2001).  Warren and Tyagi showed that 
professional, two-income families bid up home prices in school districts with 
exceptional schools so that their children could attend them (Warren & Tyagi, 
2004). 
 Having a large percentage of homeowners or high real estate values is far 
from a guarantee that such a school district will view all school tax increases in a 
favorable light.  Fischel’s argument is that homeowners will vote for tax increases 
only to the extent that such an increase can be capitalized into the value of their 
homes. If homeowners believe that a tax increase will not positively affect the 
value of their homes, Fischel’s theory predicts that they will vote against it.  
According to this argument, because they perceive themselves as being primarily 
and adversely affected by additional school taxes, homeowners will vote against 
school tax increases.   
 The evidence on this point is mixed.  Citing several studies from the mid-
1960s, Piele and Hall concluded that “a majority of the studies report findings 
indicating that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
homeownership and voting for or against a school financing election” (emphasis 
original) (Piele & Hall, 1973, p. 101).  Noting that educational spending and 
taxing preferences are correlated, Berkman and Plutzer cited Gallup/Phi Delta 
Kappa polls conducted between 1981 and 1986, General Social Survey polls 
 22 
conducted between 1985 and 2002 and American National Election Studies 
conducted between 1984 and 2000 to argue that, on average, homeowner 
support for increased spending on education was between 5 and 12 percentage 
points lower than the support given to education spending by renters.12  
The Gray Peril Hypothesis 
 
 Closely related to the Homeowner Hypothesis are hypotheses relating to 
the impact of older voters on school tax elections. The argument here is that 
older voters prefer to live in low tax areas and that they are likely to vote against 
additional school taxes (or school spending that seems likely to lead to new 
taxes) because they (i) are more likely than younger voters to be homeowners; 
(ii) live on fixed incomes and so cannot count on receiving additional money from 
other sources with which to pay the additional taxes; (iii) wish to conserve their 
own resources by keeping taxes low; and (iv) do not have children who are 
enrolled in the school system and would prefer that additional taxes be used for 
something from which they will derive greater benefit (See Berkman & Plutzer, 
2005, p. 129).  Scholars who study school tax elections refer to this idea as the 
                                            
12 In the earliest set of polls taken during the first Reagan administration when 
taxes and spending were under serious attack, only 39% of homeowners wanted 
to increase spending on education compared to 48% of renters.  In the General 
Social Survey, 73% of renters wanted to increase spending on education 
compared to only 66% of homeowners; in the ANES survey 74% of renters 
wanted to increase spending on education whereas only 62% of homeowners felt 
the same way.  Thus, even though there is a gap between the preferences of 
renters and owners, at least in the last two sets of polls, substantial majorities of 
homeowners preferred to spend more on education.  If Berkman and Plutzer are 
correct about the correlation of taxing and spending preferences, the survey 
results imply that substantial majorities thought paying more in taxes for schools 
was appropriate.  
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“Gray Peril Hypothesis”: As the percentage of older voters in a community 
increases, the likelihood that the community will adopt a tax increase decreases.  
 After a review of the early studies on the point, Piele and Hall concluded 
that “the unanimity of the research supports the idea that older voters were less 
likely to support school financial issues at the ballot than younger voters. (Piele & 
Hall, 1973, p. 104).  Many subsequent studies are in agreement (see, e.g. 
Rasinski and Rosenbaum, 1987, Brokaw, Gale, & Merz, 1990; Chew, 1992; 
Gradstein & Kaganovich, 2004; MacManus, 1997; Tedin, Matland, & Weiher, 
2001). 
 Despite Piele and Hall’s mid-1970s conclusion about the “unanimity of the 
research,” the recent research on the Gray Peril Hypothesis does not always 
conclude that school districts with large populations of older citizens are less 
likely to adopt tax increases (Berkman & Plutzer, 2005, Chapter 7).   While later 
studies agree that though, sometimes, older Americans do take concerns about 
material benefits into account when they vote on school tax increases, those 
material benefit concerns cut the other way:  Because older voters are 
disproportionately homeowners who anticipate that they will soon need to cash 
out the equity accumulated in their homes, they are willing to invest more tax 
dollars in the school district so as to ensure that they can make a good profit 
when they sell (Poterba, 1998; Berkman and Plutzer 2004).   Ehrenberg and 
Ehrenberg, Smith and Zhang, in a study of data from New York, found that the 
greater the proportion of county residents older than 65, the less likely it was that 
a county’s school budget would be defeated. (Ehrenberg, Ehrenberg, Smith, & 
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Zhang, 2002). In a particularly nuanced study Lambert and colleagues found that 
while seniors who had recently relocated to Cumberland County, Tennessee, in 
order to benefit from its low tax rates, were unwilling to support a hypothetical tax 
increase in support of the local school system, other seniors were more willing to 
support a hypothetical increase in school taxes if they were most concerned with 
home prices (Lambert, Clark, Wilcox, & Park, 2009a). 
The Parenthood Hypothesis 
 
 Other scholars argue that parents tend to be more supportive of school tax 
increases because of the material benefits they expect to receive if the tax 
passes.  Aside from school district personnel, school-aged children and their 
parents are the proximate beneficiaries of revenues raised by increases in school 
taxes.  Primary and secondary education are, after all, among the most basic of 
public services provided by local government.  Few can disagree with the notion 
that everyone requires at least some level of education in order to become a 
productive member of society; there is little controversy about the proposition that 
if all are educated, the community as a whole benefits.  Education enables 
people to develop the skills required by our economy, making them self-sufficient, 
less likely to engage in crime or other antisocial activities and less likely to 
require the alms of others or the support of society at large through the 
government.  Once their children become economically self-sufficient, parents 
can redirect family resources toward the needs and wants of other children or of 
the parents themselves.  While parents could be required, individually, to pay for 
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the educational services given to their children, providing that education through 
a school system that can take advantage of economies of scale is much more 
cost efficient.  The “Parenthood Hypothesis” takes these considerations into 
account and holds that the more households there are with school-aged children 
in a school district, the more likely it is that the school district will adopt a tax 
increase (Chew, 1992; Preston, 1984). 
 The research on this point seems consistent over time.  Summarizing 
studies conducted before 1973, Piele and Hall found a “strong and consistent” 
line of evidence indicating that parents with children who attend public school are 
generally more willing to support tax increases for public schools than people 
who do not currently have children in the public school system (Piele & Hall, 
1973, p. 100).  Berkman and Plutzer found “modest gaps between parents and 
non-parents [in their willingness to vote for school tax increases]  . . . with 
differences ranging between 5 and 11 percentage points” (Berkman & Plutzer, 
2005, pp. 42–43). 
 Despite this general agreement that having children enrolled in the public 
schools makes parents more likely to vote for tax increases, a few studies 
moderate or even contradict this view.  In their review of studies on the impact of 
parenthood on school tax elections, Piele and Hall noted that between 1969 and 
1792, the percentage of parents who told surveys that they would support 
additional taxes for school purposes fell from 51% to 37%, (Piele & Hall, 1973, pp. 
101–102). In a later study of a school tax election in Eugene, Oregon, Hall and 
Piele warned that “parental status is a relatively unimportant factor for 
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differentiating between high- and low-support polling places in school budget 
elections.  Including Gallup survey results and Wilson and Banfield’s most recent 
analysis, there now appears to be substantial evidence seriously questioning the 
longstanding belief that schools can look to parents rather than to the general 
public for greater support in school financial elections” (Hall & Piele, 1976, 455).  
Similarly, Chew found only modest a relationship between parental status and 
voting on school tax issues: the difference between parents and non-parents in 
the likelihood of voting in favor of a tax increase was only two-thirds of the 
difference between conservatives and liberals voting on the same issue (Chew, 
1992)  In their study of a school bond election in two Houston area school 
districts, Tedin et al also reported that having children in the public schools was 
only significant for white voters. (Tedin et al., 2001)     
The Educational Attainment Hypothesis 
 
 One last explanation for results in school tax elections that focuses on 
material benefits is the “Educational Attainment Hypothesis,” which holds that the 
higher the level of educational attainment in a school district, the more likely it is 
that the school district will pass a tax increase.  The research is unequivocal 
across time on this point (see Berkman & Plutzer, 2005, pp. 44–45; Piele & Hall, 
1973, pp. 117–118 and the studies summarized therein).  All things being equal, 
college graduates are at least 10% more likely than people who never completed 
high school to support higher school taxes (Berkman & Plutzer, 2005, p. 51).  
The reason is that by first-hand experience, better educated people often see 
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that they are wealthier and have more prestige than people who have not had as 
much education. If they are also parents, they may find it to be more cost 
effective to purchase excellent education for their children through a public 
system funded by tax payments than to enroll them in a private school that 
requires them to make tuition payments.  
 But good schools are not only a matter of material benefit for well-
educated voters.  Some relatively recent research notes that good school 
systems are important for communities that are trying to attract or retain 
businesses.  Summarizing this research, Weiss pointed out that “the available 
evidence suggests that businesses seek an existing educated workforce—or, 
increasingly, the ability to draw such a workforce to their chosen location. . . . The 
need for businesses to draw from an existing educated work force often 
presumes the need for quality local public schools” (Weiss, 2004, p. 16).  Cohen 
listed “quality labor force with technical skills” and “good schools for employee 
recruitment and their children,” as key factors companies seek when deciding 
where to locate their back office operations (Cohen, 2000, p. 8, Table A).  She 
also listed the existence of  “poor quality urban education systems, which 
generate a low-quality labor force, as the top reason corporate real estate 
executives give for not locating facilities in central cities.  She went on to write: 
Cities whose public officials have focused on their education and training 
systems are attractive to growth sector companies on the move. . . . A 
company cannot expect [highly educated] people to relocate to a place 
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that is undesirable.  Desirability includes a good elementary and 
secondary school system for employees’ children (Weiss, 2004, p. 15). 
Explanations Based on Purposive and Solidary Benefits 
 
 Rasinski and Rosenbaum warn us that material benefits are not 
everything when it comes to understanding school tax elections.  Analyzing data 
from citizens considering an Illinois school tax ballot issue, for example, they 
found that while material benefit factors such as parenthood and concerns about 
property values explained only 5% of the variance in their data, solidary and 
purposive benefit factors such as attitudes about the schools explained about 7% 
of the variation.  Among the people most likely to vote, the gap was even larger:  
In their study, the factors reflecting solidary and purposive benefits explained four 
times as much of the variance in the data set than the other factors did (Rasinski 
& Rosenbaum, 1987). 
The Gray Peril Revisited Hypothesis 
 One factor that influences the outcomes of school tax elections by 
conveying solidary and purposive benefits to voters is community engagement.13  
                                            
13 A “community” is “an image in the mind of an individual, of a group toward 
whose members she feels a sense of similarity, belonging or fellowship” (Wong, 
2010, p. 6).  For Wong, the boundaries of a community are flexible and 
encompass the people for whom we feel an obligation. What is important about 
this definition is that it focuses on relationships among people and not on 
geographic locations.  In the United States, school districts may be coterminous 
with other, larger jurisdictions, contained within larger jurisdictions or imposed on 
multiple other larger jurisdictions. Thus, school districts, in and of themselves, are 
not necessarily “communities” in Wong’s sense.  The more the people in the 
school district see themselves as having shared values and a shared destiny and 
are willing to pay for public goods for each other, the more likely it is that the 
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According to Hall and Piele, “Virtually unanimously, the studies agree that the 
individuals most likely to support school issues are those who have relatively 
strong community ties and who feel that they in some way contribute to and are 
affected by community and educational decision-making” (Hall & Piele, 1976, p. 
451).   
 One of the ways community engagement manifests itself is in the 
presence of older adults in the community. While, as previously discussed, the 
presence of senior citizens in the community is usually regarded as an 
explanation that focuses on material benefits, large percentages of seniors in a 
community can also sometimes indicate community attachment.  Poterba 
(Poterba, 1998, 318), therefore, suggests that altruism might be a better model 
for evaluating the motives of senior citizens who participate in school tax 
elections.  In support of this contention, he cites Logan and Spitze, (Logan & 
Spitze, 1995)  who found that older people responding to a survey on family and 
public policy issues were more inclined to take the position favoring the young 
over the old.  Ehrenberg et al, in a study of New York School districts, found that 
older voters were no more likely to vote against school budgets than younger 
voters and that the chances of budget passage improved as the number of 
                                                                                                                                  
school district will be a true community.  According to Wong, “political attitudes 
about the obligations of government to redistribute resources and decisions 
about political participation are “helping behaviors” that are based not only on 
values and calculations of self-interest, but also on assessments of broader 
interests that are often articulated in terms of “community.”  If the potential 
beneficiary of an opinion voiced, a meeting attended, or an initiative supported is 
part of my community, I am more willing to help” (Wong, 2010, p. 211). 
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residents who were at least 65 years old in a school district increased (Ehrenberg 
et al., 2002).    
 Berkman and Plutzer refined this suggestion even further by reporting 
evidence that the tenure of older people in a community might determine whether 
they support or oppose tax increases: 
As originally explicated by Hirschman (1970), loyalty is a powerful 
motivator of behavior that can conflict with instrumental self-interest.  
Given the wide support that appears in the public for their public schools 
despite their questionable performance . . . as well as the central role that 
a school system plays in the life of a community, we should not expect 
older members of the community simply to “abandon” the schools as they 
age.  Long-standing residents have roots in their community.  They may 
have themselves attended the local schools and, if not, it is likely that their 
children or grandchildren did.  They have likely been linked to the schools 
through sports, cultural activities, or community functions held on school 
grounds (Berkman & Plutzer, 2005, pp. 133–34). 
This “Gray Peril Revisited Hypothesis” holds that as the percentage of senior 
citizens in a school district increases, the more likely it is that a school tax 
increase will be adopted.  
The Racial Diversity Hypothesis 
 
 Another way that community engagement has been conceptualized and 
examined is as the degree of racial or ethnic homogeneity that prevails in a 
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community.14   The “Racial Diversity Hypothesis” holds that as a community 
becomes more racially diverse, it also becomes less likely to support a tax 
increase for the school district.   
 According to Bali, “race becomes important if different racial groups 
receive or perceive different outcomes from a measure” (Bali, 2008, 429).  Thus, 
Alesina et al offer a model that demonstrates that “more ethnic fragmentation 
leads to fewer resources pooled together to provide nonexcludable public goods” 
such as education (Alesina, Baqir, & Easterly, 1999).  Tedin found that whites 
were less supportive of a school equalization measure in two Texas school 
districts when they thought that the measure would mostly benefit blacks, even 
though the measure would benefit their district overall (Tedin, 1994).  Silverman 
found that New York State school districts were less likely to pass tax increases if 
they had large minority populations (Silverman, 2011).  Ehrenberg et al found 
that, with all other things being equal, “districts with 10 percentage points more 
Hispanic American residents appeared to have a five percentage point higher 
percentage of voters voting against” a school budget proposal (Ehrenberg et al., 
2002). 
The Community Affinity Hypothesis 
 
 Community engagement can also be conceptualized in terms of 
                                            
14 It is difficult to say whether racial factors are solidary incentives or purposive 
ones.  On the one hand refusing to raise taxes because of the belief that it will 
fund people who are not members of one’s ethnic group may tap feelings of 
ethnic solidarity while, on the other hand, voting to increase taxes to benefit 
people perceived as outsiders may tap feelings of “noblesse oblige.”  
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participation with or alienation from the community at large. Under the 
“Community Affinity Hypothesis,” the more tightly knit the community, the more 
likely it is to vote in favor of a school tax increase.   A study by Clark, Lambert, 
Park and Wilcox, which I have already cited in my discussion of the Gray Peril 
Revisited Hypothesis, supports this claim.   They found that senior citizens who 
had migrated to Cumberland County, Tennessee and had volunteered with the 
community were more supportive of a hypothetical tax increase for the benefit of 
the schools than were senior citizens who had not volunteered. They concluded 
that “integration into the community” as evidenced by volunteering, “may also be 
important” in determining their level of support for a tax increase (C. Clark, 
Lambert, Park, & Wilcox, 2009, p. 12). 
 On the other hand, Tedin, Matland and Welher write that “a consistent 
theme in the literature is that a principal source of “no” votes are those alienated 
from government,“ and their findings confirmed that the greater the distrust of 
government was, the more likely it was that a bond measure would be defeated 
(Tedin et al., 2001).  Lowery and Sigelman made a similar finding with respect to 
a ballot measure that sought to limit school property tax increases, (Lowery & 
Sigelman, 1981), and Silverman also provided evidence that political alienation, 
particularly with respect to the governance of local school systems, paves the 
way for a school tax election defeat (Silverman, 2011).  According to Tedin et al, 
“one interpretation is that a “no” vote by the alienated reflects a backlash against 
the establishment” (Tedin et al., 2001, p. 275). 
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 The Partisanship Hypothesis  
 
 The second of the two solidary/purposive explanations discussed in the 
literature focuses on partisanship and ideology.  “Partisan attitudes might 
summarize attitudes toward government, taxes and even the schools” (Piele & 
Hall, 1973, pp. 124–125).  Despite Piele and Hall’s insistence that partisan 
attitudes should not be discounted as an explanation for school tax victories or 
defeats, through the early 1970s, there was no evidence that these kinds of 
attitudes played any role in a school tax election.  Being alienated from national 
politics did not appear to influence participation in local politics (Templeton, 1966) 
and voting for increased school funding did not correlate with votes for black 
“liberal” candidates in the 1969 Los Angeles, California mayoral and school 
board elections (Hahn & Almy, 1971).  Boskoff and Zeigler, found no relationship 
between a person’s ideology and the way he or she voted on a local school bond 
issue. (Boskoff & Zeigler, 1964) 
 Since the mid-1970s, though, scholars have begun to report evidence 
supporting the idea that polarized partisanship and ideology have become 
important factors in school tax elections.  The “Partisanship Hypothesis” holds 
that the higher the percentage of conservatives or Republicans in a school 
district, the less likely it is that the district will approve a tax increase.  Thus, 
Chew’s study, which I mentioned in my discussion of the Parenthood Hypothesis, 
found that self-identified political liberals and moderates were more likely to 
support school tax increases than were self-identified conservatives, and that 
“liberal nonparents  . . .[were] more likely to support the [tax] increase 
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than . . .[were] conservative parents (emphasis original) (Chew, 1992, p. 285).  
 Along these lines, in a study that focused on voter reaction to three 
different ballot measures, including one that would make it easier to pass school 
tax increases, Bali found that compared to various demographic predictors, voter 
ideology had a stronger and more consistent impact on all three issues.  He even 
found that whereas many of his variables lost statistical significance when he re-
estimated his model by race, the variables related to partisanship and ideology 
remained statistically significant (Bali, 2008).15  Finally, Berkman and Plutzer 
present evidence that any antipathy senior citizens may have to increased school 
taxes is a cohort effect related to the consistent political conservatism of the 
people counted as senior citizens in the relevant studies (Berkman & Plutzer, 
2005, chapter 7). 
Why So Many Answers? 
 The evidence in support of the theories described above is obviously quite 
mixed.  There are several possible reasons for this.  First, as Chew has 
suggested, research published before about 1980 may be speaking to different 
social and economic conditions than are present now.  In Budgets, Bonds and 
Ballots, for example, Piele and Hall, summarized a vast number of studies done 
over the 1960s and early 1970s when the “Baby Boomers” were flooding into the 
public school system, (see Chew, 1992, p. 282) when the ethos of Lyndon 
                                            
15 To address the possibility that statistical significance depended on the larger 
number of white voters compared to African-American and Hispanic voters, Bali 
used a random subsample of the white respondent group equal in size to the 
number of African-Americans and a random subsample equal in size to the 
number of Hispanic respondents.  In both cases, the variables representing 
partisanship and ideology retained statistical significance while demographic 
factors did not.  
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Johnson’s “Great Society” was developing, and when the economy was 
expanding at a great rate.   
 After the publication of Budgets, Bonds and Ballots, things changed 
dramatically.  The Watergate scandal and the conclusion of the war in Vietnam 
shook the nation’s trust in government (Hetherington, 2006).  At the same time, 
the economy faltered and the nation experienced a period of “malaise” under 
President Jimmy Carter that gave rise to a quarter century of Republican 
dominance, during which the prevailing ethos was that, as Ronald Reagan 
claimed, government was the problem.  Even Bill Clinton, a Democratic president 
during those years, observed that the era of big government was over.  In 
general, during that period, Americans wanted lower taxes and less government 
than they had wanted during the Johnson era.  To some extent, that change in 
mood may be reflected in the studies that came after the 1970s. 
 A second possibility, suggested by Berkman and Plutzer, is that the 
research may be infected with a cohort effect.  In offering the Gray Peril Revisited 
Hypothesis, they argue that: 
Those born in the 1930s and 1940s grew up in a time when formal 
education was less important to economic security and in a day when 
schools claimed only a small amount of tax revenues.  Thus older 
Americans were socialized into a political mindset in which public 
schooling was just one of many important domestic priorities. . . . At any 
given time, older Americans are less likely to support spending on schools, 
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but they did not adopt these views as they aged; rather, they were always 
like this (Berkman & Plutzer, 2005, pp. 132–133). 
Thus, it could be that studies that took place at different times focused on people 
who were socialized differently, and who, therefore, reacted differently to different 
kinds of stimuli. 
 A third possibility is that most of the research relevant to the questions of 
interest consisted of studies based on single school districts, cities or states. As 
Lentz put it: 
Many studies center on referenda conducted throughout an entire state.  
These important studies provide a benchmark statewide explanation of 
school referenda; however, they are not of much use for referenda 
planning, as they do not address local problems.  Also, many works are 
case studies conducted in one school district.  While these studies are 
theoretically interesting, they are difficult to generalize.  Last, researchers 
lack agreement as to types of community or jurisdiction.  Perhaps this 
problem is the most thorny (Lentz, 1999, p. 461). 
Lentz’s point is that much of the work on school tax elections was either steeped 
in local considerations or that it ignored the impact of local context.  In other 
words, though systematically performed, these case studies might turn on 
idiosyncratic factors that might not be significant or important for other school 
districts.  
 This is essentially the same point made by Gimpel and Schuknecht: 
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The contextual approach suggests that the geographic clustering of like-
minded voters does not just indicate the presence of particular social 
groups at those locations, but adds something extra to these communities 
through the instrument of political socialization.   Even after accounting for 
group traits, regional or local effects can frequently be detected because 
people who are proximate to one another influence each other’s attitudes 
and behavior (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004, p. 3). 
Gimpel and Schuknecht’s key concern was to explain political diversity within 
states, and so they focused on geographic clusters of people within state and 
local boundaries.   
 But nothing in the argument limits it to regionalism within states.  Chinni 
and Gimpel take the argument one step farther in Our Patchwork Nation: 
Although scholars have been studying voting behavior for sixty years now, 
they have been slow to investigate how being a Republican in 
Massachusetts may mean something very different from what it means to 
be a Republican in Arizona.  Voters of the same party, but in different 
places are likely to have very different understandings of what they are 
doing when they cast a vote for the same candidate.  Traditional 
approaches to studying voting and candidate choice have ignored these 
nuances for broader, but less helpful, generalizations (Chinni & Gimpel, 
2010, pp. 2–3). 
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They go on to define 12 county types into which they sorted all American 
counties to show how the economy, politics and culture can be interpreted 
differently from the vantage point of each archetypal place.    
  In a 1999 study of the 892 school tax elections held in Illinois between 
1981 and 1989, Lentz attempted to address this problem in the literature.  
Relying on Lows (Lows, 1992) and Lows and Ho (Lows & Ho, 1988), Lentz 
argued that owners of different classes of property are likely to have different 
values and different ideas about the appropriate way to fund local education.  
Farmers, for example, may not be “as favorably disposed to tax property for 
education . . . [as are] homeowners with children in school” (Lows, 1992).  If this 
were so, according to Lentz, traditional analysis that did not take these 
differences into account would be suspect.  Even if two parcels of real estate are 
of equal value, different rates of taxation producing different revenue for schools 
might be applied. “If owners of different classes of property have different values, 
they might also vote differently in school referenda” (Lentz, 1999, p. 462).   
 To address this, Lentz proposed a six-category typology of land use to 
classify all of the districts in her database.16  Having divided her cases by 
typology category, Lentz observed that two property categories had much higher 
                                            
16 Lentz’s categories were based on “the traditional rural, suburban and urban 
classifications” (Lentz, 1999, pp. 462–63), each of which were further subdivided 
based on equalized assessed values of Agricultural, Residential and Business 
property.  The resulting categories were Small Rural, Mixed Rural Residential, 
Older Growing, Residential Suburbs, Small/Midsize Cities, and Large Central 
Cities.  There was only one city in Illinois—Chicago—that could be defined as a 
Large Central City, and so she was forced to exclude it from her study. 
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rates of referenda passage than did the three others she studied.17  Those 
categories had “relatively homogeneous land uses in the tax base” (Lentz, 1999, 
p. 464). This led Lentz to suggest that: 
Land-use diversity, then, may provide an analogy for population diversity.  
Communities that share common economic and social experiences are 
likely to share many values, including attitudes about school taxes.  
Consequently, districts with homogeneous jurisdictions may pass more 
referenda than communities that are economically or socially diverse 
(Lentz, 1999, p. 464). 
For present purposes, Lentz made another crucial observation: 
If the type of jurisdiction in which a school district is located affects 
referenda passage, a statewide theory of referenda prediction may be 
inappropriate.  Instead of one explanation, a series of explanations, one 
for each type of school jurisdiction based on land use, might better explain 
election outcomes. (Lentz, 1999, p. 464) 
 To test her theory that jurisdiction type is a predictor of school tax election 
outcomes, she proposed three hypotheses: (1) Separate equations for each 
typology category should explain more of the variation in the data than a single 
statewide equation; (2) There should be variation in the predictive power among 
and between each of the separate equations; and (3) The values of the predictive 
variables in each of the separate equations should vary depending on the 
jurisdiction type.   A fourth hypothesis is implied by this work:  The correlation 
                                            
17 Because only Chicago met the criteria for Large Central Cities, she excluded it 
from her analysis. 
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matrices for each typology type should be different from all of the others and from 
the correlation matrix for the state as a whole.18  I shall refer to these hypotheses 
as the “Lentz Criteria.” 
 After regressing the percentage of votes in favor of tax increases in each 
election for each district on variables representing four different explanations for 
election outcome, Lentz found, first of all, that in every case the equations for the 
typology categories explained much more of the variation than a single equation 
for the state did.19  Second, she found that her predictors explained between 
42% and 48% of the variation in the data for small rural, mixed rural residential 
and older growing jurisdictions, 26% of the variation in residential suburbs and 
30% of the variation in small cities.  Third, she found that “some predictors are 
more powerful in some jurisdictions than others.”   These results led Lentz to 
conclude that her study “dispels the notion that one theory of school finance 
applies to all districts.  Using a local typology provides more predictive power 
than a statewide analysis and identifies referenda predictors that are more useful 
in some jurisdictional types than in others” (Lentz, 1999, p. 479). 
 Though Lentz was studying school tax elections in a single state—Illinois--
the logic of her conclusions has important implications for anyone studying 
                                            
18Lentz found that “according to the correlation matrices, many of the 
independent variables used in the study appear to be highly correlated.  The 
level of correlation, however varies depending on the community type.  Some 
independent variables may be highly correlated in some community types and 
not in others.”  Lentz tested her equations for multicollinearity using Variance 
Inflation Factor and determined that her results were not affected by 
multicollinearity. (Lentz, 1999a, p. 471 note 24) 
19 R2 for the statewide equation was .185.  R2 for the typology equations ranged 
from 0.254 to 0.48. 
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school tax elections using any kind of database.  Without accounting for 
community type in a way that groups jurisdictions likely to have similar social, 
political and economic interests, Lentz warns us, reliance on a single equation 
that applies to all cases without such a grouping is likely to produce unreliable 
results.  I pick up on these observations in the next chapter where I describe 
what I believe is a better way of understanding school tax elections. 
Conclusion 
 
 The mixed perspective that emerges from the literature has made it 
difficult for scholars to reach any consensus about the factors that distinguish 
communities that should generally be willing to approve tax increases from those 
that should not.  Despite this, the literature does reveal a pattern that can be 
used to formulate some theories as to why some districts vote to accept 
additional burdens for the benefit of their school districts.   
 First, the literature has been clear that school districts succeed at the polls 
when they are able to convince a substantial number of voters that that voting for 
the tax increase is ultimately in their material interest.  As empirical support for 
this proposition, scholars have looked to changes in home values over time and 
compared price increases in districts that chose to fund their local school 
systems generously to home prices in school districts where the voters have not 
been willing to pay more for education (Bradbury et al., 2001).  Scholars also 
point to the actions of districts where there are large numbers of households with 
parents who presumably are voting to improve the future prospects of their 
children (or to avoid the costs of private education) by choosing to grant their 
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school districts the requested tax increases (Chew, 1992; Tedin et al., 2001).   
Scholars also cite studies of places where there are large numbers of elderly 
voters who presumably get no immediate benefit from the school district and 
prefer to pay less in taxes or want public resources devoted to something from 
which they will receive a direct benefit. (Lambert, Clark, Wilcox, & Park, 2009b) 
 Yet, it is also clear that theories that depend on voters who pursue 
material benefits are only part of the story.  School tax elections can sometimes 
also be explained in terms of voters pursuing solidary and/or purposive benefits 
related to community engagement, race, partisanship and political ideology; 
some scholars have insisted that these factors have more to do with whether a 
tax increase will pass than factors relating to material benefits. Though Berkman 
and Plutzer have argued that a national commitment to education underpins 
public school funding decisions, (Berkman & Plutzer, 2005, pp. 46–47) in the 
polarized political world in which we now live, it may well be that political ideology 
is more important than that national commitment. 
  In the next chapter, I will argue that two social dynamics—partisan 
polarization and spatial sorting—have greatly magnified the significance of the 
contextual dynamic described by Lentz. I will also suggest that the contextual 
foundations of school tax election decisions flow from the intersection of material 




Hypothesis, Data and Analytical Approach 
 
 In the preceding chapter, I provided an overview of the Lentz study (Lentz, 1999), 
which I use as a starting point for my study.   While I believe that Lentz was conceptually on 
the right track in arguing that that understanding school tax elections requires “a series of 
explanations, one for each type of school jurisdiction” (Lentz, 1999, p. 464), I do not agree 
that her classification scheme  is necessarily the best method for grouping cases, at least at 
the present time for two basic reasons.  First Lentz relied on data unique to Illinois, data not 
likely to be available for school districts located in other states.  Second, for reasons I 
explain below, I believe that American school districts are better classified, at least for the 
present time, by dimensions of wealth and partisanship. 
 Lentz studied the 892 Illinois school tax elections that occurred between 1981 and 
1989. Her working assumption was that people who owned the same sort of property would 
share the same kinds of values and, perhaps more importantly, the impact of a new tax 
would be the same for most people in the district.  A school district where most of the land 
was classified as agricultural, for example, would have an economy based mostly on 
farming.  Farmers and agricultural workers, she assumed, would share similar economic 
interests and would look at school tax issues the same way.  While she did not assert that 
farmers and agricultural workers would tend to favor or oppose school tax increases, implicit 
in her work was the idea that it would be easier for school tax proponents to make a case 
tailored to a population that largely shared the same economic interests and would feel the 
brunt of the tax the same way than it would be to make a pitch to an electorate with more 
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diverse economic interests.  In fact, she found that school districts dominated by only a few 
land use categories, regardless of whether those categories included agricultural, residential 
or urban land use categories had a better chance of passing tax increases than those 
jurisdictions with a more diverse mix of land uses (Lentz, 1999). 
 Though Lentz published her study in 1999, her data was between 10 and 18 years 
old.   Using land use as a proxy for community values might have been a sensible way to 
categorize districts when Lentz was doing her research and writing, but it assumes that the 
key dimension of conflict would be economic.  Thus, she quotes Lows (Lows, 1992) 
approvingly: 
Obviously, owners of various classes of property may not share the same 
perceptions about funding for education.  For example, an owner of agricultural 
property whose livelihood is dependent on holdings of land may not be as favorably 
disposed to tax property for education as is a homeowners (sic) with children in 
school.  In many situations, farmers are often blamed for the defeat of referenda . . .  
(Lentz, 1999, p. 462) 
Similarly, she quotes Lows and Ho (Lows & Ho, 1988): 
As there are different classes of properties, there are different values attaching to 
owners of those properties.  Owners of one class of property may have different 
values than owners of another class of property.  Therefore, equal valuations in two 
classes of property may not necessarily result in equal revenues for public education 
because of different values of owners of those properties (emphasis added by author) 
(Lentz, 1999, p. 462). 
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 The key point of Lentz’s analysis, for present purposes, is that if we do not account 
for the fact that people with similar values and interests may have segregated themselves 
from others with other values and interests, we cannot get an accurate picture of what 
moves communities to behave as they do.  The effects of some factors may cancel out the 
effects of others, improperly encouraging school tax proponents from pursuing strategies 
that may not work in their jurisdictions.  Lentz, thus equips us to build powerful analysis tools, 
provided that we find a good a good method for classifying school districts, and this is likely 
to be especially true when the sorting criteria pick up the key demographic forces that inform 
a school district’s character. 
 As a practical matter, it would be difficult or impossible to apply Lentz’s classification 
system to a larger set of cases from states outside of Illinois such as the one I use here.  
Lentz was primarily concerned with demonstrating that grouping school districts by coherent 
categories was a better way to begin to understand the factors that influenced school tax 
elections, and she seemed less concerned about justifying the particular categories she 
proposed to do the grouping.  According to Lentz “the typology evolved through 
observations that districts with high proportions of agricultural or residential land passed 
more referenda than districts with a diversified property tax base.  The algorithm developed 
the cut off levels to group similar jurisdictions together” (Lentz, 1999, pp. 463–4).  But Lentz 
was working exclusively with Illinois school districts at a particular point in time, and she 
appears to have developed her categories with her particular dataset in mind.   
 This is problematic when attempting to apply the system to cases that come from 
states other than Illinois and from time periods other than the one she studied because it is 
not clear that the category “cutoffs” she developed would make any sense today.  For 
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example, Lentz created a “Residential Suburbs” category that included all Illinois school 
districts that had more than 73% of its land classified by the Illinois Department of Revenue 
as Residential Equalized Assessed Value and less than 10% Agricultural Assessed Value.  
Leaving aside, for the moment, the fact that the categories depend on determinations made 
by the Illinois Department of Revenue, Lentz did not argue that her categories were based 
on theoretical considerations, and there is, therefore, no reason to think that cutoffs like 
these are still meaningful. 
 There is also no reason to think that her system of categorization would work across 
states.  Lentz’s system worked, for her purposes, because she was studying only Illinois 
school districts, and so all the land Lentz considered could be assumed to have been 
classified by Illinois Department of Revenue using a consistent methodology.   Classifying 
real estate for the purposes of taxation, though, depends on political considerations dictated 
by state and local legislative bodies, taking into account local conditions, sensibilities and 
political consideration.  For a study like this one, reconciling the decisions of the Illinois 
Department of Revenue with those of other states so that all school districts could be 
properly and consistently classified is likely to be a difficult and time consuming task fraught 
with potential error.   If one seeks, as I do, to assist local school tax authorities in 
understanding the factors that will shape their tax elections, a simpler classification method 
is required. 
 As a theoretical matter, Lentz’s classification system is inappropriate for another 
reason:  The United States is demographically quite different from the way it was in during 
the time period Lentz studied.  By focusing on the economic dimension of conflict, Lentz 
missed two long-term demographic trends that are both arguably more nuanced and more 
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salient.  First, though perhaps not as clearly observable in 1999 as it is today, Lentz’s study 
failed to address a long-term trend that began to accelerate in the 1990s.  As Bishop put it:  
The migration of people and money throughout the United States in the 1990’s 
created a stark pattern.  Some cities were sucking up people and income.  Others 
were flinging them out with what appeared to be centrifugal force.  . . . People didn’t 
scatter like ants from a kicked-over hill.  There was an order and a flow to the 
movement—more like a flow of birds (Bishop, 2009, pp. 129–30). 
The driving force behind this migration was economic.  Some locations such as Portland, 
Oregon were better able than others to attract the kinds of people that the burgeoning 
technology and intellectual property oriented businesses wanted to hire (Bishop, 2009; 
Florida, 2012; Moretti, 2013).  Those businesses tended to need highly educated workers, 
and they were willing to pay those workers handsomely, compared, at least, to workers in 
places not so fortunate.  This created a “virtuous circle” that tended to increase the 
communal wealth of these places:  high tech and intellectual property oriented businesses 
would attract a corps or highly educated, versatile workers who would attract more such 
business that would, in turn, attract more workers. (Moretti, 2013)  
 This “virtuous circle” had a transformative impact on the demographics of the United 
States.  According to Bishop: 
 . . . by 1980 a decidedly un-American trend began.  Places stopped becoming more 
alike and began to diverge.  The economic landscape stopped growing flatter and, in 
Richard Florida’s description, it got spikier. . .The cities that grew the fastest and the 
richest were the ones where people with college degrees congregated . . . As people 
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with different levels of education sorted themselves into particular cities, the migration 
pattern set off segregation by income (Bishop, 2009, p. 131). 
 As people flood into particular places and flood out of others, the respective housing 
markets will react.  Home prices in places with hot job markets able to attract large groups of 
new workers should go up, particularly if wages are also going up.  On the other hand, 
prices in housing markets that are having trouble attracting new residents should remain 
relatively low as demand for land and existing housing declines.  This phenomenon, is the 
force that has made home buying in places like New York City, San Francisco, Washington 
D.C., Portland, Oregon and their close-in suburbs challenging over the last two decades, 
and it may have been one of the prime causes of the housing bubble that triggered the 
Great Recession (See, Adelino, Schoar, & Severino, 2015; Warren & Tyagi, 2004). 
 Because of the highly symbiotic relationship between an area’s population growth 
and its economic growth, Lentz’s land use classification system may not work as she 
expected with current school districts.  As Moretti observed: 
The economy of a successful city is based on a remarkable equilibrium between 
labor supply and demand: innovative companies (the labor demand) want to be there 
because they know they will find workers with the skills they need, and skilled 
workers (the labor supply) want to be there because they know they will find the jobs 
they are looking for.  The economy of a struggling city is the opposite.  Even if real 
estate is dirt cheap, skilled workers do not want to be there, because they know there 
are no jobs; innovative companies do not want to be there either, because they know 
there are no skilled workers.  It would be in the interest of one group to move if the 
other did, but neither wants to go first (Moretti, 2013, p. 188).    
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 Moreover, if Bishop is correct in his observation that the highly educated people who 
are moving to brain hubs prefer urban and semi-urban areas that de-emphasize the use of 
personal automobiles to reach work places, recreation areas, shopping areas and 
entertainment areas, different dynamics than the ones that Lentz assumed were important 
would be influential in their school tax elections.  Contrary to Lentz, the presence of a mix of 
land uses may therefore mark a community comprised of highly educated, relatively wealthy 
people who, because of their own life experiences, place a higher value on public education, 
just as the Educational Attainment Hypothesis expects.  Homogenous land uses may be a 
sign of a faltering economy, and that may trump the importance of shared values as people 
begin to focus on the affordability of a tax increase in the context of the local economy. 
 A second trend that Lentz’s work misses is that Americans have polarized politically 
(Abramowitz, 2012; Abramowitz & Saunders, 1998, 2008; Bishop, 2009; Sussell, 2014), and 
this political polarization has manifested itself geographically.  The mechanism for this, 
according to Bishop’s argument in The Big Sort is simply human nature.  As Americans seek 
and obtain employment in different locations, they move to the communities near their new 
employers where they feel most politically and socially comfortable.   
 The extent of this political and geographic polarization, in Bishop’s view, has been 
significant.  As of 1976—only 5 years before the first tax election in Lentz’s database—less 
than a quarter of the electorate lived in a county where the outcome of the presidential 
contest was decided by less than 20 percentage points (Bishop, 2009, p. 6).  By some 
accounts, as of 2012, more than half of all voters live in counties where the presidential 
contest was uncompetitive (Edsall, 2013); in 2012, presidential candidates won less than 
half as many counties by 10% of the vote or less than they did in 1996, and there is no 
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reason to think that the trend may have halted, slowed or reversed.  In support of this idea, 
Abramowitz shows that “there were fewer closely contested states and more landslide 
states in 2008 than in any other nationally competitive presidential election in the past half 
century” (Abramowitz, 2012).  
 This is extremely important for present purposes.  We can view county-wide 
presidential voting results as a way of classifying jurisdiction as either Democratic or 
Republican leaning.  That a place tends to favor one party’s presidential nominee over that 
of the other party may, in some places, be an indication of how that jurisdiction views other 
public policy issues.  While classic studies by scholars like Converse and Apter (P. 
Converse & Apter, 1964) and Campbell et al (Campbell, Converse, Warren E. Miller, & 
Stokes, 1960) found little evidence of constrained ideological thinking during the 1950s and 
1960s on the part of the mass public, more recent work notes that party identification and 
voting are now more tightly linked with attitudes on other issues. Says Alan Abramowitz:  
To a much greater extent than in the past, disagreements on different types of issues 
tend to coincide with and reinforce one another—disagreements on economic issues 
increasingly coincide with disagreements on cultural issues, and disagreements on 
both economic issues and cultural issues increasingly coincide with disagreements 
on national security issues.  And all of these policy disagreements increasingly 
coincide with party identification (Abramowitz, 2012, p. 13).  
Using ANES data to confirm this point, Abramowitz shows that between 1984 and 2008, the 
average correlation between responses on 5 survey questions asked in each survey 
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increased by 16 percentage points (Abramowitz, 2012, p. 13).20   What this suggests is that, 
at least in some jurisdictions, there is a strong chance that partisan attitudes will be reflected 
in school tax election outcomes even though school tax elections are almost never the 
subject of overt interparty political conflict.   
 While I cannot replicate Lentz’s complete land use classification scheme, I can at 
least show that today, failing to take a community’s political orientation and levels of 
affluence into account distorts our understanding of school tax elections there.  In Table 3-1, 
I show the percentage of communities that adopted tax increases in 2011 by Census locale 
codes similar to the ones Lentz used.  In the first column, I present the raw percentage of  
 
Table 3- 1  Locale Types for Republican and Democratic Districts 








Rural 33.72 31.34 42.11 37.50 28.95 
Suburban 44.25 32.00 53.97 38.78 48.44 
Town 60.00 53.85 100.00 55.23 66.67 
Urban 50.00 33.33 58.33 50.00 50.00 
   
communities in each code that adopted a higher tax.  In the second column, I show the 
percentage of Republican communities21 that adopted tax increases and in the third column, 
I report the percentage of Democratic communities that adopted tax increases.  In the last 
two columns, I report results by locality type and level of affluence. 
 Sorting the school districts by locale type and political orientation make a dramatic 
difference; so does sorting them by locality type and level of affluence.  Sixty percent of all 
                                            
20 “The five questions that have been included in ANES surveys since 1984 ask about 
ideological identification, government aid to blacks, government versus individual 
responsibility for jobs and living standards, government versus individual responsibility for 
health insurance, and the tradeoff between government services and taxes (Abramowitz, 
2012, p. 51).   
21 I describe my method of classifying school districts later in this chapter. 
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districts classified as “Towns” and 50% of all of the districts classified as “Urban” adopted 
tax increases, while less than 50% of all “Rural” and “Suburban” districts similarly did so.  
Looking at the percentages of Republican Districts and Democratic Districts that adopted tax 
increases, though, discloses that Republican Districts were less willing by far to adopt tax 
increases than were Democratic Districts.  A majority of Democratic districts in three of the 
four locales were willing to adopt tax increases while a majority of Republican districts were 
willing to adopt tax increases in only one of the four locale type.  And the smallest difference 
in passage rates between Democratic and Republican locales was more than 10 percentage 
points.  When we consider the districts sorted by locale code and affluence, the results are 
similar, though perhaps less dramatic. 
 These considerations have led me to the conclusion that we can do a better job in 
explaining school tax elections than Lentz did if we use a more parsimonious system of 
classification based on data readily available for all school districts.   More specifically, I 
shall argue that because Americans have self-segregated themselves on the basis of wealth 
and partisanship22 during and after the time period Lentz studied, we can better understand 
the general forces that decide school tax elections if we first group school districts by these 
two dimensions. 23 Because the various hypotheses I discussed in Chapter 2 are influenced 
                                            
22 I do not mean to suggest that migration is the only reason Americans may find themselves 
living in homogeneous school districts.  From 1939 until about 1970, the U.S. reduced the 
number of school districts from over 100,000 to about 14,000 (See Berkman & Plutzer, 2005, 
p. 20 Figure 2.1).  For the most part, these consolidations took place so as to take 
advantage of the economies of scale that came from having a larger school district.  Since 
1970, though, school district boundaries have been relatively stable, and so it is more 
reasonable to think that in most modern cases, people have chosen to live in particular 
school districts and have not found themselves “gerrymandered” into undesired school 
districts by legislative fiat. 
23 Of course there are other ways to group districts.  Marketing companies, for example, 
have been able to slice the American population into finer and finer classifications so as to 
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by wealth and partisanship, I will show that those hypotheses have different explanatory 
power depending on where a school district falls on dimensions of wealth and partisanship.   
 
Preliminary Hypothesis, Data and Method 
 
Data and Methods 
 
 Assessment of my theory requires the creation of an original database of school tax 
election data.  According to Berkman and Plutuzer, there are over 14,000 school districts in 
the United States (Berkman & Plutzer, 2005, p. 1).  Of those, Berkman and Plutzer counted 
over 6,000 school districts that are required to submit all proposed tax increases or tax 
increases in excess of a specified amount to the voters for approval (See Berkman & Plutzer, 
2005, p. 70 Table 4.2).  Without an existing database, identifying and surveying all of these 
districts to see if they placed a tax increase on the ballot for any given year would be an 
extraordinarily expensive, impractical and time consuming exercise.   
 While there is no such comprehensive database that provides this information, I was 
able to create a database by using information provided by Ballotpedia.org.  Ballotpedia.org 
is a non-profit, non-partisan “online encyclopedia about American politics and elections,” 
whose goal is to “connect people to politics by providing accurate and objective information 
                                                                                                                                                   
make specific appeals that will motivate specific audiences to purchase their products.  I 
encountered several problems with using a highly nuanced scheme as a framework for my 
research, the most serious of which was that only a few school districts fit in any one 
category, making statistical analysis impossible.  I propose here a parsimonious framework 
consisting of only a few subgroups, making statistical analysis possible and making it easy 
for future investigators and school districts to follow up on my research.  A second problem 
with many of these classification systems is that they are proprietary and require the 
payment of a substantial fee for their use.  
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about politics at the local, state and federal level.”24  Ballotpedia’s database relies on 
election data published on official state websites.  For 2011, it includes data for school tax 
elections in the states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, 
Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin.  In all, there were 232 elections in these states that 
met the criteria described below for inclusion in my database. 
 These 10 states are not necessarily a fair cross-section of the American states.  
Notably missing from this group of states are any cases from the South, New England or the 
Mid-Atlantic region.  In part this stems from the fact that in many school districts from these 
areas, results are not reported on publicly available databases, school tax decisions are 
made by elected officials who are accountable to voters for their decisions, or, in the case of 
some New England school districts, school tax decisions are made at annual town meetings 
where a large number of municipal governmental issues receive discussion.  Accordingly, 
the results I report in Chapters 4 through 7 may not be easily generalizable to the United 
States as a whole because they cannot take distinctive regional influences into account 
(See Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004).  On the other hand, the database has a robust 
distribution of cases from places with different degrees of urbanicity, population sizes and 
densities, levels of affluence, political orientation, ethnicities, age distributions and levels of 
poverty.   
 I use cases from 2011 because that was the year in which state governments had 
begun to cut or reduce state subsidies to local school districts, forcing many school districts 
either to make deep cuts in programming or to ask the voters, many of whom were cash 
strapped themselves due to the Great Recession, for more money.  Because my research 
                                            
24 http://ballotpedia.org/Ballotpedia:About 
 55
questions address adding additional burdens, the database excludes cases where the only 
question before voters was to continue existing taxes at current rates.25  If a jurisdiction held 
more than one ballot on increasing school taxes during 2011, I have included only the first 
election because the first election is likely to be a predictor of future voting behavior (see e.g. 
Lentz, 1999, p. 474).  Finally, the database includes an oversample of Ohio cases because 
state law there makes school finance elections more frequent than in the other states.26 
 Partisan voting statistics are generally not recorded by school district, and, without 
exit poll data, it is impossible to know or predict whether a voter who participated in a school 
tax election subscribed to any particular political ideology.  In states like Ohio where there 
are “open primaries,” a large number of voters register as independents so as to be able to 
choose whether to participate in an election as a Democrat or Republican, and in such 
cases, merely looking at party registration statistics, if available, is an unreliable way to 
decide whether a district leans Democratic or Republican.  For these reasons I use a three-
pronged strategy to classify districts.   
 Berkman and Plutzer note that there is a high degree of homogeneity in most school 
districts (Berkman & Plutzer, 2005, p. 149).  In accordance with Bishop (Bishop, 2009), this 
homogeneity shouId extend to political orientation, and so communities that have a 
                                            
25 The psychological theory of loss aversion holds that , people typically dislike losses more 
than they like equivalent gains.(see, e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Sunstein, n.d.).   Thus, 
an election where people are asked to pay even a small amount of additional money is 
psychologically very different from an election in which people are asked whether they wish 
to continue an existing burden or receive a reduction in that burden.   
26 The partisan mix of Ohio cases is about equivalent to the partisan mix of the database 
excluding Ohio but it has twice as many cases in which the districts are below median in 
housing values.  I am not concerned about this because my argument is that in accordance 
with Lentz, local effects, not state level effects control the outcome of school tax issues.  For 
that reason, I am comfortable treating my cases as having been selected at random.  To 
account for any state level effects, standard errors for each equation have been clustered. 
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particular partisan “lean” should tend to elect people who have campaigned for office under 
the banner of the political party that most closely matches this “lean.”  Though many 
localities conduct partisan elections for town or even school district offices, not all do.  On 
the other hand, every state has a legislature where representatives are elected on a partisan 
basis.   Relying on Schaffner and Strebb, who found that in low information downballot 
contests such as races for the state legislature, voters depend on cues like partisanship “not 
only to participate but also to participate intelligently in our political system,” (Schaffner & 
Streb, 2002, p. 589), I looked to the party identification of the person or persons 
representing the zip code of the school district in the lower house of the state legislature. 27  
In most cases, these zip codes were represented either by a single legislator or a group of 
legislators from the same party.  Where a delegation was either closely divided or equally 
divided, I attempted to reconstruct the presidential vote that took place in the school district 
in 2012 using the precinct- by-precinct vote of the same precincts that voted on the school 
tax question in 2011; if the precincts in 2011 were different from the precincts in 2012, I 
used the precinct-by-precinct presidential vote in 2008.  In cases where presidential election 
data were unavailable on a precinct-by-precinct basis or where I could not match school 
district precincts or polling places to presidential election precincts, I used the two-party vote 
in the county or counties in which the school district in question was located, weighted by 
the percentage of the vote each county contributed to the school tax election result.  
 As a measure of wealth, I used the school district’s median home value as reported in 
the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey 2006-2010 Summary File (the “ACS”) 
                                            
27 To identify the people who represent each zip code, I used the Project Vote Smart web 
site (http//:www.votesmart.org) that allows people to find out who represents them at each 
level of government simply by entering a zip code.  
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adjusted by the Comparable Wage Index (“CWI”) developed by researchers to facilitate 
comparisons of financial and economic data across geographic localities.28 
 In running the general-purpose logistic regression model, the dependent variable is a 
binary variable for election result with passage labeled “1” and defeat labeled “0”.  I 
clustered standard errors by state so as to take any statewide random effects into account.  
To calculate the change in probabilities in moving from a particular low value for the variable 
in question to a particular high value for the variable I held all other variables constant at 
their observed values instead of at their mean values (Hanmer & Kalkan, 2013).  My tables 
report both the change in probabilities from the lowest value of a variable to its highest value 
and, to exclude potential outliers, they also report the change in probabilities from one 
standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean. 
Proof of Concept 
 
 Table 3-2 confirms that both Home Value and Partisan Orientation are significant and 
substantial predictors of school tax elections.  Moving from the home value that is one 
standard deviation below the dataset mean to the home value that is one standard deviation 
above the dataset mean improves the probability that a district will adopt a tax increase by 
almost 20%.29  The change of a district’s status from Republican oriented to Democratically 
oriented improves the likelihood that a district will adopt a tax increase by almost 14%. 
                                            
28 The procedure I followed for adjusting median home values is described in some detail in 
Documentation for the NCES Comparable Wage Index Data Files, 2005.(Taylor, Glander, & 
Fowler, 2007) 
29 Using the entire range of the variable, moving from the lowest home value in the dataset 
to the highest increases the probability of adopting a tax increase by almost 51%. 
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from 1 Std. 
Dev. Below 





Home Value 0.025 
(0.012) 





0.1392 N/A 0.005 
Constant -1.233 
(0.415) 
  0.006 
N 232    
Pseudo R2 0.0536    
R2 0.0717    
  
 As a more robust, test of my claim, I next provide a model that includes variables for 
home value and partisanship together with the variables I will use in later chapters to create 
a general-purpose logistic regression model for testing my theories about what matters in 
the school tax elections in each group of districts.  Based on ACS data, those variables are:  
a. To test the Homeowner Hypothesis (school tax increases are sensitive to the 
percentage of homeowners in the community and the effect a school tax will 
have on home equity), I provide a variable that is a measure of the percentage 
of homeowners in a school district (“Homeowners”). 
b. To test the Racial Diversity Hypothesis (the more racially homogenous the 
district, the more likely it is to pas a tax increase), I provide a variable that is a 
measure of the percentage of whites living in a school district (“Whites”). 30 
                                            
30 The overwhelming majority of school districts in the database have majority white 
populations.  In only 9 of the districts was the percentage of whites in the population below 
50%.  Six of these majority-minority districts are in the Googleplex group where high levels 
of racial diversity is normal, and as I will show, not predictive of whether the community will 
adopt a tax increase.  Four of these districts adopted tax increases.  One of the districts with 
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c. To test the Gray Peril Hypothesis (large percentages of seniors reduce the 
likelihood of a tax increase as they seek to avoid costs that benefit others) and 
Gray Peril Revisited Hypothesis (large percentages of seniors who seek to 
give back to the community or protect their home investments improve the 
chances of adopting a tax increase), I provide a variable that is a measure of 
the percentage of households in the school district that include a person who 
is at least 60 years of age (“Seniors”).  If the model produces significant 
positive coefficients for the Seniors variable, we may conclude that the Gray 
Peril Revisited Hypothesis provides at least part of the explanation for tax 
increases in the quadrant.  If the model produces significant negative 
coefficients for the Seniors variable, we may conclude that the Gray Peril 
Hypothesis provides at least part of the explanation for tax increases in the 
quadrant. 
d. To test the Parenthood Hypothesis (the greater the percentage of the 
population with school age children, the greater the likelihood of a tax 
increase), I provide a variable that measures the percentage of households 
that have at least one child who is between five and 18 years of age 
(“Children”).  With the relatively small group of cases in each group of districts, 
this hypothesis cannot be tested in the same model as the Seniors model 
without creating statistical problems.  For each group of districts, therefore, I 
provide an alternative model in the appendix to each chapter showing the 
                                                                                                                                                   
white populations below 50% was the only district in the Smallville group that had a majority- 
minority population (it adopted the tax increase) and the remaining two districts were in the 
Clintonland group (both rejected the tax increase) where, as I will show, economic 
considerations are more important. 
 60
results for each group of districts using the Children variable instead of the 
Seniors variable 
e. To test the Community Affinity Hypothesis, I use the log of the total population 
size (“Total Population (log)”).  In accordance with Dahl and Tufte (Dahl & 
Tufte, 1973) and Oliver (Oliver, 2001) school district administrators in smaller 
school districts are likely to be more attuned to the economic sensibilities of 
the relatively fewer people living in the school district than are officials in larger 
ones.  Larger communities tend to be more culturally and economically 
heterogeneous than smaller ones (Kaniovski & Mueller, 2006)  and 
heterogeneity tends to reduces civic engagement (Costa & Kahn, 2003). From 
a practical perspective, it should be easier for school district advocates in 
smaller districts to mobilize voters than it is for school district advocates in 
larger jurisdictions (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004, p. 370). 
f. To test the Educational Attainment Hypothesis (the greater the level of 
educational attainment in a school district, the more likely it is to adopt a tax 
increase), I compute a score for each community based on the percentages of 
its population 25 year old and older who have (i) not graduated from high 
school; (ii) graduated from high school but not received any additional 
education;  (iii) taken some college courses but have not received a college 
degree; (iv) earned a college degree.31 (“Educational Attainment”).  
                                            
31 The ACS does not have a variable that provides the level of adult education in the school 
district, but it does provide the numerical count of people who have attained the following 
levels of education: (i) did not graduate from high school; (ii) high school graduate without 
any college education; (iii) high school graduates with some college experience but not 
college degree; and (iv) college graduate.  From these raw counts, I computed percentages 
 61
  As Table 3-3 shows, my theory that wealth and partisan orientation are highly 
important in understanding school tax elections survives even when the two variables of  







from 1 Std. 
Dev. Below 





Home Value 0.028 
(0.012) 





0.1528  N/A 0.009 
Homeowners -2.098 
(1.29) 
0.2552 -0.1025 0.052 
Whites -0.506 
(0.525) 
0.084 -0.0317 0.168 
Seniors 0.861 
(2.53) 
0.069 0.074 0.367 
Children32 -2.864 
(1.767) 
-0.248 -0.08 0.053 
Population Size -0.372 
(0.138) 
0.493 0.1934 0.004 
Constant 4.047 
(1.702) 
  0.008 
N 232    
Pseudo R2 0.0834    
R2 0.1089    
 
interest are placed in a model that controls for most of the key hypotheses discussed in 
Chapter 2.33 
                                                                                                                                                   
for each group and then regressed election outcome on them.  The variable in the model is 
the predicted probability of a vote in favor of a tax increase as computed by STATA. 
32 From alternative specification.  See Appendix Table 3B-1 
33 The model specified in Table 3-3 does not include a variable for educational attainment 
because for this dataset, the correlation between educational attainment and home value 
was over 73%, and it would cause multicollinearity problems wit the model. 
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 Tables 3-2 and 3-3 provide the evidence required to support my claim that it is 
analytically reasonable and useful to divide all of the cases in the dataset into groups 
defined by wealth and partisan orientation.  Finally, Table 3-4 provides evidence that moving  







from 1 Std. 
Dev. Below 













-0.148 0.059 0.167 
Whites 0.078 
(0.646) 
0.012 -0.004 0.452 
Seniors -0.574 
(2.860) 
-0.043 0.047 0.421 
Children -1.127 
(1.1822) 
-0.095 0.057 0.268 
Population Size -0.651 
(0.202) 
-0.702 0.299 0.0005 
Googleplex -0.927 
(0.462) 
-0.165 N/A 0.023 
Smallville -0.716 
(0.206) 





-0.330 N/A 0.000 
Constant 4.473 
(2.512) 
  0.038 
N 232    
Pseudo R2 0.1299    
 
from one group of districts to another group of districts significantly and substantially affects 
the probability of passing school tax increases taking all other factors into account.34   
                                            
34 In Table 3-4, the comparison group is the Clintonland group of districts, and so the results 
displayed must be understood as the difference in the probability of passing a tax increase 
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 Table 3-5 summarizes the results of grouping the districts by wealth and political 
orientation.   According to the Table 3-5, without controlling for any of the factors  
 
Table 3- 5 Summary of School Districts by Quadrant 
 Partisan Orientation 
 Democratic Republican 
 







Voting Yes 31 
(57.41%) 









Voting Yes 19 (30.65%) 
Voting No 39 (69.35%) 
 







Voting Yes 20 
(47.62%) 









Voting Yes 27 (36.49%) 
Voting No 47 (63.51%) 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
between the Clintonland group and each group displayed in the table, controlling for all other 
factors.  Separate tests of each group against each other group continue to show significant 
differences in all cases except that there is no difference in the overall probability of passage 
in moving from the Googleplex group to the Smallville group once all other factors are taken 
into account. 
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hypothesized to influence the outcome of school tax elections in Chapter 2, the chances of 
passing a tax increase were  much better in the affluent, Democratically leaning Googleplex 
districts than anywhere else. 35 
 The Googleplex group was the only one of the four groups of districts in which a 
majority of the districts adopted tax increases, and it passed them at a substantially higher 
rate than did their less affluent co-partisans in the Clintonland districts. Downscale 
Republican Smallville districts passed tax increases at a lower rate than either of the 
Democratically oriented districts, but at a higher rate than did their more affluent co-
partisans in the Goldwater Country districts.  Table 3-5 confirms that school authorities in 
different types of districts are likely to face different challenges in getting their tax measures 
passed.  Advice appropriate for school tax authorities in one quadrant is therefore probably 
not appropriate in any other. 
Between Group Differences 
 
 Before turning to within group differences between Adopter districts and Rejecter 
districts in Chapters 4 through 7, I highlight the similarities and differences between the 
districts that fall within the various dimensions of the typology depicted in Table 3-5 and the 
ways each cell of the typology compares to the other cells in the typology.  This will facilitate 
comparisons of group characteristics both with the dataset as a whole and with the partisan 
and economic groups of which each cell in the typology is a part.  Republican oriented 
school districts are quite different from their Democratic counterparts and districts with 
above median home values are quite different from districts with home values below the 
                                            
35 I have listed all of the school districts by these groupings in Tables 3A-1 through 3A-8, 
which appear as an appendix to this chapter.   
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median.  It is therefore not surprising that in trying to learn how school districts decide to 
adopt or reject proposed tax increases, we need to look at different kinds of districts with 
different expectations.  
Republican Districts vs. Democratic Districts 
 
 Table 3-6 reports the results of significance tests of differences between the means  
Table 3- 6 Comparison of Democratic and Republican Means for Selected Demographic Characteristics 
Characteristic Republican Mean Democrat Mean Difference 
Home Value $200,630 $294,067 -$93,437*** 
Income $61,249 $61,414 $165 
Education 0.4056 0.4830 -.0774*** 
Home Owners 0.7802 0.7104 0.0697*** 
Whites 0.9258 0.8014 0.1243*** 
Seniors 0.3384 0.3399 0.0014 
Children 0.3381 0.3266 0.0114* 
Poverty 0.1042 0.1030 0.0012 
Total Population 22768 51058 -28290*** 
Pop. Density 472 2019 -1547*** 
District Ranking 0.609 0.562 0.046*** 
Private School 0.1498 0.1763 -0.0265** 
College Grads 0.2361 0.3209 -0.0847*** 
Vacant Housing 0.1192 0.911 0.208** 
Owner Tenure 12.96 13.61 -0.6413* 
Median Age 39.81 39.71 0.1 
Per Pupil Spend $10.436 $10.668 -$0.2317 
Minority 
Enrollment 
0.1306 0.2936 0.163*** 
Total Enrollment 3668 6499 2831*** 
Tax Approval Rate 0.3382 0.5312 -0.193*** 
N 136 96  
  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.005 (one-tailed) 
 
for a number of demographic factors in Republican and Democratic districts.  Whereas 
Republican districts approved only 33.82% of the school tax increases proposed in 2011, 
Democratic districts approved 53.12% of the school tax increases proposed in 2011, a 19.3 
 66
percentage point difference.  All else being equal, a district’s political orientation made a 
huge difference in the likelihood that it would approve a tax increase in 2011. 
 What Table 3-6 suggests is that this difference in the passage rate may stem from 
ways that Republican school districts differ from Democratic school districts.  First of all, the 
home values in the database’s Republican school districts are over $93,000 lower, on 
average, than they are in the Democratic school districts. This probably stems, in part, from 
the relatively higher mean level of overall educational attainment and the higher mean 
percentage of adults holding college degrees in the Democratic districts.  Taking home 
value as an indicator of wealth, it is not surprising that parents in the Democratic districts are 
somewhat better able to send their children to private school than parents in the Republican 
districts.  Home ownership is somewhat more prevalent in the Republican districts, and so 
this is consistent with an inverse relationship between home ownership and a willingness to 
pay additional school taxes that has been cited by previous scholarship. 
 One of the key demographic differences between the two district types is the 
relationship between home value, total population size, population density and housing unit 
density.  In Figure 3-1, I plot the linear predictions of the relationship between mean median 
home value and total population size for both kinds of districts.  In general, higher home  
values are linked to places with higher population sizes for both Democratic and Republican 
communities,36 but on average, Republican districts have significantly fewer 
                                            
36 This could account for the fact that the school districts in the Democratic districts have 
higher total enrollments than those in the Republican districts. 
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people than do their Democratic counterparts.  Despite this, as Figure 3-2 discloses, 
Republicans apparently tend to value places with lower population densities and open space 
more than do Democrats, and so as their home values go up they seek to locate those 
homes in places where neighbors are relatively scarce.  Democrats appear to want to live in 
more densely developed areas as their home values increase.  While it cannot be 
determined from my current data, it seems intuitive that these preferences could play an 
important role in explaining why it seems easier to pass school tax questions in Democratic  
Figure 3- 1  Place Size Preferences by Political Orientation and Adjusted Median Home Value 
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Figure 3- 2 Population Density Preferences by Political Orientation and Adjusted Median Home Value 
 
 
districts than in Republican districts: It simply requires less time and effort for school tax 
proponents to get their messages disseminated and to get people to the polls when people 
are packed more closely together than when they are spread out (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 
2004, pp. 369–70). 
 Another key distinction between Democratic districts and Republican districts is racial 
diversity.  On average, all of the districts of both political orientations are overwhelmingly 
white, but Republican districts have significantly more whites than Democratic districts have, 
and they also have lower percentages, on average, of minority students enrolled in their 
schools.  As previously noted, Democratic school districts passed tax increase at a higher 
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rate than did the Republican school districts, and this is not what the Racial Diversity 
Hypothesis might lead us to expect.  In most of the studies cited in Chapter 2 on this point, 
higher racial diversity works against school tax approval, especially when the degree of 
diversity in the school population does not match the degree of diversity in the underlying 
school district.  It could be that racial diversity simply means something different in 
Republican districts than it does in Democratic ones.  Democrats may have a greater 
tolerance for diversity than do Republicans.   
 The two types of districts do not differ significantly on other important characteristics.  
Both district types have approximately equal mean percentages of households with people 
60 years and older and approximately equal mean percentages of households with children 
under the age of 18.37 The median age for both types of communities is between 39 and 40 
years old.  Poverty is not significantly more problematic in one district type than in the other, 
and so from that standpoint, it is not likely that capacity to pay any new tax is any greater in 
the Democratic districts than in the Republican districts.  Neither district type spends 
materially more on its students, on a per pupil basis, than does the other, though the 
students in the Democratic districts, as a group score about 5 points lower than students in 
the Republican districts on standardized tests. 
Above Median Home Value Districts vs. Below Median Home Value Districts 
 
 Table 3-7 reports the results of significance tests of differences between means of a 
number of demographic factors for above median home value districts and below median 
home value districts.  Although districts in the above median home value group passed a 
                                            
37 Table 3-6 shows that Republican districts had slightly more children than their Democratic 
counterparts.  While the difference does reach statistical significance, the difference is not 
substantial. 
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greater percentage of tax increases than the districts in the below median group, the 
difference between the two is quite modest and not statistically significant compared to the 
difference between Republican and Democratic districts described above; most of the 
 
Table 3- 7  Comparisan of Selected Demographic Characteristics for Below Median and Above Median Districts 





Home Value $136,225 $342,362 -$206,137*** 
Income $51,172 $71463 -$20,290*** 
Education 0.352 0.524 -0.172*** 
Political 
Orientation 
0.362 0.465 -0.103* 
Home Owners 0.75 0.75 0.00 
Whites 0.894 0.855 0.039** 
Seniors 0.348 0.33 0.018** 
Children 0.324 0.343 -0.019** 
Poverty 0.131 0.076 0.055*** 
Total Population 25,406 43,543 -18,137 
Pop. Density 956 1269 -313* 
District Rank 0.567 0.614 -0.049*** 
Private School 0.148 0.173 0.025** 
College Grads 0.177 0.366 -0.189*** 
Vacant Housing 0.111 0.104 0.007 
Owner Tenure 14.474 11.991 2.483*** 
Median Age 39.485 40.048 -0.563 
Per Pupil Spend $10.755 $10.31 $0.444 
Minority 
Enrollment 
0.153 0.243 -0.09*** 
Total Enrollment 3407 6272 -2865*** 
Tax Approval Rate 0.405 0.431 -0.026 
N 116 116  
 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.005 (one-tail) 
  
difference is attributable to the relatively large percentage of school districts that adopted tax 
increases in the Googleplex group.   Neither group of districts adopted a majority of the tax 
increases it was asked to consider. 
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   Almost by definition, we should expect to find significant economic differences 
between above median home value districts and below median home value districts.  As 
was true in the comparison between Republican and Democratic districts, differences in 
mean educational attainment, median home values, and percentages of college graduates 
are substantial and highly significant.  There are also substantial and significant differences 
in income between above median home value districts and below median home value 
districts.  Above median districts also have about half as much poverty as do below median 
districts.  As can also be expected, the schools in the above median districts rank about 
three percentage points higher than those In the below median districts, lending some 
support to Warren & Tyagi’s notion that one of the key reasons that home prices are so high 
in areas where people have a lot of income and education is that people are using their 
wealth to buy into areas where the schools are better (Warren & Tyagi, 2004). 
 Districts with home values above the median also differ socially and demographically 
from districts with home values below the median. There are about 2% more households 
with members who are at least 60 years old in the below median districts, a difference which 
is significant and could be pivotal given the low voter turnout typical of school tax elections.  
By contrast, there are about 2% more households with children in the above median districts, 
which might make it easier to pass tax increases in this wealthier group.  Below median 
districts have significantly more white residents.  This probably goes a long way in 
explaining why below median districts have a smaller percentage of minority students 
enrolled in their public schools.  
 As Figure 3-3 demonstrates, race works very differently in above median home value 
districts than in below median home value districts. For the above median home value group,  
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Figure 3- 3 Private School Enrollment and Minority Public School Enrollment 
 
as minority enrollment in the public schools increases, the percentage of children who 
attend private school declines; for the below median school district group, just the opposite 
occurs.  What the linear prediction line for the below median group implies about racial 
tolerance in these districts is clear.  For the above median group, the negatively sloping 
linear prediction line is consistent with the high levels of tolerance that Moretti, Florida and 
Bishop say is inherent in richer communities built on knowledge-based economies. 
 One key difference between above median and below median districts is the length of 
time people spend living in the same house.  In below median districts, people have lived in 
the same home, on average, about 2.5 years longer than people living in above median 
districts.  When coupled with the fact that people in the below median districts are, on 
average, somewhat poorer and less well educated than people in the above median districts, 
 73
the data suggest that people in the below median districts are less able to leave their 
neighborhoods.  On the other hand, people who live in the same place for an extended 
period of time may do so voluntarily because they feel an attachment to their communities 
that makes them willing to bear additional burdens for their neighbors. (Wong, 2010)  
 Another key difference between above median and below median districts is the size 
of the community.  The communities in the above median group are, on average more than 
71% bigger in terms of total population and have about 33% greater population density.  
Above median districts also handle about 84% more students, on average, than the below 
median districts do. 
 Above median districts do not differ from below median districts on several other 
factors.  There are about as many homeowners in both types of districts, and the housing 
unit vacancy rates are about the same.  Though the above median districts have somewhat 
better schools than the below median districts have, both district types spend about the 
same amount of money on a per pupil basis.  The median age for the above median and 
below median groups is about the same.  
The Googleplex Districts 
  
 Partisan orientation and home value combine to produce distinctive groups of school 
districts.  Table 3-8 provides a statistical profile of the Googleplex districts.  The Googleplex 
districts are, on average, the most affluent.  As compared to the other districts, they have, 
on average, adjusted median home values that are more than twice as high as the mean for 
the other three quadrants and $135,886 higher than the mean adjusted median home value 
for the Goldwater Country group, which is the quadrant with the next highest adjusted 
median home values.  Median income levels in the quadrant are over $70,000, which is 
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more than $11,000 higher than the mean for the other three quadrants.  It is therefore not 
surprising that the Googleplex districts can be distinguished from the others on the basis of 
its poverty mean, which is lower than the poverty mean for the two below median home  
 
Table 3- 8 Selected Demographic Characteristics of Googleplex Districts 
Variable Googleplex 
Districts 
Other 3 Quadrants Difference 
Home Value $414,991 $185,992 $228,999*** 
Income $70,180 $58,629 $11,551*** 
Education 0.567 0.398 0.169*** 
Owners 0.703 0.766 -0.064*** 
Whites 0.777 0.904 -0.127*** 
Seniors 0341 0.338 0.003 
Children 0.335 0.333 0.002 
Poverty 0.079 0.111 -0.032*** 
Total Population 56,420 27,817 28,603*** 
Population 
Density 
2142 800 3142*** 
District Rank 0.604 .584 -0.019 
Private School 0.186 0.153 0.033** 
College Grads 0.41 0.229 0.181*** 
Vacant Housing 0.086 0.114 0.028* 
Owner Tenure 12.81 13.36 -.545 
Median Age 40.13 39.66 0.47 
Per Pupil 
Spending 
$10,00 $10.69 -$0.69 
Minority 
Enrollment 
0.34 0.155 0.185*** 
Total Enrollment 7211 4119 3092** 
Approval Rate 57.41% 37.08% 20.33%*** 
N 54 178 124 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.005 (one-tail) 
 
value groups and about equal to the poverty mean for the Goldwater Country districts.  The 
general level of educational attainment and the percentage of college graduates, both of 
which are higher than the mean for the remaining districts together and for the mean for the 
Goldwater Country districts, no doubt contribute to the affluence of this group of districts.   
 75
 While being the most affluent and best educated, the districts in this quadrant are 
also the most racially and economically diverse.  The Googleplex districts are distinctive for 
their relatively low percentages of whites.  The mean Googleplex school district has a 
minority school population of over 33%, more than twice what the mean is for the other three 
quadrants, and more than eight percentage points higher than in the Clintonland group of  
Figure 3- 4 Private School and Minority Public School Enrollment for Googleplex Districts 
 
districts, which had the second highest percentage of minority students.  If we take the 
share of students who attend private school as crude evidence of tolerance, we see, in 
Figure 3-4, that in the Googleplex group of districts, increased diversity in the classroom 
implies lower private school enrollment. 
 Finally, the school districts in the Googleplex group are characterized by large 
populations and high population densities.  The average school district in the Googleplex 
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group is home to more than 56,000 residents.  That is almost twice the mean for the 
remaining quadrants and more than 20,000 people more than in the Clintonland group, 
which is the next most populous quadrant.  Population density in the Googleplex districts is 
over 1,300 people per square mile greater than the mean for the other three quadrants and 
about 275 people per square mile higher than the average for the districts in the Clintonland 
group of districts, which has the second highest average population density.  Figure 3-5  
Figure 3- 5 Distribution of School Districts by Quadrant and Location Type 
 
 
shows how the various school districts are distributed among rural locations, small town 
locations, suburban locations and urban locations.38   
                                            
38 The Bureau of the Census’s eight “old” locality categories have been collapsed into these 
four categories as follows:  (i) “Rural” includes all areas classified as rural regardless of 
whether they are inside or outside a CBSA/MSA; (ii) “Small Town” includes all areas 
classified as “small towns”; (iii) “Suburban” includes all areas classified as “urban fringe” 
regardless of the size of the city to which it is adjacent; and (iv) “Urban” includes cities, 
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 All of these characteristics are hallmarks of what Moretti describes as “brain hubs” 
(Moretti, 2013).  As I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 4, brain hubs dominate the 
Googleplex quadrant.  For Moretti, brain hubs are relatively large population centers that 
focus generally on creative, high-tech and financial, insurance, and real estate (“FIRE”) 
industries.  Brain hubs tend to be large and highly diverse.  They have to be fairly large 
because they require a large number of employers to attract the highly educated talent that 
creative, high-tech and FIRE industries require.  Well-educated workers want to be in 
markets where there is an abundance of jobs should they need to change, and these kinds 
of businesses want to be in labor markets that are most likely to be able to provide the talent 
the businesses need to be successful (Moretti, 2013, pp. 126–127).    
 High levels of diversity prevail in these kinds of communities because the high levels 
of talent brain hub employers need is not confined to whites born in the United States.39  
Employers who need well-educated talent discovered long ago that no race or ethnicity had 
a monopoly on the intellectual capabilities their businesses needed to remain on the cutting 
edge; these kinds of businesses have proven that they will hire people who possess those 
capabilities and pay them generously for it regardless of ethnicity and/or nationality.  
 When people with high levels of education take jobs, they move to communities 
where they feel comfortable.  Florida notes that:  
Tolerance—or, broadly speaking, openness to diversity—provides an additional 
source of economic advantage that works alongside technology and talent.  The 
places that are most open to new ideas and that attract talented and creative people 
                                            
39 According to Forbes Magazine, over 40% of the Ph. D degrees awarded by American 
universities in 2011 in science, technology, engineering and mathematics went to people 
born outside of the U.S. (Wright, 2013) 
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from across the globe broaden both their technology and talent capabilities, gaining a 
substantial economic advantage (Florida, 2012, pp. 232–33). 
High levels of racial and ethnic tolerance tend to lead to highly diverse communities like the 
ones in the Googleplex group. 
 For present purposes, though, in addition to proximity to good, high paying jobs, 
people in these fields probably demand good schools (Cohen, 2000; Weiss, 2004).  After all, 
more than almost anyone else, workers in the kinds of industries located in these brain hubs 
have benefited from their educations and know its value.  That is probably why school 
districts in the Googleplex group passed a greater percentage of school tax increases than 
did any of the other groups of districts. 
The Clintonland Districts 
 
 Table 3-9 provides a statistical profile of the Clintonland district group. About the only 
thing that the districts in the Clintonland group hold in common with the Googleplex districts 
is political orientation.  Otherwise, they are, on average, substantially worse off economically, 
than the districts in the Googleplex group.  Median home values in this quadrant, are, on 
average, over $276,000 lower than they are in the other Democratic quadrant; even if the 
Googleplex group home values are excluded from the calculation, Clintonland median home 
values are, on average still over $155,474 lower than the average median home value in the 
Republican oriented quadrants, making them the lowest in the typology.40  Median income 
for the districts in this quadrant is also well below the mean for the Goldwater Country 
districts but not much different than the mean for the Smallville districts.  Clintonland districts, 
                                            
40The difference between the Clintonland and Smallville districts for this variable is not 
statistically distinct from zero.  
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on average, have the second largest percentage of people living at or below the poverty 
level, though Clintonland districts cannot be distinguished statistically from the Smallville 
 
Table 3- 9  Selected Demographic Characteristics of the Clintonland Districts 
Variable Clintonland Other 3 Quadrants Difference 
Home Value $138,593 $261,554 -$122,961*** 
Income $50,145 $63,788 -$13,643*** 
Education 0.375 0.451 -0.076*** 
Owners 0.72 0.758 -0.38* 
Whites 0.833 0.883 -0.05* 
Seniors 0.338 0.339 -0.001 
Kids 0.316 0.337 -0.021* 
Poverty 0.133 0.097 -0.036 
Total Population 44,165 32,332 11,833 
Population 
Density 
1862 947 915*** 
District Rank 0.545 0.601 -0.056*** 
Private School 0.164 0.160 0.004 
College Grads 0.206 0.286 -0.08*** 
Vacant Housing 0.098 0.110 0.012 
Owner Tenure 14.64 12.92 1.72*** 
Median Age 39.16 39.90 0.74 
Per Pupil 
Spending 
$11.53 $10.31 $1.21* 
Minority 
Enrollment 
0.234 0.19 0.44 
Total Enrollment 5582 4675 907 
Approval Rate 47.62% 40.52% 7.1% 
N 42 190  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-tailed) 
 
districts on this variable.   
 The reason that the means for the economic variables in this quadrant are lower than 
they are for the above median home value districts probably comes down to education.   
The general level of education and the percentage of college graduates are both much 
lower than the mean for the remaining three districts together, though higher than the mean 
for the Smallville group. 
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 Socially and demographically, the districts in the Clintonland group are only 
somewhat different from the districts in the other three quadrants.   The difference in the 
mean percentage of white residents in the Clintonland group of districts and the mean of the 
other three districts collectively reaches statistical significance.41  It is about 4.9 percentage 
points higher than the mean for the Googleplex districts, a statistically significant 
difference,42 and could be substantial in a close, low turnout election.  On the other hand, 
the mean percentage of white residents in the Clintonland districts is more than 9 
percentage points lower than in the Smallville group43 of districts and 6 percentage points 
lower than in the Goldwater Country group, with both differences statistically significant.44  
 The Clintonland school districts have the second highest percentage of minority 
student enrolled in their schools. The percentage of minority students who attend school in 
the Clintonland districts is not statistically different from that of the other three districts 
considered together, but the lack of significance is largely due to the relatively high 
percentage of minority students in the Googleplex group.  Compared to the mean 
percentage of minority students enrolled in districts in the Smallville group of districts and 
the Goldwater Country districts individually, the difference between minority enrollment is 
statistically significant in the Clintonland/Smallville comparison,45 but not in the 
Clintonland/Goldwater Country comparison.46  
 Figure 3-6 suggests that the percentage of minority students in the Clintonland school 
districts may be a problem in terms of passing tax increases.  Unlike Figure 3-5, the slope of 
                                            
41 p=0.0.21 (one tailed) 
42 p=0.038 (one-tailed) 
43 p=0.000 (one-tailed) 
44 p=0.004 (one-tailed) 
45 p=0.0016 (one-tailed) 
46 p=0.069 (one tailed) 
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the linear prediction line representing the school districts in the Clintonland districts is 
positive.  The implication is that the decision to send one’s children to private school for 
parents living in the Clintonland group of school districts is extremely sensitive to classroom  
 
Figure 3- 6 Private School and Minority Public School Enrollment for Clintonland Districts 
  
diversity and that, at least within the quadrant, a district’s willingness to adopt a tax increase 
may be influenced by racial considerations. 
 Clintonland schools have, on average, fewer households with children47 than the 
other three quadrants.  There is no statistical difference between the percentage of 
households with members at least 60 years of age in the Clintonland group and that of the 
other groups in the typology taken together. 
                                            
47 p=0.01 (one-tailed) 
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 What ultimately distinguishes the Clintonland districts from all of the others is its mix 
of locality types. As Figure 3-5 shows, like the Googleplex group, the Clintonland group has 
a large percentage of districts that can be classified as suburban and as rural, but the 
Googleplex group has more suburban districts than does the Clintonland group.  The 
Clintonland group has more rural and urban districts than the Googleplex group of districts.   
Likewise, the Clintonland group has a much higher percentage of suburban school districts 
than the Smallville and Goldwater Country districts, which are, in turn far more rural in 
character.  Given these differences in location type, it is not surprising that, even though the 
total population sizes for the Clintonland districts are, on average, statistically about equal to 
the mean population size for all of the remaining districts, its mean population density is 
much greater, and as previously discussed, added density may be an advantage in passing 
school tax increases.  
 Given the mix of characteristics described above, it is appropriate to regard these 
school districts as lower middle class or working class areas.  Median home values and 
incomes in this quadrant are too high for the districts to be regarded as impoverished or 
underprivileged, but the general level of education and the mean percentage of college 
graduates are too low for these districts to be considered brain hubs akin to those in the 
Googleplex group.  Because the level of educational attainment is relatively low, it is likely 
that the people who live in these school districts have semi-professional, pink collar, blue 
collar or clerical jobs.48  Lower level jobs generating lower levels of income mean that tax 
increases may not be as affordable in these types of districts than as in others.  Finally, 
                                            
48 For the Clintonland group, on average, according to ACS data, 60% of the workers in 
each school district are employed in low skill, “blue collar” type jobs such as production, 
transportation, construction, protective services such as fire and police and unskilled 
personal care. 
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these districts probably do not feature the level of racial and ethnic tolerance typically 
required in a brain hub, and so if people in these districts have not been able to arrest racial 
animus, the levels of diversity present in these districts could make it harder for these 
communities to pass tax increases, especially if there is a perception that members of a 
racial outgroup will be the prime beneficiaries of taxes paid by the white majority.  
The Smallville Districts 
 
 Table 3-10 provides a statistical profile of the below median Republican school 
district group.  The characteristics that most distinguish the districts in the Smallville group 
from the others are locality type, population size, population density and racial homogeneity.  
As Figure 3-5 discloses, the Smallville group has the largest percentage of rural districts and 
the smallest percentage of suburban and urban districts in the dataset.  These districts also 
have the smallest mean populations and the lowest population densities in the dataset.  This 
is probably why the average school district in this quadrant has about 3,900 fewer students 
than the average school district in the rest of the dataset.  The average percentage of whites 
living in the Smallville districts exceeds 92%, which is well above the mean level of whites in 
either of the Democratic quadrants, but about equal to the average level of whites living in 
the Goldwater Country districts. 
 From an economic standpoint the Smallville school districts are more like the school 
districts in the Clintonland group than they are like their more affluent Republican 
counterparts in Goldwater Country.  While the Smallville school districts can be 
distinguished from the dataset as a whole on the basis of median home value, median 
income and poverty, they cannot be distinguished from the Clintonland schools on these 
characteristics.  Economic factors may be one reason that, compared to the dataset as a 
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whole, the Smallville school districts have the smallest share of students attending private 
school. 
 
Table 3- 10 Selected Demographic Characteristics of Smallville Districts 
Variable Smallville Other 3 Quadrants Difference 
Home Value $134,880 $288,196 -$143,315*** 
Income $51,756 $65,796 $14,040*** 
Education 0.338 0.484 -0.146*** 
Owners 0.766 0.744 0.022* 
Whites 0.928 0.849 0.079*** 
Seniors 0.354 0.332 0.022*** 
Kids 0.329 0.0336 -0.007 
Poverty 0.13 0.091 0.039*** 
Total Population 14,759 43,708 28,949*** 
Population 
Density 
442 1427 -985*** 
District Rank 0.58 0.594 -0.014 
Private School 0.139 0.170 -0.031*** 
College Grads 0.16 0.323 0.163*** 
Vacant Housing 0.118 0.102 0.016 
Owner Tenure 14.378 12.696 1.682*** 
Median Age 39.67 39.81 0.14 
Per Pupil 
Spending 
$10.31 $10.63 -$0.32 
Minority 
Enrollment 
0.107 0.241 0.134*** 
Total Enrollment 2,172 6088 3,915*** 
Approval Rate 36.49% 44.3% 7.81% 
N 74 158  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.005 (one-tailed) 
 
 The only other factors that distinguish the Smallville school districts are the median 
tenure of their residents in the same home and the percentage of households with residents 
who are at least 60 years old.  The average median tenure for the Smallville districts is more 
than a year and a half longer than the mean for the other three quadrants, though not 
different statistically from the mean median tenure for the Clintonland group.  Finally, its 
population of households with members who are at least 60 years old exceeds the other 
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three district groups taken together by about 2 percentage points, but once the Googleplex 
group is excluded, the Smallville group exceeds the Clintonland and Goldwater Country 
districts together on this measure by more than 2.6 percentage points49; it has only a slightly 
higher percentage of households with seniors than does the Clintonland group.50 
 From the characteristics just presented, there is a distinctly small town, rural feel to 
these districts.  Though there is a significant amount of variation, low population density 
signals agricultural land use and wide open spaces.  This is consistent with Figure 3-5.  
Given the economic indicators, the fact that the median percentage of college graduates is 
relatively small and the quadrant’s level of educational attainment is relatively low, as we 
shall see in Chapter 6, it is likely that there are not many people coming or going from these 
districts.  Unlike their Democratic counterparts, these districts apparently have very little that 
is attractive to minorities. When Sarah Palin spoke about the “real America” during the 2008 
presidential campaign (Eilperin, 2008), she probably had places like these in mind. 
The Goldwater Country Districts  
 
 Table 3-11 provides a statistical profile of the Goldwater Country school district group.  
Like the districts in the Googleplex group, the districts in this quadrant are quite affluent. 
Home values and median income are well in excess of the respective means for the rest of 
the dataset and the percentage of people in the typical Goldwater Country district living at or 
below the poverty level is well below the percentage living at or below the poverty level in 
the other three quadrants. Average median income and poverty levels in the Goldwater 
Country districts, though, are not significantly different from the means for those variables in 
the Googleplex districts.  This probably stems from the generally high level of education and 
                                            
49 p=0.0012 (one-tailed) 
50 p=0.0032 (one-tailed) 
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large percentage of college graduates who live in Goldwater Country districts.  Because 
these districts lean Republican, in accordance with Figure 3-2, we should expect these  
 
Table 3- 11 Selected Demographic Characteristics of Goldwater Country Districts 
Variable Goldwater Country Other 3 Quadrants Difference 
Home Value $279,105 $224,774 $54,331*** 
Income $72,580 $57,210 $15,370*** 
Education 0.486 0.42 0.66*** 
Owners 0.797 0.735 0.062*** 
Whites 0.922 0.857 0.065*** 
Seniors 0.32 0.346 -0.026*** 
Kids 0.349 0.328 0.21*** 
Poverty 0.073 0.115 0.042*** 
Total Population 32,328 32,258 2,930 
Population 
Density 
508 1333 825*** 
District Rank 0.625 0.579 0.046*** 
Private School 0.163 0.160 0.003 
College Grads 0.327 0.251 0.076*** 
Vacant Housing 0.12 0.103 0.017 
Owner Tenure 11.27 13.95 2.68*** 
Median Age 39.97 39.69 0.28 
Per Pupil 
Spending 
$10.58 $10.52 $0.06 
Minority 
Enrollment 
0.159 0.212 0.053* 
Total Enrollment 5,453 4,615 838 
Approval Rate 30.64% 45.88% -15.24%** 
N 62 170  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.005 (one-tailed) 
 
districts to have relatively low population densities, and that is what we find.  Though about 
53% of these districts are located in towns and rural areas, more than a third of the districts 
are located in suburban areas. 
 One remarkable characteristic of the districts in this quadrant is the percentage of 
people who own their homes.  On average, nearly 80% of the residents of the school 
districts in this quadrant are homeowners.  As homeowners, though, they have remained in 
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the same home for less time than their counterparts in the other three quadrants.  According 
to the literature, these two facts could be key reasons these districts passed so few of the 
tax increases proposed in 2011: Homeowners who are wary of tax increases that directly 
affect them and people without substantial ties to the community are less likely to vote for 
tax increases. (Berkman & Plutzer, 2005, p. 44; Piele & Hall, 1973, pp. 127–130) 
 Despite the relatively high level of education in these districts, most are probably not 
“brain hubs.”  The relatively small average minority presence in these districts tells us this.  
High levels of affluence, home ownership and Republican political orientation, though, 
intimate that perhaps a large proportion of people in these areas are successful 
entrepreneurs who have used their wealth to buy privacy and autonomy in relatively remote 
and sparsely populated communities.  We cannot be certain about what the people living in 
these communities think about taxes and government services in general or the functioning 
of their school systems in particular because we only have aggregate level data, but it would 
be a reasonable guess that highly entrepreneurial people who demand privacy and want 
physical distance from others hold a good degree of skepticism about the effectiveness of 
any government agency (including the local school system), are willing to purchase private 
resources for their families should they be needed, and are disinclined to pay for additional 
government in the form of additional taxes, especially if they are dissatisfied with the 
services the government is providing to them. 
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter I have established the analytical framework for the remainder of this 
dissertation.  Recognizing that there is a significant amount of variability in our current 
understanding of school tax elections, in reliance on Lentz and Gimpel and Schuknecht, I 
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have suggested that school tax elections can best be understood in the context of their 
levels of wealth and their political orientations.  I have argued that the reason for the mixed 
results I observe in the existing literature stems from the fact that most of the observations 
upon which they are based come, not from faulty methodology, but from the fact that the 
factors that turn an election in one kind of community may not be important in another kind 
of community.  In particular, I have argued that rather than attempting to generalize from 
case studies that focus only on single cases or to draw conclusions from an undifferentiated 
universe of cases as a whole, it makes better sense to divide cases into district types so that 
each type of district can be considered without the “noise” emanating from districts that are 
not members of the group and don’t share salient characteristics. 
 These problems can be addressed by grouping school districts in accordance with a 
four-cell typology defined by wealth and partisan orientation, two variables that seem 
together to explain a large portion of the variance in my dataset.  Like Lentz, I have shown 
that grouping cases in accordance with the typology cells is a sensible and effective way to 
explain the in-group variance.  This innovation alone should make it easier for school 
districts seeking tax increases to begin to make more effective plans for achieving them. 
 Having grouped the cases in my dataset by wealth and partisan orientation, I have 
been able to show that these subgroups are distinct and can be distinguished from each 
other by a number of demographic and social characteristics.  In the next four chapters, I 
take a detailed look at each of these subgroups and make predictions about the intragroup 
factors that make it more likely that a district in the group will pass a tax increase.  I begin 




Googleplex Adopter Districts 
 
Table 3A- 1 Googleplex Adopter Districts 
School District County State 
Alameda City Unified School District Alameda CA 
Brisbane Elementary School District San Mateo CA 
Burlingame Elementary School District San Mateo CA 
Central Kitsap School District Kitsap WA 
Cupertino Union Elementary School District Santa Clara CA 
Davis Joint Unified School District Yolo CA 
Dixie Elementary School District Marin CA 
Englewood School District 1 Arapahoe CO 
Esparto Unified School District Yolo CA 
Gahanna-Jefferson City School District Franklin OH 
John Swett Unified School District Contra Costa CA 
Lafayette Elementary School District Contra Costa CA 
Lake Washington School District King WA 
Los Altos Elementary School District Santa Clara CA 
Los Gatos-Saratoga Joint Union School District Santa Cruz CA 
New Haven Unified School District Alameda CA 
Nicolet Union High School District Milwaukee WI 
Oak Park and River Forest District 200 Cook IL 
Orange City School District Cuyahoga OH 
Orcas Island School District San Juan WA 
Pacific Grove Unified School District Monterey CA 
Peotone Community Unit School District 207U Kankakee, Will IL 
Port Angeles School District Clallam WA 
Portland School District 1J Multnomah OR 
Ravenswood City Elementary School District San Mateo CA 
Shoreline School District King WA 
South Shore School District Bayfield WI 
Southern Boone County R-I School District Boone MO 
Sunnyvale Elementary School District Santa Clara CA 
Tamalpais Union High School District Marin CA 




Googleplex Rejecter Districts 
 
Table 3A- 2 Googleplex Rejecter Districts 
School District County State 
Arbor Park School District 145 Cook IL 
Beaverton School District 48J Washington, Multnomah OR 
Canfield Local School District Mahoning  OH 
Clatskanie School District 6J Clatsop, Columbia OR 
Cuyahoga Heights Local School District Cuyahoga OH 
Fern Ridge School District 28J Lane OR 
Fontana Unified School District San Bernardino CA 
Grand Valley Local School District Ashtabula OH 
Hollister School District San Benito CA 
Jefferson Union High School District San Mateo CA 
Las Virgenes Unified School District Ventura CA 
Olmsted Falls City School District Cuyahoga OH 
Oregon City School District 62 Clackamas OR 
Pleasanton Unified School District Alameda CA 
Prospect Heights School District 23 Cook IL 
Pueblo County School District 70 Pueblo CO 
Riverside Brookfield Township School District 208 Cook IL 
Rootstown Local School District Portage OH 
Round Valley Unified District Apache AZ 
Santa Clara Unified School District Santa Clara CA 
St. Helens School District 502 Columbia OR 
West Northfield School District 31 Cook IL 




Clintonland Adopter Districts 
 
Table 3A- 3 Clintonland Adopter Districts 
School District County State 
Adams-Friendship Area School District Adams WI 
Canton City School District Stark OH 
Cleveland Heights-University Heights City School                                                       
District     Cuyahoga OH 
Davison Community Schools Genesee MI 
Firelands Local School District Erie, Lorain OH 
Grand Rapids Public Schools Kent MI 
Groveport Madison Franklin, Union OH 
Independence School District Buffalo, Trempealeau WI 
Kalamazoo Public School District Calhoun, Kalamzoo MI 
Lamphere Public Schools Oakland MI 
McDonald Local School District Trumbull OH 
Melrose-Mindoro School District La Crosse WI 
Mogadore Local School District Summit, Portage OH 
Northridge Local School District (Montgomery County) Montgomery OH 
Norwood City School District Hamilton OH 
Parma City School District Cuyahoga OH 
Quillayute Valley School District Clallam, Jefferson WA 
Troy R-III School District Lincoln MO 
Washington Local School District Lucas OH 




Clintonland Rejecter Districts 
 
Table 3A- 4 Clintonland Rejecter Districts 
School District County State 
Akron City School District Summit OH 
Amherst Exempted Village School District Lorain OH 
Benton-Carroll-Salem Local School District Ottawa OH 
Cincinnati City School District Hamilton OH 
Euclid City School District Cuyahoga OH 
Field Local School District Portage OH 
Garden City School District Wayne MI 
Garfield Heights City School District Cuyahoga OH 
Harrisburg R-VIII School District Boone MO 
Howland Local School District Trumbull OH 
Lake Local School District (Ottawa and Wood Counties) Ottawa, Wood OH 
Mathews Local School District Trumbull OH 
Maumee City School District Lucas OH 
Midview Local School District Lorain OH 
Mount Healthy City School District Hamilton OH 
North Ridgeville City School District Lorain OH 
Northwest Local School District (Hamilton Counties) Hamilton OH 
Poland Local School District Mahoning OH 
Saginaw Township Community Schools Saginaw, Genesee, Bay MI 
Trotwood-Madison City School District Montgomery OH 
Waterloo Local School District Portage OH 




Smallville Adopter Districts 
 
Table 3A- 5 Smallville Adopter Districts 
School District County State 
Advance R-IV School District Stoddard MO 
Ash Grove R-IV School District Greene MO 
Athens School District Marathon WI 
Cedar Springs Public Schools Kent, Newaygo MI 
Coldwater Community Schools Branch MI 
Delaware City School District Delaware OH 
Fairport Harbor Exempted Village School District Lake OH 
Keller School District Ferry WA 
LaCrosse School District Whitman, Adams WA 
Lexington Local School District Morrow, Ottawa OH 
Manistee Area Schools Manistee MI 
Marietta City School District Washington OH 
Marshall Public Schools Calhoun MI 
Michigan Center School District Jackson MI 
Newaygo Public School District Newaygo, Muskegon MI 
North Pekin-Marquette Heights School District 102 Tazewell IL 
Orangeville Community Unit School District 203 Stephenson IL 
Ottawa-Glandorf Local School District Putnam OH 
Prairie School District RE-11 Weld CO 
Tekonsha Community Schools Branch, Calhoun MI 
Union City Community Schools Branch, Calhoun MI 
Walnut Grove R-V School District Greene MO 
Wellington Exempted Village School District Huron, Lorain OH 
White Lake School District Langlade WI 
Wickliffe City School District Lake OH 
Willard City School District Huron OH 




Smallville Rejecter Districts 
 
Table 3A- 6 Smallville Rejecter Districts 
School District County State 
Adams County/Ohio Valley Local School District Adams, Highland OH 
Atwood-Hammond Community Unit School District 39 Champaign, Piatt, Moultrie, Douglas IL 
Barberton City School District Summit OH 
Batavia Local School District Clermont OH 
Black River Local School District Ashland, Lorain, Medina OH 
Blanchester Local School District Clermont, Clinton, Warren OH 
Cardinal Local School District Geauga, Trumbull OH 
Clyde-Green Springs Exempted Village School District Seneca, Sandusky OH 
Conotton Valley Union Local School District Harrison OH 
Covert Public Schools Van Buren MI 
Crawford AuSable Schools Crawford, Ogemaw Oscoda, Roscommon MI 
Delphos City School District Allen OH 
Douglas Unified District Cochise AZ 
East Guernsey Local School District Guernsey OH 
Edison Local School District Carroll, Harrison, Jefferson OH 
Fairborn City School District Greene, Montgomery, Clark OH 
Fredericktown Local School District Knox OH 
Fremont Public School District Muskegon, Oceana, Newaygo MI 
Geneva Area City School District Ashtabula OH 
Genoa Area Local School District Ottawa OH 
Graham Local School District Champaign OH 
Greeneview Local School District Greene OH 
Huber Heights City School District Montgomery OH 
Jackson Public Schools Calhoun, Eaton MI 
London City School District Madison OH 
Mad River Local School District Montgomery OH 
Mount Vernon City School District Knox OH 
Niangua R-V School District Webster MO 
North Fork Local School District Licking, Knox OH 
Ontario Local School District Richland OH 
Osnaburg Local School District Carroll, Stark OH 
Ovid-Elsie Area Schools Shiawassee, Saginaw, Gratiot, Clinton MI 
Park School District Boulder, Latimer CO 
Patrick Henry Local School District Henry, Putnam, Wood OH 
Pike-Delta-York Local School District Fulton OH 
Selkirk School District Pend Oreille WA 
St.Marys City School District Auglaize OH 
Stryker Local School District Williams OH 
Tecumseh Local School District Miami, Clark OH 
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Tiffin City School District Seneca OH 
Vandalia-Butler City School District Montgomery OH 
Villa Grove Community Unit School District 302 Champaign IL 
Wadsworth City School District Medina OH 
West Carrollton City School District Montgomery OH 
West Clermont Local School District Clermont OH 
Wyoming Public Schools Kent MI 





Goldwater Country Adopter Districts 
 
Table 3A- 7 Goldwater Country Adopter Districts 
School District County State 
Adna School District Lewis WA 
Byers School District 32J Arapahoe CO 
Cashmere School District Chelan WA 
Cheyenne Mountain School District 12 El Paso CO 
Columbia Local School District Lorain County OH 
Green Local School District (Summit County) Summit OH 
Independence Local School District Cuyahoga OH 
Little Miami Local School District Clermont, Warren OH 
Loveland City School District Hamilton OH 
Madeira City School District Hamilton OH 
Mammoth Unified School District Mono CA 
Northville Public Schools Oakland, Washtenaw, Wayne MI 
Prescott School District Pierce WI 
Revere Local School District Summit OH 
River Falls School District Pierce WI 
Roaring Fork School District RE-1 Pitkin, Eagle, Garfield CO 
Sylvania City School District Lucas OH 
Tahoe-Truckee Joint Unified School District El Dorado, Nevada Placer CA 




Goldwater Country Rejecter Districts 
 
Table 3A- 8 Goldwater Country Rejecter Districts 
School District County State 
Beavercreek City School District Montgomery, Greene OH 
Bennett School District 29-J Adams, Arapahoe CO 
Berlin-Milan Local School District Huron, Erie OH 
Brecksville-Broadview Heights City School District Cuyahoga OH 
Brighton School District 27J Adams, Weld CO 
Buckeye Local School District (Lorain and Medina Counties) Medina OH 
Cave Creek Unified District Maricopa AZ 
Centralia School District Lewis WA 
Chardon Local School District Lake, Geauga OH 
Climax Springs R-IV School District Camden MO 
Cloverleaf Local School District Medina OH 
De Beque School District 49-JT Garfield, Mesa CO 
Douglas County School District RE-1 Elbert, Douglas CO 
Eagle County School District RE 50 Garfield, Eagle CO 
Earlville Community Unit School District 9 DeKalb, LaSalle IL 
East Holmes Local School District Holmes OH 
East Knox Local School District Coshocton, Knox, Licking OH 
Falcon School District 49 El Paso CO 
Garfield County School District 16 Garfield CO 
Garfield School District RE-2 Garfield CO 
Hilliard City School District  Franklin OH 
Kiowa School District C-2 Elbert CO 
Kirtland Local School District Lake OH 
Lake Holcombe School District Chipewa WI 
Lakota Local School District (Butler County) Butler OH 
Lebanon City School District Warren OH 
Lee's Summit R-7 School District Cass, Jackson MO 
Liberty Schools Clay MI 
Mancos School District RE-6 Montezuma CO 
Mesa County Valley School District 51 Mesa County CO 
Mill A School District Skamania WA 
Mokena School District 159 Will IL 
Nordonia Hills City School District Summit OH 
Riverside Local School District (Geauga and Lake Counties) Lake OH 
Skamania School District Skamania WA 
Stow-Munroe Falls City School District Portage, Summit OH 
Strongsville City School District Cuyahoga, Lorain OH 
Thompson School District R-2J Larimer, Weld, Boulder CO 
Weld County School District RE-1 Weld CO 
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West Geauga Local School District Geauga OH 
Woodland Park School District RE-2 Teller CO 
Woodridge Local School District Summit OH 
Yamhill-Carlton School District 1 Yamhill OH 





Alternative Specification for Table 3-1 
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Brain Hubs and Servants’ Quarters 
 
  The school districts in the Googleplex districts are the wealthiest districts 
in the dataset.  Adjusted median home values for the Googleplex districts, at 
close to $415,000, are more than double what they are for the rest of the dataset 
and over $135,00051 more than their Republican peers in Goldwater Country.  A 
closer look at home values in the Googleplex group reveals that, on average, the 
home values in the districts that approved tax increases were over  $169,000 
greater than the average value prevailing in the districts that rejected them.52  
This large difference in adjusted median home values gives weight to the claim 
that I made in Chapter 1:  The Googleplex group consists of two economically 
distinct subgroups, which, as we shall see later, diverge from each other on the 
basis of educational attainment. 
 I have used home values as an indicator of wealth.  There is no question 
that being able to afford a tax increase is a key factor in whether a community will 
pass it, and so it is not surprising that in addition to being the wealthiest quadrant, 
the Googleplex group adopted over 57% of the tax increases it considered, which 
is the highest percentage of tax increases adopted of any of the groups in the 
dataset.  
 All other things being equal, if there are two communities, one wealthy and 
the other less so, it would be fair to guess that the wealthier community is more 
                                            
51 p=0.000 (one-tailed) 
52 p=0.001 (one-tailed) 
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likely to be willing to adopt a tax increase.  But knowing that the wealthier 
community could better afford to pay more in taxes than the other doesn’t tell us 
why the community would choose to impose additional burdens on itself.  After all, 
a district in which the median level of wealth is relatively high should also have a 
significant number of people in it who can either do without the public goods the 
tax increase would buy or be able to provide those goods for themselves without 
also providing them to others who will pay less for them.  The Goldwater Country 
group, for example, is the next wealthiest set of districts in the dataset (measured 
by adjusted median home values) and it adopted the smallest percentage of tax 
increases. 
  There are two possible explanations for the behavior in the Googleplex 
group of districts.  The first is the Homeowner Hypothesis discussed in Chapter 2.  
The argument is that the people in this quadrant have made a substantial 
investment in their homes and, provided that a school tax increase enables the 
district to maintain or improve its quality, a modest school tax increase would 
support or improve the resale value of their homes.   Thinking along these lines, 
school district homeowners would expect, as Warren and Tyagi posit, that 
families with high incomes would bid up the prices of homes in order to get their 
children into excellent school districts. (Warren & Tyagi, 2004)     
 The second possibility, the Educational Attainment Hypothesis, regards a 
district’s wealth as the result of another underlying factor that both explains a 
district’s wealth and suggests the reason that some of the Googleplex districts 
that adopted tax increases in 2011 while others did not.  This hypothesis holds 
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that well educated people understand, through their own experience, the material 
and purposive benefits good education brings and seek to duplicate their 
experiences for the next generation.  In this chapter, I argue that the Educational 
Attainment Hypothesis provides the best way to understand the voting behavior 
in the Googleplex group of districts.   
 As I will do in this and the next three chapters, I first provide a brief 
overview of the school districts in the group.  The overview will highlight various 
factors that I will use in developing theories for explaining how this group of 
districts reacted to requests for school tax increases and for constructing 
hypotheses to test the theories.  I then and use the general-purpose logistic 
regression model to see whether there is any support for my hypothesis in the 
data, particularly in the face of the other hypotheses discussed in Chapter 2.    
Finally, by way of illustration, and to fill in the lacunae the statistical analysis has 
left, I provide case studies of an Adopter district and a Rejecter district.  The case 
studies add weight to my claim that educational attainment is the key factor in 
distinguishing Adopter districts from Rejecter districts, and, by comparing the 
theoretically nonpartisan vote on the school tax question with the highly partisan 
vote in the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, they also show how political 
orientation affects school tax elections in this quadrant of the typology.  
 
Overview of the Googleplex Districts 
 
 As I noted in Chapter 3, in addition to having the highest average adjusted 
median home values in the dataset, the Googleplex group of districts has the 
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highest level of educational attainment.  There is a significant 18 percentage 
point difference between the mean level of educational attainment in the 
Googleplex districts and their counterparts in the Clintonland districts,53 a 
significant 21.9 percentage point difference between the Googleplex districts and 
the Smallville districts54 and a significant 8 percentage point difference between 
the Googleplex districts and their affluent Republican peer districts in the 
Goldwater Country districts.55   
 In the Googleplex group of districts, adjusted median home values and 
educational attainment are highly correlated at r=0.75.  Home values and 
educational attainment are not always functions of each other.  In the Clintonland 
districts, the correlation is only r=0.01, in the Smallville districts it is only r=0.17 
and in affluent Goldwater Country, the correlation is only r=0.36.  Though 
correlations cannot tells us which of the correlated factors caused the other, in 
the case of the Googleplex group, it seems more reasonable to infer that 
education was the source of the high home values rather than to infer that higher 
levels of education are rooted in home values.56 
 The Adopters and Rejecters in the Googleplex districts are easily 
distinguishable from each other demographically.  The key difference between 
                                            
53 p=0.000  
54 p=0.000 
55 p=0.001 (one tailed) 
56 For home values to influence educational attainment, we would expect that 
people would have to have been living in their current homes throughout their 
educational careers.  That is probably not the case. Median tenure is less than 
13 years and the median age is about 40.  If home value was the causal agent, 
that would mean that the median age at which residents began their educational 
career would have been about 27.  Common experience tells us that most people 
have completed their educations well before they reach their 30s. 
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them is educational attainment.  The level of educational attainment in Adopter 
districts is, on average, a statistically significant 13.5 percentage points higher 
than it is in the Rejecter districts.57   This is an example of what Moretti calls the 
“Great Divergence,” a separation of communities into what Moretti calls “brain 
hubs” on the one hand and into what I have called “servants’ quarters” on the 
other: 
America’s new economic map shows growing differences, not just 
between people, but between communities.  A handful of cities with the 
“right” industries and a solid base of human capital keep attracting good 
employers and offering high wages, while those at the other extreme, 
cities with the “wrong” industries and a limited human capital base, are 
stuck with dead-end jobs and low average wages. . . . Geographically, 
American workers are increasingly sorting along educational lines.  At the 
same time that American communities are desegregating racially, they are 
becoming more segregated in terms of schooling and earnings (Moretti, 
2013, pp. 3–4). 
 The 13.5 percentage point difference in educational attainment between 
the Adopter districts and the Rejecter districts in the Googleplex group manifests 
itself in the careers of their residents.  While, overall, 52% of the residents of the 
Googleplex districts are working in white collar jobs that require a college 
education, that percentage swells to 61% in the districts that adopted tax 
increases and falls to 48% in the districts that rejected them.  These differences 
                                            
57 p=0.000 
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in careers may well provide the best practical explanation for the $169,000 
difference between Adopter and Rejecter districts in average median home 
values.58  
 Beyond economics, Adopter districts differ from Rejecter districts in racial 
composition and in the utilization of private schools.  In the Adopter districts, the 
percentage of whites is a statistically significant 8.8 percentage points lower than 
in Rejecter districts.59  Adopter districts also send about 4.5% more of their 
children to private school than do Rejecter districts.60  
Basic Test of Hypothesis 
 
 If, as I claim, the Educational Attainment Hypothesis is the best 
explanation of why a district in the Googleplex group voted for a tax increase, in 
a logistic regression of election result on variables representing all of the 
hypotheses described in Chapter 2, the variable representing the Educational 
Attainment Hypothesis should have the largest statistically significant effect on 
the likelihood of voting yes.  Table 4-1 provides evidence on this point.  For the 
                                            
58  While the Rejecter districts tend to be somewhat smaller and less densely 
populated, and the proportion of rural Rejecter districts is more than twice as 
large as the proportion of rural Adopter districts, the large statistically significant 
difference in adjusted median home values is not attributable to the mix of 
locations that comprises the two subgroups.  Comparing just the suburban 
Adopter districts with the suburban Rejecter districts still yields a statistically 
significant difference of almost $193,77258; aggregating the suburban and urban 
districts together, accounting for 83.87% of the Adopter districts and 73.91% of 
the Rejecter districts still yields a statistically significant difference in favor of the 
Adopter districts of over $164,000.58  There were not enough cases of rural 
districts, towns and cities to determine whether the mean values differed from 
each other significantly.   
59 p=0.021 (one-tailed) 
60 p=0.008 (one-tailed) 
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Googleplex school districts, the general level of education attainment prevailing 
there is the most influential variable. Holding all other variables constant at their  
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actual values, as educational attainment increases from one standard deviation 
below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean, the likelihood that a 
community will adopt a tax increase improves by 57.5%.62    
 Table 4-1 also tells us that the variables that typically measure self-
interest do not, in the Googleplex Districts, work the way the other hypotheses 
might lead us to expect them to work.  First, the model provides no support for 
                                            
61 From Alternative Specification.  See Appendix Table 4A-1 
62 Moving from the lowest level of the variable to the highest increases the 
likelihood of adopting a tax increase by 89.5%. 
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the Homeowner Hypothesis because the Homeowners variable fails to reach 
statistical significance.  For the same reason, the model provides no support for 
the Parenthood Hypothesis.  Even if we focus on the substantive significance of 
the Children variable instead of on its statistical significance, the coefficient’s sign 
is negative, implying that the smaller the percentage of households with children 
there is in a community, the more likely it is to adopt a tax increase.  This is 
clearly something theory does not expect.   
 The fact that the racial diversity variable (“Whites”) does not reach 
statistical significance in either specification of the model provides additional 
support for the Educational Attainment Hypothesis.  Under the Racial Diversity 
Hypothesis, we should expect the likelihood of adopting a tax increase to decline 
as the percentage of whites in the community declines because we expect a 
white majority population to be increasingly unwilling to provide benefits to non-
whites as the size of the outgroup population grows.  But in the Googleplex group 
of districts, racial diversity is higher than anywhere else.  That racial diversity 
does not seem to matter is consistent with what Moretti and Florida have told us 
to expect in brain hubs.  Increasing racial diversity is a hallmark of economies 
based on intellectual work because employers seek to attract the best talent 
without regard to irrelevant characteristics such as race, gender or national origin.  
What matters in these types of communities is talent developed through 
education (Florida, 2012, pp. 56–59).63   
                                            
63 In discussing the role of the university as an engine of economic development, 
Florida remarks: “Universities foster a progressive, open, and tolerant people 
climate that helps attract and retain members of the creative class.  College 
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 It is notable that the variable in the model that points to attachment to 
community—Total Population (log)—seems to lend some support to the 
Community Affinity Hypothesis.  The variable reaches statistical significance and 
has a substantial impact on the results of tax elections in this group.  
 Considering all of these results, it is fair to infer from the evidence that the 
Adopter districts in the Googleplex districts were probably not significantly moved 
by concerns about immediate material benefits.  Instead, it is likely that their 
voters were interested in passing the advantages education conveys down to the 
next generation. Table 4-1 makes it clear that many of the other conventional 
explanations discussed in Chapter 2 are not relevant in this quadrant of the 
typology.  The fact that in the Alternative Specification shown in Table 4A-1 in the 
Appendix, the only variable to reach statistical significance is the one that 
measures educational attainment bolsters this conclusion.   
Detailed Illustrations 
 
 Returning, now, to the larger themes of this project, I am particularly 
interested in the role, if any, that wealth and partisanship played in the outcome 
of school tax elections in the Googleplex districts.  My results show that in the 
Googleplex group of districts, at an aggregate level, there is a link between 
education and wealth, which, in turn, influences electoral outcomes in this group 
of districts.    
                                                                                                                                  
towns from Austin to Iowa City have always been places where gays and other 
outsiders in those parts of the country could find a home” (Florida, 2012, p. 310).  
College graduates who seem to dominate this group of districts are likely to have 
picked up or reinforced the value of tolerance while in school. 
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 While we now know that Democratically oriented, better-educated, 
wealthier districts tend to support school tax increases, we do not yet know 
whether this is so at a lower level of abstraction.  Because there is no uniform 
and reliable measure of partisan intensity for any of the school districts in the 
dataset, we also do not yet know the extent to which partisan attitudes may have 
influenced the vote.  It could be that well educated, wealthy voters who tend to 
prefer voting for Democrats may support increased school taxes as an 
ideological matter.64  It could also be, though, that people living in Democratic 
areas with expensive homes who might otherwise wish to avoid paying higher 
taxes are being outvoted by their less well-educated and poorer neighbors.  In 
this section, I present case studies of the Portland (an Adopter district) and St. 
Helens (a Rejecter district) school districts to address this point. 
 My analysis begins with the fact that local voting precincts are typically 
compact geographic units that tend to include homes that are similar to one 
another and are often valued in the same price range.  I also make use of the 
fact that precincts tend to be “general use” political units that cast ballots on a 
number of things from time to time, including school tax and presidential 
elections.   Presidential elections are both highly publicized and overtly partisan.   
While candidates for major political offices sometimes try to obscure their 
partisan identities to avoid being associated with the president or with unpopular 
policies, actions or individuals linked to their parties, presidential candidates 
                                            
64 As I will show in Chapter 7 in greater detail, the least educated Democrats are 
more enthusiastic about paying additional taxes in support of education than the 
best educated Republicans. 
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cannot do this.  The vote for president is generally a highly partisan act that has 
customarily been used as a yardstick for measuring the ideology of a community 
(see Ardoin & Garand, 2003, p. 1169 and studies referenced therein).  Under 
ordinary circumstances, precincts that are ideologically Republican or 
Democratic can be expected to favor their parties’ respective presidential 
candidates by wide margins (Abramowitz, 2012).  In precincts that are not as 
highly ideological, we expect the winning presidential candidate to prevail by 
narrow margins. 
 On the other hand, while both political parties may have preferred 
positions on education, local school tax proposals are at least nominally 
nonpartisan issues upon which it is unusual for a local political party to take a 
stand.   For many of these issues, we might expect local voters to take their cues 
about how to vote from local circumstances and not from party elites.  Without 
partisan cues or priming, we would expect people to base their vote for or against 
a tax proposal that will affect them directly on the merits of the proposal, 
regardless of for whom they would vote for in a presidential election.  If a 
community decides a ballot question on the merits without regard to partisan 
ideological thinking, there should be only a weak correlation (if any at all) 
between the presidential vote and the vote on the proposition.  Conversely, if the 
pattern of voting for a school tax bears a strong relationship with the pattern of 
voting for president, we have evidence that the tax question may have become 
incorporated within a more partisan ideological framework.   
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 If a school tax issue has become embedded within a partisan ideological 
framework, we should not expect the percentage of the vote cast by any precinct 
for or against a school tax question to approximate the percentage of the vote 
cast by that precinct for either presidential candidate.  My claim is that if 
ideological considerations are influencing the vote on the school tax to any large 
extent, the precinct-by-precinct pattern of voting in both elections will be similar.  
For purposes of consistency in this and the next three chapters, I have compared 
the vote in favor of Barack Obama in either 2008 or 201265 to the vote in favor of 
the school tax, on the assumption that approving the tax is more consistent with 
a Democratic orientation; I could just as easily have compared the vote in favor 
of Mitt Romney or John McCain and the vote against the school tax because the 
absolute value of the correlation will be the same.  By this procedure, I do not 
mean to imply that voting in favor of the school tax requires any great sympathy 
for a Democratic presidential candidate.  School districts that detest Democratic 
candidates might still be acting ideologically when they approve a tax increase if 
the pattern of the vote on the tax has a strong relationship with the pattern of the 
vote cast for the Democrat. 
 Data on vote by precinct both in presidential elections and in school tax 
elections is easy to find and generally available for download from local boards of 
election.  Information on home values is much more difficult to acquire.  In some 
places, county tax assessment records are available to the public without charge.  
                                            
65 School district and precinct boundaries change from time to time, particularly 
after redistricting that comes as the result of a decennial census.  I used the 
results of the Presidential election in which the precinct boundaries most closely 
resembled the precinct boundaries in the school district in 2011. 
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Where those records were not available, I used value assessments provided by 
private real estate companies.  The real estate value information used in this 
chapter comes from Zillow.com, a publicly held company that operates an online 
database of residential real estate.  For each property in the database, 
Zillow.com has created a “Zestimate” of the property’s fair market value.  Each 
Zestimate is based on publicly available information about a home including total 
square footage, location, number of bathrooms, number of bedrooms, lot size, 
tax assessments and comparable recent sales in the area (Zillow.com, 2011).  
The accuracy of any one “Zestimate” is not important for present purposes.  
What is important is that Zillow.com has applied the same methodology to real 
estate in the same market, and so even if a particular Zestimate is wrong, or 
even if all of its Zestimates are wrong, the real estate values presented will be 
correct relative to each other.  Since there can be hundreds of properties in any 
given precinct, I selected between 30 and 50 homes from each precinct and 
recorded their Zestimates by hand.  I then computed an average home value for 
each precinct in each of the school districts I selected as an example of an 
Adopter district and a Rejecter district. 
 By considering real estate valuation data with election return data, I can 
assess the extent to which political and economic considerations affected the 
school tax vote in the Adopter and Rejecter communities profiled in this and the 
next three chapters.  Since, at an aggregate level, education and home values 
are highly correlated in this quadrant, I predict that the precincts with high home 
values will also produce high percentages of votes in favor of the tax increase.  
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Since the Googleplex districts are Democratic in political orientation and since 
taxation is not the “hot button” issue to these kinds of voters that it is to 
Republicans, the results of the school tax election should be highly correlated 
with the vote for president for Adopters but more moderately correlated, if at all, 
with the vote for president for Rejecters.   This should be so because tax 
increases are a greater threat to the family budgets of the less affluent than they 
are to the more affluent.  Rejecter districts in this quadrant of the typology have 
lower levels of educational attainment and therefore, less wealth. 
Portland Schools District 1J, Oregon 
 
 The Portland school district is the largest school district in the Googleplex 
group of districts.  The district includes about 80% more people than the next 
largest school district in the group and is more than 2.5 times larger by 
population than the next largest Googleplex district that voted in favor of a tax 
increase.  It services more than six times more students than the average 
Googleplex Adopter district. The Portland school district has about the same 
level of diversity as the other Googleplex Adopters, and though the general level 
of educational attainment in Portland is somewhat higher than the average 
Googleplex district and the percentage of college graduates is somewhat lower 
than average, the differences are not significantly different from zero.   
 Portland, Oregon is a clear example of a brain hub.  According to Moretti, 
of all U.S. metropolitan areas, Portland has the 14th largest population of college 
graduates (Moretti, 2013, p. 94) and it produces almost as many patents per 
capita as does Boston (Moretti, 2013, p. 202).  Portland is a major producer of 
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silicon computer chips, and it is trying to “build the most sustainable economy in 
the world  . . . [to] become the capital of the global green economy” (Portland 
Development Commission, 2012).  SolarWorld, one of Germany’s top 
manufacturers of solar cells, has its North American headquarters and what it 
describes as “the largest and most advanced solar photovoltaics production 
facility in the Western Hemisphere” in Hillsboro, which is about 20 miles outside 
of Portland.  It placed its facilities in Hillsboro specifically because of its proximity 
to a “trained high-tech work force.”66  Vestas, a large producer of wind turbines is 
also located nearby. 
 In the Portland metropolitan area, high-tech industries are able to find the 
kinds of workers that they need because, with its relaxed atmosphere, 
recreational opportunities and cultural amenities, Portland has been able to 
attract a large number of young, college educated people.  As of the early part of 
the last decade, according to Cortright, “Portlanders [were] more physically active 
and recreationally oriented than the typical American, more literate and less 
television-addicted, more techonolgically adept and more environmentally active” 
(Cortright, 2002, p. 9).  Portland features a large number of used book stores, 
microbreweries and coffee shops,   Quoting Cortright, Bishop describes the 
Portland economy as built on “books, beer, bikes and Birkenstocks” (Bishop, 
2009, p. 198)  Portland has become attractive to the kind of people who “want 
good public transportation and city life . . . they want to be able to buy certain 
                                            
66 http://www.solarworld-usa.com/about-solarworld/locations 
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books, see certain kinds of movies, and listen to particular styles of live music” 
(Bishop, 2009, p. 201).   
 Portland’s cosmopolitan lifestyle is so attractive that people will apparently 
accept less in compensation than they could earn elswhere to live there (See 
Value of Jobs Coalition, 2013).  Though some of this can be attributed to the fact 
that Portland has a large number of people with degrees in the humanities and 
arts that lead to relatively lower paying jobs and a relatively small number of 
people with degrees in business, finance, management and law, (Value of Jobs 
Coalition, 2013), something else is going on.  Portland workers who are in 
business operations and finance make about $19,000 per year less than the 
national average; lawyers make about $43,000 less per year than the national 
average , (Value of Jobs Coalition, 2013).  There are similar differentials for 
many other professions.  Bryce Ward, an economist who was the lead 
researcher for the Value of Jobs Coalition, believes that “there is something 
different about who is choosing Portland and what else Portland is offering  to get 
them here that is not money” (Hammond, 2013).  
 Residents of Portland take public education seriously.  Six of the 18 high 
schools in the Portland school district have been rated as top schools by U.S. 
News and World Report.67   In a public opinion poll conducted in March of 2011, 
using a 10 point scale of important issues facting the Portland area, 47% rated 
education as either a nine or a ten, higher than any other concern except “the 




economy”.68   In the same poll, 61% rated “having good quality schools” either a 
9 or a 10 on a scale listing factors important to having a good quality of life.  
 All of this has given rise to a politically liberal orientation.  Portland has 
become very much a stronghold of the Democratic Party.  Barack Obama won 
over 75% of the vote in Portland in both the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections. 
Considering only the Portland school district, Obama won almost 85% of the two-
party vote in 2008.  Both of the legislators who represent the Portland school 
district’s zip code in the lower house of the state’s legislature are Democrats.  
Portland’s mayor and all of its four commissioners are also Democrats. 
 In 2011, the Portland school district sought to raise an additional $21 
million for school operations.  That entailed asking voters to raise property taxes 
by $0.74 per $1,000 in assessed property values.  According to the League of 
Women Voters, a Portland homeowner at the median assessed home value 
would see property taxes increase from about $184.00 per year to $300.00 per 
year or about $9.67 more per month for five years.69  Portlanders for Schools, a 
private group, raised $1.2 million to campaign in favor of the tax increase, 
claimed to have knocked on 60,000 doors and estimated that it made 35,000 
phone calls in support of the effort.70 There was apparently no organized 
opposition to the tax, although a group named Learn Now, Build Later 
                                            
68 http://www.portlandalliance.com/pdf/PBA-PGE-opinion-poll-summary.pdf 
69 http://lwvpdx.org/files/past-election-archive/voters-guide-may-2011 
70 www.portlandtribune.net/news/print_story.php?story_id=130565370675841800.  





campaigned against an associated bond issue, the proceeds of which Portland 
school district said it needed for school construction and renovation.  Proponents 
of the tax increase insisted that the additional funds were necessary to prevent 
the school system from having to lay off 200 teachers and increase class sizes.  
Opponents argued that additional taxes would be difficult for taxpayers to bear 
during the recession.71 
 The Portland school district adopted the tax increase by a vote of 58% in 
favor to 42% opposed.  To illustrate the influence of political ideology on the vote, 
in Figure 4-1, I plot the percentage of votes in favor of the school tax and the 
percentage of votes cast for Barack Obama in 2008 by precinct, with precincts 
ordered from lowest percentage of the vote in favor of the tax increase to the 
highest together with trend lines that facilitate the comparison.  The red line 
represents the precinct-by-precinct vote for Obama while the blue line represents 
the the precinct-by-precinct vote on the school tax.  





Figure 4- 1 Portland Vote for School Tax increase and Barack Obama 
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(Arranged by Ascending Percentage Vote in Favor of Increasing School Taxes)







The two lines both have similar positive slopes; their underlying datapoints have 
a correlation of r=0.75.  A regression of the precinct-by-precinct vote on the 
school tax on the precinct-by-precinct vote for Barack Obama discloses that the 
latter is a highly significant predictor of the school tax vote.  By itself, the vote for 
Barack Obama explains over 55% of the variation in the vote on the school tax; 
each 1 percent increase in a precinct’s vote for Barack Obama predicts about a 
1.25% increase in the vote for the school tax.  This is strong evidence that even 
though the school tax election was a formally nonpartisan issue, partisan political 
orientations played an important role in it. 
 The impact of wealth, measured by precinct average home value, is not 
quite as clear.  In Figure 4-2, I plot the results of both the 2008 Presidential vote 
and the 2011 school tax election for the 10 Portland districts that cast the lowest 
percentage of votes in favor of the school tax.  The precincts are arranged in 
ascending order by average home value.  As should be expected in a place 
populated by liberal Democrats, all of the precincts favored Barack Obama by a 
large margin.  There is not much variation (and therefore, not much of a pattern) 
in the presidential vote: It ranged only 7 percentage points between the highest 
and lowest average home value precincts. In these districts though, the school 
tax did not fare as well as the Democratic presidential candidate: The percentage 
of the vote in favor of the tax increase ranged between 28% and 41% though the 
percentage of the vote did tend to increase as the average home value increased.  
Overall, the correlation between the precinct-by-precinct vote in the presidential 
election and the school tax election in these 10 precincts was only a modest 0.38,  
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Figure 4- 2 Portland School Tax and Presidential Vote -- Lowest Precincts 
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about half of what the correlation between the 2008 Presidential vote and the 
school tax vote was without regard to home value. 
 On the other hand, for the 10 precincts that cast the highest percentages 
of votes in support of the school tax, the correlation between the presidential vote 
and the school tax vote was about 10 percentage points higher.  However, once 
again, this was well less than the correlation between the two votes depicted in 
Figure 4-2.  While the two votes depicted in Figure 4-3 show a more robust 
correlation, there is not much variation.  The percentage of the 2008 presidential 
vote that went to Barack Obama varies by about four percentage points and the 
total range for the vote on the school tax is only nine percentage points including 
the one precinct—precinct 4027--that appears to be a small outlier. 
 What is striking about Figures 4-2 and 4-3 are the relative sizes of the 
gaps between the lines.  It should be no surprise that the level of support a 
preferred candidate receives would be higher than the level of support a ballot 
initiative that promises to cost the voters money receives.  As a matter of self-
interest, a vote for Barack Obama can be seen as a symbolic act of identification 
because there are no immediate adverse consequences to a supporter for 
casting such a vote.  Any personal pecuniary consequences the voter 
experiences are likely to be diffuse and attenuated, resulting from eventual 
changes in national policy.  This is not so for a vote likely to cost the average 
voter about $116.00 more per year.   
 Portland is a liberal Democratic bastion, and so it is unlikely to harbor any 
of the almost reflexive aversion to additional taxes generally expected of
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Figure 4- 3 Portland School Tax and Presidential Vote-- Highest Precincts 
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Republican oriented places that I will discuss in greater detail in Chapters 6 and 
7.  Conflicting political ideology, therefore, does not explain the gaps.  Democrats 
do not dread the growth of the state the way Republicans typically do:  Judging 
by the results of an October 2011 Harris poll, Democrats are general much more 
sympathetic to education than are Republicans.72  But, while there may be a 
general partisan impulse to support the tax, a voter probably feels a lot less 
enthusiasm for the cause when it will cost him or her money. 
 That may explain why the school tax vote percentages are always below 
the presidential vote percentages, but it does not explain the difference in the 
sizes of the gaps.  What best explains the size of the gaps is wealth, pure and 
simple.  The precincts depicted in Figure 4-2 are all strong Democratic precincts, 
and were ideology the crux of the matter, we might expect the vote on the school 
tax to track the presidential vote the way it does in Figure 4-3, albeit with a lower 
intercept, given the lower intercept on the presidential vote line.  In the 10 
precincts that voted against the school tax by the greatest margin, the precinct 
average home values range from $145,600 to $311,300.  The average precinct  
home values for the precincts that provided the highest percentages of their 
votes in support of the school tax begin at $314,000--$2,700 more than the 
highest average precinct value for the other group--and end at $486,150.  Since 
                                            
72While majorities of both Democrats and Republicans, during tough economic 
times, favored an increase in public spending on education, there was a 20 point 
gap between the percentage of Democrats who favored increased educational 






the tax is based on assessed home value, this latter group would end up paying 
more in absolute terms.  Because they have higher home values, though, they 
are probably not as concerned about the impact of the tax on their family budgets 
as the people in the less expensive home value precincts, who will probably feel 
the weight of the tax more directly.  If the people living in the precincts with more 
expensive housing were, in fact, less concerned about the impact of the tax on 
their own consumption, they would be freer to vote in accordance with their 
political views.   This is might be why the school tax line in Figure 4-2 has a mild 
positive slope: People living in the Googleplex Adopter districts may become 
more willing to vote in accordance with their political orientations as the financial 
consequences of that vote become more affordable.   
St. Helens School District 502, Oregon 
 
 The St. Helens school district sits about 25 miles northwest of the center 
of Portland, Oregon.  It is home to about 20,000 people.  Though the St. Helens 
school district has a land area of approximately 100 square miles and a 
theoretical population density of about 195 people per square mile,73 three 
quarters of the population lives in either the city of St. Helens (which is the county 
seat of Columbia County, Oregon) or in Columbia City, where the population 
densities are much higher.  The remaining 5,000 people are scattered around the 
school district’s rural precincts.  The St. Helens school district operates one high 
                                            
73 I call these population density numbers “theoretical” because, to arrive at them, 
the American Community Survey simply divides the total population by the 
school district’s land area.  It does not take into account the fact that while the 
bulk of the population may live in densely populated population centers, the 
school district may have a large amount of farmland, parkland or undeveloped 
land. 
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school, one middle school, two elementary schools and two alternative schools, 
together serving about 3,650 students. 
 The St. Helens school district is within Portland’s economic orbit.  
According to the school district’s website, it has “small and large acreage home 
sites. . . for families who choose the rural life but have easy access to the 
Portland Metro area.  Many of our parents commute to work in the Portland 
Metro area on a daily basis, preferring the lifestyle of a smaller semi-rural area.”74 
 The St. Helens school district, though, is not a bedroom suburb of 
Portland, a place where Portland area workers simply choose a different lifestyle 
than is available in a big city. The people who live in the St. Helens district are 
demographically quite different from the people who live in Portland.   The 
adjusted median home value for the St. Helens school district is almost $113,000 
less than it is for Portland, and St. Helens school district residents earn, on 
average about $6,250.00 less annually than do Portland residents.   
 These differences are probably attributable to the large differences in 
educational attainment between Portland residents and St. Helens school 
district‘s residents.  On my measure of educational attainment, the St. Helens 
school district scores more than 27 percentage points lower than does Portland, 
and the percentage of the population holding at least bachelor’s degrees in the St. 
Helens school district is more than 29 percentage points lower than it is in 
Portland.  
                                            
74 http://www.sthelens.k12.or.us/site/Default.aspx?PageID=69 
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 This, in turn, is apparent in the kinds of professions and industries the 
people in these places choose. In Figure 4-4,  I compare the top careers for 
people working in the St. Helens and Portland school districts.   In Figure 4-5, I 
compare the top industries employing people in the two school districts. In all, 
Figure 4-4 accounts for 85.7% of the work force in the St. Helens school district 
and 95.66% of the Portland school district work force; Figure 4-5 accounts for 
66.48% of the St. Helens school district work force and 74.01% of the Portland 
school district work force.  

















Top Careers in St. Helens School District 





Figure 4- 5 Top Industries in Portland and St. Helens 
 
 In the St. Helens school district, the two largest categories of workers are 
managers/professionals and salespeople.  While the Portland school district has 
a slightly smaller percentage of workers engaged in sales, the percentage of 
workers who work as managers/professionals is almost twice as high.  The 
percentage of Portland workers engaged in production, manufacturing and 
material moving is only half as big as it is in the St. Helens school district, and in 
the St. Helens school district, the percentage of people working in construction, 
extraction maintenance and repair is almost three times bigger than it is in 
Portland school district.  In the Portland School district, on the other hand, almost 
87% of its workers are managers, professionals, salespeople and people who 
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 A fair inference from the employment and the educational data provided 
above is that the St. Helens school district is probably a “servants’ quarters” area 
composed largely of working class people for whom family financial 
considerations are quite important.  While the district’s median adjusted home 
value is about $52,000 higher than the median for the dataset, given its 
distribution of educational attainment and careers, the St. Helens School District 
provides evidence of Moretti’s claim that highly educated areas bring wealth not 
just to the highly educated, but to everyone in the community (Moretti, 2013, pp. 
4–5). 
 Politically, the St. Helens school district leans Democratic, though not as 
strongly as the Portland school district.  The mayors of both of the main 
population centers, Columbia City and St. Helens, are Democrats as are three of 
the four members of the St. Helens City Council.75  In 2012, Barack Obama 
received almost 55% of the two party vote cast in the St. Helens school district, a 
healthy majority, to be sure, but not anywhere near the percentage cast for 
Obama in the Portland school district. 
 In 2011, the St. Helens school district found itself in more severe fiscal 
straits than did the Portland school district.  In addition to state cutbacks that 
affected every Oregon school district equally, the St. Helens school district was 
facing a decline in enrollment that, in turn, affected the state funding formula: 
Fewer students meant fewer state dollars.  To close its projected deficit, the St. 
                                            
75 The party affiliations of the members of the Columbia City City Council were 
unavailable.  The official canvas of votes does not identify candidates for these 
offices by party. 
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Helens school district decided to ask voters for an additional $1.6 million through 
a levy that would increase the tax rate for five years by $1.20 per $1,000 
assessed value.76  For a home assessed at $210,000, that would have amounted 
to about $21.00 in additional taxes per month or $252.00 per year.  Approving 
the levy would have made it possible for the district to maintain (i) its K-6 music, 
library and physical education programs; (ii) current class sizes in grades K-6; (iii) 
its current level of courses for grades 7-12; (iv) its alternative high school 
program; (v) extra-curricular athletic programs for grades 7-12; and (vi) high 
school activities such as band, choir, drama, yearbook and newspaper without 
substantial cuts to the faculty resulting in larger class sizes.77 
 Voters rejected the tax increase by a vote of 36.18% in favor to 63.82% 
opposed. This vote was apparently not heavily influenced by political ideology.78  
First of all, if ideological concerns were important here, we should see a high 
correlation between the vote for president and the vote on the school tax just as 
we did in the Portland school district.  In fact, the correlation between the two 
votes is a quite modest r=0.34, less than half of what it was in the Portland 
school district.  Figure 4-6 shows the relationship between the two votes on a
                                            
76 This rate had been scaled back from $1.50 per $1,000 assessed value.  The 




77 St. Helens School District Local Option Expenditure Plan 
http://sccchamber.org/Resources/Documents/LevyExpenditurePlan_4-11-11.pdf 
78 Unlike the Portland school district, regressing the percent in favor of a tax 
increase on percent vote for Barack Obama produced a statistically insignificant 
coefficient, though it is unclear whether this is the true impact of the variable or 
whether there were too few cases to support a bivariate regression model. 
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precinct-by-precinct basis. Like the Portland school district, there is an overall 
gap between the two lines, but unlike the Portland school district, the voting 
patterns are much less consistent. 
 Figure 4-7 suggests an explanation for this pattern.  In Figure 4-7, I 
arrange the precincts in order by average precinct home value and then plot the 
results of the two elections.  Overall, the correlation between average precinct 
home values and the percentage vote for Obama in 2012 was r=-0.61.  As one 
might expect, voters in this Democratic leaning school district voters preferred 
Barack Obama to Mitt Romney in 2012; Obama just barely lost only two of the 18 
precincts in this school district.  Voters in the precincts with average precinct 
home values of $200,000 or less, though, voted in much greater percentages for 
the President than did voters in precincts where the average precinct home value 
was greater than $200,000.   
 Assuming that the voters in the precincts with average home values below 
$200,000 are, in fact, less well off financially than the people living in the higher 
average home value precincts, a fair inference is that these voters either did not 
see any harmful economic consequences flowing from Obama’s reelection, or 
thought of themselves as being net recipients of the income redistribution policies 
that Democrats tend to favor.  On the other hand, while, for the most part, still 
favoring Obama over Romney, the people living in the precincts with higher 
average home values were less enthusiastic about the President, perhaps  
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Figure 4- 7 St. Helens  Home Value, Presidential Vote and School Tax Vote 
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because they thought that they would be affected less positively by policies 
favored by Democratic politicians, and if this is so, than it can explain the 
negative correlation.  
 The same reasoning should apply to the school tax issue.  We observe, 
first of all, that there is a sizable intercept gap between the presidential vote and 
the school tax vote, just as we saw in the Portland school district.  If one is voting 
consistently with ideological principle, it is still far easier to vote for a favored 
candidate than for policies that will cost money in the immediately foreseeable 
future.  In this regard, it should be remembered that there are significantly more 
homeowners in the St. Helens school district than there are in the Portland 
school district.  Proportionately more households would, therefore, be affected 
directly by a tax increase in the St. Helens school district than in the Portland 
school district.  Second, for people living in precincts with average home values 
of $200,000 or less, the trend line is more or less flat.  While the voters in these 
precincts generally opposed the tax, the level of support for the tax does not 
materially increase or decrease with home values.  For voters in these precincts, 
ideology does not appear to play a part: The correlation between voting for 
Obama in 2012 and voting for a tax increase in 2011 was only r= 0.07.   
 While we would not expect this kind of a correlation for precincts where 
voters are voting consistently and ideologically, it is precisely the way we would 
expect precincts with poorer voters who expect to benefit from national 
redistributive programs to vote.  Voters in precincts where the average home 
value was greater than $200,000, had a much more negative reaction to the tax 
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than voters living in precincts where the average home value was less than 
$200,000.  Support for the tax drops precipitously among the precincts where the 
people who would have to pay the most.  Though the trend line turns generally 
positive after the huge drop in support for the tax at about $200,000 in average 
precinct home value—perhaps because of a return to ideologically influenced 
voting79—support for the tax by this subgroup of precincts never reaches 50%. 
 An op-ed from the Portland Tribune confirms this analysis.  Writing in 2013, 
columnist Darryl Swann noted that among the factors that lead to the defeat of 
the school tax in 2011, “[n]ot the least has been an oppressive economic climate 
that surely has dampened enthusiasm for any tax increase, whether it is for 
schools or local law enforcement in St. Helens.”80  
 This statement is telling.  In 2012, the local police department asked the 
voters for additional funds to restore four police officer positions cut from the 
force after the Great Recession began in 2008.  The additional tax sought by the 
police department was 20 cents less per $1,000 of assessed home value than 
the tax sought by the school system a year before.  Unlike the schools, a police 
department serves everyone in a community; police staffing levels have a direct 
impact on community safety and, in a tax election, we might expect it to fare 
somewhat better that a school district that serves only a subgroup of the 
community.  St. Helens rejected the request by a vote of 42.5% in favor and 
                                            
79 The correlation between the Presidential and school tax vote for precincts with 
average home values in excess of $200,000 is 0.45 indicating that as support for 
the President grew so did support for the tax increase or that as support for the 




57.4% opposed. The chief of police chalked the defeat up to  “a perfect storm“ of 
factors that focused the attention of voters on the economy. “I’m a taxpayer too,” 
he said. “I understand the hesitancy to commit to more taxes and say ‘Yeah, 
charge me more,’ when you have an option.” 81   
 While it is possible that the St. Helens school tax election and the police 
tax election turned on unique local factors, the local press coverage of both of 
these relatively contemporaneous elections is consistent.  In both cases, the 
reporters agreed that economic considerations played a key role. 
 What the data from the St. Helens school district suggest is that, at least in 
this relatively well-off Democratic leaning school district without a highly educated 
population, the school tax elections are likely to be shaped more by economic 
concerns than by ideological ones.  Unlike their highly educated counterparts in 
the Adopter districts, the voters in school districts like the St. Helens school 
district may not be as able to afford an ideological vote that impinges on the 
family budget.  Instead, even though a proposed tax increase may seem 
relatively small, voters in the school districts resembling the St. Helens school 
district may choose to vote “selfishly” by rejecting the collective good in favor of 
the personal one. 
Conclusion 
 
 For school districts located in Democratic communities with home values 
is above the dataset median, there is no better predictor of a school tax election 
than the general level of educational attainment.  A high level of educational 




attainment makes it more likely that communities in these kinds of places will 
adopt a school tax increase; as the general level of educational attainment 
declines, so do the chances that the school district will get the tax increase it has 
requested. 
 A high level of educational attainment brings with it a number of 
demographic characteristics that make it much easier for these kinds of 
communities to act in accordance with what are ordinarily principles associated 
with Democrats.  First of all, high levels of educational attainment are associated 
with greater wealth and higher incomes.  Because of their greater wealth and 
higher incomes, residents of these brain hub districts have a greater capacity to 
bear the cost of the tax increases sought.  Without this additional level of wealth, 
servants’ quarters districts find it much more difficult to pass school tax increases. 
 Second, Democrats with higher educational attainment may simply see 
education as a good in and of itself because their personalities may make them 
more open to experience than are others.82  If they are relatively well off, more 
education or better education may be well worth a modest increase in taxes as 
an investment in good social policy.  Without the same experience with education 
                                            
82These are Democrats, after all.  It is likely that as Democrat, the residents of 
these communities are likely to be characterized by “openness to experience,” 
which is a “Big Five” personality trait normally associated with liberals. (Gerber, 
Huber, Doherty, & Dowling, 2010; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, & Ha, 2010; 
Haidt, 2013, p. 142)  People characterized by this personality trait “tend to be 
artistic, nonconforming, intellectual, aware of their feelings, and comfortable with 
new ideas” (Barondes, 2012, p. 18). These are precisely the kind of people who 
would have invested more of their lives in learning about new things and who 
would see education as a good in and of itself. 
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that their neighbors in the brain hubs have, servants’ quarters districts are less 
enthusiastic about providing more money to their school systems. 
 If people in these communities are more open to experience, then they are 
also probably less likely to accept, tolerate or act on racial stereotypes (Flynn, 
2005).  That may be why the Racial Diversity Hypothesis has no explanatory 
power in Googleplex districts.  I have provided evidence that, at least for parents 
in the brain hubs, there is probably not a high degree of discomfort with rising 
levels of diversity in the community, and to the extent that they have chosen to 
move their children from public schools to private ones, the likely explanation is 
that they are looking for a better quality education for their children.  Even though 
Figure 4-1 shows that in Rejecter districts, increased minority enrollment predicts 
an increase in private school enrollment, the predicted increase in private school 
enrollment is less than a full percentage point after moving from the smallest 
minority enrollment to the largest. This suggests that these servants’ quarters 
areas are also highly tolerant. 
 The Portland and St. Helens school districts provide evidence about how 
political orientation, wealth and the willingness to accept a tax increase interact in 
these districts.  In the Portland school district, presidential voting and voting on 
the tax increase were highly correlated and regression analysis shows that voting 
for Barack Obama for president was a strong predictor of the vote on the school 
tax.  In the St. Helens school district--a less affluent community--the correlation 
between presidential voting and voting for a school tax increase was about half 
what it was in Portland.  The data suggest that the reason for the difference may 
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boil down to economic self-interest, perhaps because the impact of an increased 
school tax would have a greater impact on the family budgets of the people living 
in school districts like the St. Helens school district than in school districts like the 
Portland school district. 
 As I discussed in Chapter 3, even though both districts have a Democratic 
political orientation, the school districts in the Clintonland group have a different 
demographic profile than the school districts in the Googleplex quadrant.  In the 
next chapter, I examine the districts in the Clintonland group in order to explain 
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0.851 0.522 0.005 
Homeowners -4.906 
(3.059) 
-0.431 -0.201 0.055 
Whites -1.98 
(1.492) 
-0.236 -0.119 0.093 
Children -7.025 
(4.365) 





-0.678 -0.271 0.09 
Constant 10.998 
(0.651) 
   
N 54    
Pseudo R2 .2772    






Homeowners in Clintonland 
 
 If it was difficult, in the Googleplex group, for less wealthy districts that 
lean left politically to adopt tax increases, we ought to expect similar reluctance in 
Democratically oriented school districts where one of the defining characteristics 
is a relative lack of wealth.  We have already seen some evidence of this in 
Chapter 3: Despite a general Democratic orientation, Clintonland school districts 
passed tax increases at a rate well below that of the Googleplex group, but at a 
much higher rate than those of the Republican districts in the typology. 
 Wealth, as an explanatory factor for the results of school tax elections, 
though, is a double-edged sword.  For wealthy people, such as those in the 
Googleplex brain hubs, wealth allows voters a certain amount of freedom to 
consider the purposive benefits of a tax increase without substantial concerns 
about its impact on material well-being:  A relatively few more tax dollars per year 
for voters in wealthier districts probably means much less than the feeling of 
having done “the right thing” for the community.  For people somewhat lower on 
the wealth distribution pyramid, those “few extra dollars” may take an 
uncomfortable bite out of the monthly family budget.  And finally, people with little 
wealth—and therefore a belief that a tax that targets real estate will not touch 
them directly—might perceive that a vote in favor of a new school tax will provide 
them, their children or people they care about with material or other benefits for 
which they will not have to pay, enabling them to vote in favor of a tax increase 
with impunity.  
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 By definition, the Clintonland districts are places where home values are 
relatively low.  Like almost everything else in a relatively free market, home 
values there depend on supply and demand.  From the fact that Clintonland 
home values are relatively low, we can infer that these districts are not as 
attractive to wealthier Democratic leaning home buyers as are the homes in the 
Googleplex districts.  If they were, we might expect home prices to rise as 
wealthier people bid up their prices, as they have done in places such as 
Portland.  If it is true that the people living in the Clintonland districts are not 
wealthy, then we also ought to expect that when we consider tax elections in 
those districts, we are probably not dealing with many people who can afford to 
indulge ideological predilections. Instead, we are dealing with people for whom 
the economic impact of the tax is the primary concern. 
 We already know from Chapter 3 that the median level of educational 
attainment in the Clintonland districts is much lower than it is in the Googleplex 
districts, and when we couple that with the fact that these districts are also not as 
rich, we ought to expect that a Democratic political orientation means something 
different in these districts than it does in the more affluent school districts 
discussed in the preceding chapter.  As I will show, the Clintonland districts are 
generally populated by downscale, moderate or even conservative Democratic 
voters who tend to be more comfortable with relatively conservative Democrats 
such as Hillary Clinton than they were with politicians who have more liberal 
“brands” such as Barack Obama in 2008 (though they preferred Barack Obama 
over John McCain in 2008 and over Mitt Romney in 2012).  
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 Taking these considerations into account, I will argue that a general 
appreciation for education in these districts is not enough to win a school tax 
election there.  Instead, with an electorate composed of homeowners, renters 
and poor people, economic considerations will be dominant. Ideology should not 
be as important in Clintonland school tax elections as it was in the Googleplex 
districts, and when we compare the vote for the tax, the vote for president and 
home values, we will find that the correlations between the school tax vote and 
the vote for president are much smaller than they were in the Googleplex group 
and not nearly as high as the correlation between the school tax vote and home 
values.  Hard pressed, downscale districts where there are relatively more 
people who are likely to have to pay the additional tax directly—districts with a 
large number of homeowners--should be less likely to approve school tax 
increases than poorer districts with fewer people who are likely to believe that the 
additional tax will hurt them directly.   
 To support my argument, I first provide a general overview of the 
Clintonland districts, and then highlight the economic and social differences 
between its Adopter Districts and Rejecter Districts.  I then show that the school 
districts in the Clintonland group that were the most likely to adopt new school 
taxes were poorer and had fewer homeowners than the districts that rejected 
them.  I illustrate my argument with a profile of the Parma school district, an Ohio 
district that adopted a tax increase, and with a profile of the Amherst school 
district, an Ohio district that rejected one.  Using election and home value data, I 
show that in contrast to the Googleplex Adopter districts, home values have a 
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much stronger correlation with the school tax vote than does the presidential vote.  
From all of this I infer that personal economic considerations and not political 
ideology are the best explanation of the outcomes in the Clintonland school tax 
elections. 
Overview of the Clintonland Districts  
 
 The less affluent Democratic Clintonland districts that adopted tax 
increases in 2011 are quite different from the affluent Democratic Googleplex 
districts discussed in Chapter 4.   In addition to having far less in terms of wealth 
and income than the districts discussed in Chapter 4, the Clintonland districts, as 
a group, have somewhat more whites and homeowners than did the Googleplex 
districts.  On average, they also have much smaller populations and much lower 
theoretical population densities, fewer public school students, and minority 
enrollments about 9 percentage points lower than those that exist in the 
Googleplex school districts.  As noted in Chapter 3, about 59.5% of the 
Clintonland districts are suburban and about 21.4% are rural, whereas over 70% 
of the districts in the Googleplex group are suburban and only about 18.5% are 
rural.  As I will discuss in greater detail later, the Clintonland districts are the 
kinds of places that prefer moderate to conservative Democratic politicians such 
as Bill and Hillary Clinton to more liberal ones such as Barack Obama.  Even 
though these districts prefer Democrats, the general political center-left 
inclination to embrace government rather than to fear it is not enough to make 
passing school tax increases likely. 
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 Just as the Adopters and Rejecters in the Googleplex group are 
distinguishable from each other on the basis of educational attainment, the 
Adopters and Rejecters in the Clintonland group are distinguishable from each 
other on the basis of economic traits.  Though the median home values of the 
Adopter and the Rejecter district are not statistically different from each other, 
Rejecter districts have about $5,700 more, on average, in income than do the 
Adopters, and while that may not seem like much in absolute terms, it does 
amount to a statistically significant difference of about 12.1%.83 Measured by the 
percentage of people in each district who live at or below the poverty level, 
Adopter districts are poorer by about 4 percentage points, again, a difference that 
does not seem very great in absolute terms but does reach statistical 
significance.84  It should not be surprising, then, to find that lower incomes and 
more poverty suggest places that also have younger populations85 and more 
unoccupied residential property.86 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that added wealth enabled voters to 
focus on the purposive benefits of the tax increase and not on its impact on the 
family budget.  That is apparently not what is happening in the Clintonland 
districts.  Here, it appears that relative affluence at the margins cuts against tax 
                                            
83 p=0.019 (one-tailed) 
84 p=0.014 (one-tailed) 
85 Median age in the Adopter districts is about 3 years lower than in the Rejecter 
districts, p=0.004 (one-tailed), and the percentage of households with people 60 
years old or older is about 2.4 percentage points lower in the Adopter districts, 
p=0.027 (one-tailed) 
86 Unoccupied housing units in the Adopter districts exceeded unoccupied 
housing units in the Rejecter districts by, on average, about 3.3 percentage 
points, p=0.029 (one-tailed) 
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increases while districts that are worse off economically actually seem to stand a 
better chance of passing them.  
 A moment’s reflection discloses why that could be sensible.  School tax 
increases are generally increases in the tax on real estate. Regardless of 
whether one owns any real estate, taxes imposed on real property owners can 
be passed through by landlords to their tenants in the form of higher rent; if the 
tenants are businesses, they can pass that additional rent along to customers in 
the form of higher prices. Since tax increases affect all property in a school 
district, there is little competitive pressure for landlords and for business tenants 
to absorb the tax increase.  It is more sensible to pass those tax increases on to 
others by raising prices since, theoretically, everyone will do so and no one will 
suffer a competitive disadvantage.    
 Even though this is how the economics of a property tax work, 
homeowners tend to perceive such taxes as levied against them because the tax 
impact is direct and immediate (Berkman & Plutzer, 2005, p. 44); renters may 
end up paying higher rent in the next lease year (if they have not moved to 
another community), but that higher rent can be perceived as part of a general 
escalation in prices due to inflation. 
 Because the impact of increased school taxes is direct and immediate, 
homeowners who are not affluent in absolute terms may care a lot more about 
increased property taxes than either their counterparts in the Brain Hubs of the 
Googleplex districts (who actually are affluent in absolute terms) or their rent-
paying neighbors.  Consistent with a version of the Homeowner Hypothesis, 
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Clintonland district homeowners may resist proposed tax increases because they 
perceive additional taxes to be unaffordable, and, depending on their financial 
sophistication, an unfair attempt to redistribute their meager wealth to others.   
On the other hand, renters, who will not feel the brunt of the tax until rents go up 
in the next contract year, may perceive a vote in favor of increased taxes as a 
consequence-free vote in support of the community or their children.   
 If this is what is going on in the Clintonland Districts, we should expect to 
find evidence of this behavior in the general-purpose logistic regression model.  
In fact, that is what we do find.  In Table 5-1, I report the results of a logistic 
regression of election results in the Clintonland district on all of the same 
variables detailed in Chapter 3.  Table 5-1 shows that the Homeowners variable 
reaches statistical significance; moving from the district one standard deviation 
below the mean to the district one standard deviation above the mean implies a 
decrease in the likelihood of passing a tax increase by about 45.4%.87 
 Two of the variables in the general-purpose logistic model—Homeowners 
and Whites—correlate strongly at r=0.75, making the results of the model 
somewhat suspect due to collinearity.  The Homeowner variable is also collinear 
with two other economic variables discussed above that distinguish Adopter 
districts from Rejecter districts but had to be left out of the general-purpose 
regression model because of concerns about statistical power and 
                                            
87 Considering the full range of the variable, moving from the district with the 
lowest percentage of homeowners to the district with the highest percentage of 
homeowners decreases the likelihood of a tax increase by 81.1%. 
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multicollinearity.  Those variables are adjusted median income (r=0.82) and the 
percentage of households at or below the poverty line (r=-0.79).  It is not  




















Educational Attainment -.117 
(3.533) 
0.014 0.106 0.487 
Homeowners -10.21 
(2.555) 
-0.811 -0.67 0.000 
Whites 5.588 
(1.552) 
0.58 0.594 0.000 
Seniors -11.245 
(6.777) 
0.723 -0.048 0.049 
Children88 18.265 
(11.654) 
0.88 0.304 .0585 
Total Population (log) -0.591 
(0.27) 
-0.666 -0.282 0.014 
Constant -12.419 
(3.058) 
   
N = 42     
Pseudo R2 = 2872     
 
surprising that a principal components factor analysis finds that all four of these 
variables load heavily on a single latent factor. 
 To get a sense of how each of these variables works independently of the 
effect of the collinearity, I reran the model four times, omitting three of the 
collinear variables each time.89  The full models appear in Tables 5A-2 through 5-
                                            
88 From Alternative Specification.  See Table 5A-1 in the Appendix 
89 Because I had removed a variable from each of these models I could add in 
the Children variable without affecting statistical power or accuracy. 
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5A-5 in the Appendix to this chapter.  In Table 5-2 I report the results for only the 
variables of interest: 









from 1 Std. 
Dev. Below 







-0.553 -0.269 0.000 
Whites 1.568 
(0.633) 
0.25 0.12 0.007 
Poverty 11.911 
(3.782) 





-0.837 -0.389 0.001 
 
Table 5-2 confirms the analysis thus far.  The Homeowners variable retains 
statistical significance and continues to have a strong impact on the probability of 
passing a tax increase. Without the effects of the Homeowners variable, the 
Whites retains its statistical significance, but its impact on the probability of 
adopting a tax increase is greatly reduced and, in absolute terms, has less than 
half of the impact of the Homeowners variable.  Though all of the variables bear 
the expected signs, the economic variables are the ones that make the most 
substantial contribution to the likelihood that a district will adopt a tax increase. 
 
Detailed Illustrations 
Political Orientation, Taxes and Redistribution 
 
 I have selected the Parma, Ohio school district to represent the Adopter 
districts in the Clintonland group because its demographics make it typical of the 
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other districts in this group of districts.  Home values, median income, the 
percentage of whites, the percentage of homeowners, the percentage of college 
graduates and the general level of educational attainment are at about the 
respective means for the quadrant.   
 The Rejecter district I have selected, the Amherst school district, also in 
Ohio, is doing somewhat better economically than the Parma school district.  It 
has higher home values, higher income, higher percentages of homeowners and 
college graduates and a somewhat lower percentage of people living at or below 
the poverty level.  Both districts are working class suburban school districts in 
Cuyahoga County. The Parma school district is about five times larger than the 
Amherst district and educates about three times as many students. 
 Though Democratic in political orientation, as previously suggested, the 
Democratic voters in these places are more conservative than the voters who live 
in the Portland school district.  In March of 2008, well before it became clear that 
Barack Obama would win the Democratic Party’s nomination for president, 
Democratic voters in these two school districts were offered a choice between 
two versions of the Democratic Party’s vision of the future in the form of Hillary 
Rodham Clinton and Barack Obama. Table 5-3 provides selected demographic 
data about national supporters of Hillary Rodham Clinton, Barack Obama, 
Portland school district voters, Parma school district voters, Amherst school 
district voters and summary statistics for the Clintonland group of school districts 
as a whole: 
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Table 5- 3 Preferences for Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton in  Googleplex and Clintonland 




Parma Amherst Portland Quadrant 
Income $55,585 $54,056 $48,188 $64,154 $50,956 $50,144 
Ideology—
Liberal 
22.5% 34.78% N/A** N/A** N/A** N/A** 
Ideology—
Conservative 




20.52% 27.25% 20.74% 24.14% 47.32% 20.64% 
Home 
Ownership 
66.52% 58.43% 73.39% 82.27% 53.54% 72.04% 
Age > 54 39.16% 32.46% 40.97% 40.66% 27.7% N/A** 
Age < 45 40.71% 45.83% 39.38 36.71 55.72 N/A** 
Whites 61.82% 49.91% 94.14 91.38 79.9 83.39% 
*A person was counted as a Clinton Supporter if, in the 2008 ANES, his or her feeling 
thermometer score was higher for Clinton than for Obama. 
**Data unavailable 
   
 The data provided in the Clinton Supporter and Obama Supporter 
columns are based on responses from all 2008 American National Election Study 
respondents, unfiltered by party identification.  This table shows two things of 
importance to the present analysis.  First, it shows that the kinds of people who 
favored Hillary Clinton in 2008 were demographically distinct from the kinds of 
people who supported Barack Obama.  Clinton Supporters were generally older, 
less likely to be college graduates, more likely to be white, more likely to be 
homeowners and more likely to describe their political ideology as conservative 
than were Obama Supporters.  Second, it shows that while Portland’s 
demographics are generally closer to the demographics of the Obama 
Supporters, the demographics of the Parma school district and the Amherst 
school district, as well as the demographics for the Clintonland quadrant as a 
whole, track more closely with the demographic characteristics of the Clinton 
Supporters than the Obama Supporters.   
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 Given the concordance of the Parma school district and the Amherst 
school district demographic characteristics with those of the typical ANES Clinton 
Supporter, it is not surprising that when given the choice between these two 
potential Democratic Party standard-bearers, the voters in the Parma school 
district and the Amherst school district chose Clinton by a wide margin.  Clinton 
won every precinct in each school district with margins that ranged from six 
percentage points to almost 30 percentage points.  A fair inference from all of this 
is that the people in these school districts (and, probably the people in the rest of 
the school districts in this quadrant) are largely conservative Democrats, and 
they probably share a number of political and economic attitudes. 
 While the ANES did not ask any questions relating to school taxes, it did 
ask a number of questions related to taxation in general.  Clinton Supporters and 
Obama Supporters had different attitudes toward taxation.  I summarize the 
results in Table 5-4.  Clinton Supporters were less willing than Obama  





Favor higher gas taxes 14.88% 18.06% 
Favor raising taxes to cut budget deficit 17.07% 27.02% 




Supporters to approve of higher taxes on gasoline or to increase taxes to cut the 
federal budget deficit.  They also were more willing to agree that the federal 
government wastes a lot of money than to say that it only wastes some money or 
it does not waste very much at all.  A principal components factor analysis of 
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these responses shows that they tap a single latent factor or underlying 
attitude.90  It is a fair inference that these questions are tapping an attitude about 
taxation because adding responses to an ANES question about trust in 
government to the factor analysis yields a second latent factor upon which the 
trust in government factor loads heavily but upon which the other variables load 
only marginally. 
 While it cannot be known how ANES respondents would have answered a 
question about increased school taxes, a 2010 NBC/Wall Street Journal Poll91 
did ask whether respondents were willing to increase federal taxes to pay for 
public education; in addition, the poll used 5-point Likert scales to rate both 
Barack Obama and Bill Clinton.  Bill Clinton and Hillary Clinton had similar feeling 
thermometer scores in the 2008 ANES Survey92, and so it is reasonable to 
assume that the respondents from the 2010 poll would have probably rated 
Hillary Clinton about the same way they rated Bill Clinton, particularly relative to 
Barack Obama. While 77% of the respondents who preferred Obama to Clinton 
approved of higher federal taxes for public education, only 57% of the Clinton 
Supporters similarly approved.  
 If the Clinton Supporters in the 2010 poll hold attitudes about taxation 
similar to the Clinton Supporters in the 2008 poll, then it is fair to infer that people 
who resemble the Clinton Supporters (such as the residents of the Parma school 
                                            
90 Rotated factor loading values range between 0.4652 and 0.76. 
91 Survey by NBC News, Wall Street Journal. Methodology: Conducted by Hart 
and McInturff Research Companies, September 22 - September 26, 2010 and 
based on 1027 interviews. Sample: National adult. 
92 The mean feeling thermometer reading for Hillary Clinton was 62.95, which is 
not significantly different from Bill Clinton’s 63.35 feeling thermometer score. 
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district and the Amherst school district) probably share the attitude expressed by 
the Clinton Supporters in the ANES and the NBC/Wall Street Journal poll about 
taxation.  What is not clear is why they hold this attitude.  One possibility is that, 
with a more conservative outlook on government, they object to higher taxes on 
principle.  The second possibility is that they believe that they will have difficulty 
coping with the additional burden that higher taxes will impose on them.   
 One reason to accept the latter possibility and reject the former is that 
though they have a greater resistance to additional taxes, survey respondents 
did not have objections to the services additional taxes would pay for.   For 
example, in the 2008 ANES, respondents were asked whether they would like to 
see various elements of social spending increased, decreased or kept about the 
same. Results for people who preferred Clinton to Obama, Obama to Clinton and 
McCain to Clinton appear in Table 5-5: 







Increase Spending on Public Schools 52.55% 53.27% 45.73% 
Increase Spending on Welfare Programs 56.46% 57.48% 49.80% 
Increase Spending on Child Care 50.66% 53.91% 44.24% 
Increase Spending on the Poor 46.71% 53.95% 43.63% 
Increase Spending on Services  35.07% 47.10% 24.81% 
 
 Though there is no way of knowing whether survey respondents actually 
link their views on taxation to spending, we should expect that at least some 
respondents do make that link, and thus, that responses to questions about 
                                            
93 It is possible that some people might not have seen John McCain as an 
appropriate representative of conservative policy.  Substituting Republican 
feeling thermometer scores for McCain feeling thermometer scores does not 
materially change the results shown in Table 5-5.  
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spending bear some relationship to attitudes on taxation (see Welch, 1985).94   
We expect that McCain Supporters will generally be ideologically opposed to 
increased levels of government spending and the taxes that go with increased 
levels of spending. That is what we find.  By contrast, majorities of Clinton 
Supporters and Obama Supporters would be willing to spend more money on 
public schools, welfare programs and childcare.95  
                                            
94 Welch found that 48% of survey respondents who expressed a desire for 
increased local services were also willing to pay for them through increased 
taxation while 40% were willing to pay for the services they wanted by making 
realistic reallocations of local resources spent on other, unwanted services.  “We 
have shown that the inconsistency of citizens wanting more for less, more 
services and less spending, probably is a paradox for only a minority.  Most 
citizens are willing to raise additional revenue to pay for these services, or at 
least to reallocate from less desired to more desired services. Very few citizens 
think we can rely solely on greater efficiencies in government to pay for 
increased services, and only 12-22 percent seem to favor reallocation or 
intergovernmental aid in a way inconsistent with their preferences” (Welch, 1985, 
pp. 315–16).     
95 The attitude of Clinton Supporters toward increased spending on the poor and 
increased Spending on Services is puzzling.  Given that the Clinton Supporters 
are significantly more likely to be white and less racially tolerant than the Obama 
Supporters, we should expect them to hold highly negative attitudes toward 
welfare spending, seeing it as a handout to blacks (Gilens, 2000).  Instead we 
see a high level of support for increased welfare spending among Clinton 
Supporters when asked specifically about welfare spending, but a much less 
supportive response when asked generally about helping the poor or providing 
more social services in general.  The correlation between responses to the 
spending on welfare question and the spending on the poor question is only 
r=0.12 for the dataset in general and r=0.12 for the Clinton Supporters.  The 
implication is that Clinton Supporters are probably wary of generalized spending 
through programs with which they are not familiar but are generally willing to 
support programs they know and understand.  Another possibility is that though 
median income for Clinton Supporters and Obama Supporters is about 
equivalent, according to the ANES, the percentage of Clinton Supporters worried 
about losing a job in 2008 was about 8 percentage points greater than that of the 
Obama Supporters worried about losing a job.  If that is the case, then 
willingness to support welfare spending, conceived of as temporary aid rather 
than assistance to people who hold a particular status is an exercise in self-
interest:  People who lose jobs are beneficiaries of increased government 
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 Another reason to accept the economic explanation arises form a 
comparison of the election results in the Parma school district and the Amherst 
school district to home values using the same general procedure I used in 
Chapter 4.   If attitudes toward taxation in general are based on ideological 
considerations, we should expect that voting on the school tax proposals in both 
jurisdictions should correlate more strongly with the vote for president than they 
do with home values, as was the case in Portland.  On the other hand, if 
economic considerations were more important, we should expect that the vote on 
the school tax should correlate more strongly with average precinct home values.  
As I show below, these comparisons support the economic explanation. 
 The Parma City School District 
 
 The Parma school district is a relatively large suburban school district 
located just south of Cleveland.  It includes the City of Parma, the City of Parma 
Heights and the City of Seven Hills. Democratic officials govern both the City of 
Parma and the City of Parma Heights, while Republican officials govern the City 
of Seven Hills. The district has over 114,000 residents and serves over 12,000 
students.  It is an overwhelmingly white community where non-whites make up 
less than 6% of the population.  Overall, the rate of homeownership in the Parma 
school district is close to 75%.   In 2011, it had 18 schools, including 12 
elementary schools, three middle schools and three high schools.  For the 2010-
2011 school year, the Ohio Department of Education had rated the system as 
excellent.  
                                                                                                                                  
spending without any obligation to pay additional taxes because they have no 
income. 
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 Prior to the May 2011 election, the Parma school district had sought 
unsuccessfully to raise the school tax on seven consecutive previous occasions.  
The district had begun to accrue a deficit that had the potential to allow the State 
of Ohio to take control of the district’s finances.  To address those deficits, the 
school system had taken steps that were not popular with system stakeholders. 
According to the Cleveland Plain Dealer, these steps included: 
• A contract imposed on unionized teachers, whose leader called the 
school board  “tyrants”; 
• Cuts to teaching and other jobs; 
• Requiring students to pay participation fees to participate in extra-
curricular activities and sports teams; and 
• Cuts in classes for high-school students to state minimum 
standards;96 
In urging his community to adopt the tax increase, former Parma school district 
teacher and school tax election volunteer Gerald Manganella wrote: 
The real victims are the children of our Tri-City communities. Passing the 
levy is their only chance. There is no other option. In three years, there is 
an impossible $44 million deficit barreling down on the district which has 
already cut $18 million from the budget and has eliminated 200 employees. 
Our current course offerings are a disgrace. Middle school youngsters are 
spending three periods in study halls due to program cutbacks. Our senior 





high students are being offered the bare course minimums and this puts 
them at a great disadvantage when competing with students in other 
school districts. Class sizes at the elementary schools will increase 
dramatically.97 
 One thing that had apparently made it difficult for the community to adopt 
a tax increase was that the schools and the community did not have a “good 
healthy relationship.”98  To fix that relationship, the Parma school district hired a 
new superintendent in August of 2010.  The Cleveland Plain Dealer gave him 
kudos for spending the time between August 2010 and the May 2011 election 
“reaching out to the community” in a bid to regain trust and credibility.99 
 The Parma school district sought to increase the school tax by about 
16.3%, resulting in an annual increase in school taxes of  $212.00 per year 
($17.67 per month) on each $100,000 in assessed home value.  Even with the 
additional money, the Parma school district would still face difficult choices to 
balance its books.  Prior to the May, 2011 ballot, to save up to $2.5 million, 
Superintendent Jeffrey Graham recommended that at least four of the district’s 
12 elementary schools be closed, that high schools add the eighth grade 
students currently enrolled in the district’s middle schools and that fifth graders 












be added to the district’s middle schools.100  In endorsing the Parma school 
district’s funding request, the Cleveland Plain Dealer noted: 
After seven straight levy defeats, the Parma schools have cut to the bone; 
property values will follow close behind any academic slippage for the 
excellent-rated district.  Despite the fiscal trauma, Parma still sinks $7 of 
every $10 it spends into the classroom, an exceptionally high percentage.  
Its money woes have helped it focus on core operations, needed 
restructuring and long-term planning.  But the worst may be yet to come.  
District officials warn that “failure to pass the levy = state of emergency.”  
That would be a terrible blow to a distinguished inner-ring school 
system.101  
 Voters in the Parma school district narrowly approved the tax increase 
with a vote of 50.54 percent in favor, a margin of only 314 votes.  In Figure 5-1, I 
plot the percentage of votes in favor of the school tax and the percentage of 
votes cast for Barack Obama in 2008 by precinct with precincts ordered from 
lowest percentage of the vote in favor of the tax increase to the highest.  I also 
display trendlines for both elections to make the two lines more easily 
comparable.  Unlike Portland, where the correlation between voting for Barack 
Obama in 2008 and voting for the tax increase in 2011 was r=0.75, the 







correlation here is only r=0.11.   For Portland, a regression of the precinct-by-
precinct vote for the school tax on the precinct-by-precinct vote for Barack 
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Figure 5- 1 School Tax Vote and Obama Vote in Parma 
y = 0.0023x + 0.4163
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Obama yielded a prediction that each 1% increase in the percentage vote for 
Barack Obama would increase the percentage vote in favor of increasing the 
school tax by 1.25%, and explained  over 55% of the variation in the vote for the 
school tax.  By contrast, for the Parma school district, a similar regression model 
explains only about 5% of the variation and implies only a 0.22 point increase in 
the percentage in favor of increasing school taxes for each 1% increase in the 
percentage vote for Barack Obama.102  
 Home values played a much more important role in this tax election.  
Using Cuyahoga County’s property assessment records for substantially all of 
the homes located in the Parma school district, aggregated so as to arrive at an 
average precinct home value for all but the four precincts that had only rental 
property, the correlation between the precinct-by-precinct percentage vote in 
favor of the was r=-0.27, in absolute terms, more than twice the correlation 
between the precinct-by-precinct vote for Obama and precinct vote for the school 
tax.  The result of regressing the percentage in favor of the school tax on 
precinct-by-precinct home values is that every $100,000 in average precinct 
home value would reduce the percentage vote in favor of the tax increase by 
6.9%.103  By itself, home value explained 12.35% of the variation, more than 
twice as much as the presidential vote explains.  When both variables are added 
to a single model, the presidential vote variable loses all statistical significance 
while the home value remains highly significant and predicts that every additional 
$100,000 in home value would decrease the percentage of votes in favor of the 
                                            
102 p=0.041. 
103 p=0.001 (one-tailed). 
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tax increase by 7.26%, a 5.2% increase in the variable’s negative impact on the 
school tax vote.  Together, the two variables explain only 0.09% more of the 
variation in the school tax vote than the home value variable explains by itself.  
This is strong evidence that, at least for the Parma school district, economic 
considerations related to home values trumped ideological considerations in the 
2011 school tax election.   
 Because the Cuyahoga County residential real estate tax assessment 
records did not include more than a few values for properties located in precincts 
dominated by rental areas such as apartment buildings and trailer parks, I 
excluded Parma precincts 1-G, 4-G and Parma Heights precincts B and N from 
the regression models.  Voting in favor of the tax increase in the district as a 
whole ranged from between 40% and 65%.  All of the excluded precincts cast in 
excess of 58% of their votes in favor of the tax; three of the four cast in excess of 
63% of their votes in favor of the tax. Seven of the remaining 10 precincts that 
cast the greatest percentage of their votes in favor of the tax increase had mean 
property values of less than $100,000 while eight of the precincts with the 
smallest percentage of votes in favor of the tax had home values in excess of 
$100,000.104  This is consistent with the idea that in less affluent Democratic 
communities, those voters who would be the least directly affected by a property 
tax increase would be the most likely to vote in favor of it and that those who 
would feel the pinch more directly would be the most likely to vote against it. 
                                            
104 Of those, five had home values in excess of $140,000; four of those were 
located in Republican dominated Seven Hills. 
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 Much of this resistance to additional taxes, at least in the Parma school 
district, appears to come from senior citizens.  In Ohio, the state exempts the first 
$25,000 in assessed home value of disabled people and senior citizens from 
property tax.105  Cuyahoga County’s tax records flag those properties to which 
the exemption applies.  In a regression of the precinct percentage of the vote in 
favor of the tax increase on home value, the percentage of properties to which 
the homestead exemption applied and the percentage of Republicans in each 
precinct,106 only the homestead exemption variable reached statistical 
significance.  For each additional percentage of property in the precinct subject to 
the homestead exemption, opposition to the school tax increased by 0.314 
percentage points.107  That this opposition relates to economic matters is 
evidenced by the fact that the correlation between the percentage of properties in 
a precinct subject to the exemption and home value is relatively strong at r=0.63. 
 One explanation for this pattern could be that people in the precincts that 
gave less than 50% of their votes to the tax increase may have seen the tax 
increase as an unwelcome attempt at income redistribution.   In the Parma 
school district, as home values increased, so did opposition to Barack Obama.  
For the Parma school district as a whole, there is a correlation of r=-0.56 
between home values and the percentage vote in favor of Barack Obama in the 
2008 presidential election.  Table 5-6 reports the results of regressing the Parma 
                                            
105 According to the Cuyahoga County tax assessor’s office, most of the 
exemptions go to senior citizens. 
106 This data was available from the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections voter 
list. 
107 p=0.001 (one-tailed), R2=0.2593.  Alone, the homestead exemption variable 
had an R2 of 0.2427.   
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school district’s precinct-by-precinct vote for Barack Obama for president in 2008 
on home value, percent of homes subject to the homestead exemption in each 
precinct and the percent of Republicans in each precinct, for the school district as 
a whole and for those precincts that approved the tax by 50% or more of the vote 
and precincts that failed to approve the tax by 50% of the vote.  Overall, all three 
of the variables reach statistical significance. For the group of precincts that 
voted against the tax increase, home value is the only variable that reaches 
statistical significance.  In that group the impact of home value increases by 20% 
over its impact on the school district as a whole, and the model fits the data 
about 32% better.  On the other hand, for the group of precincts that approved 
   
Table 5- 6 Regression of Vote for Obama on Home Value, Homestead Exemption and Percent 
Republicans 
 Overall < 0.50 >=  0.50 
























N 78 37 41 
R2 .3599 0.4745 0.2941 
p<0.05* p<0.01** p<0.005*** (one-tailed) 
 
the tax increase, only the percentage of Republicans in the precinct make a 
difference at the p < 0.05 level. 
 There are several inferences one might make from this analysis, but the 
best one is that for both votes, those precincts that voted against both the tax 
and Barack Obama did so because of economic concerns.  Table 5-2 shows that 
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race does not matter nearly as much as economic considerations in Clintonland 
school tax elections, and there is no reason to think that wealthier voters would 
have been more concerned with Obama’s race than poorer ones. While political 
orientation can be seen as having had some impact in the district at large and for 
the precincts that approved the tax increase, it played no role at all for the 
precincts that voted against Barack Obama.  Instead, it makes sense to think that 
for the precincts that voted against the tax increase, Barack Obama, as the 
Democratic Party’s nominee, represented the same economic threat of wealth 
redistribution as a tax increase would.108  
Amherst Exempted Village School District 
 
 The Amherst school district is located in the City of Amherst, Ohio, about 
25 miles west of Cleveland.  The City of Amherst considers itself to be “an 
alternative to suburban and urban living,” because it retains “small town 
friendliness complete with commerce and industry, excellent schools, hospitals, 
churches, parks, service clubs and other amenities that enhance the quality of 
life.”109  The Parma school district has a much larger population living in greater 
proximity than does the Amherst school district, and while the population of the 
Parma school district grew by 3.39% between 2005-2009, the Amherst school 
district lost 5.65% of its population over the same period.  







 Like the Parma school district, the Amherst school district is a working-
class area.  Only 24% of its population has earned a bachelor degree. Figure 5-2 
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shows the distribution of careers in both the Parma school district and the 
Amherst school district.  For the most part, the communities have similar 
employment profiles, though the Parma school district has a substantially higher 
percentage of people involved in wholesale trade and the Amherst school district 
has a substantially higher percentage of people involved in manufacturing. Both 
districts have large percentages of people involved in education and social 
services.  Median income and median home values in the Parma school district 
are about 25% and 18% lower, respectively, than they are in the Amherst school 
district. 
 The Amherst school district is much smaller than the Parma school district, 
and according to Table 5-2, its smaller size should have made it easier to pass a 
tax increase.  It has only three elementary schools, a middle school, a junior high 
school and a high school serving together approximately 4,200 students.  The 
Ohio Department of Education rated the district and all of its schools as 
“excellent,”110 despite the fact that “it serves a 21 percent needy student 
population.”111 
 Unlike the Parma school district, which was facing an economic crisis in 
2011, the Amherst school district was facing an opportunity.  In the May election, 






the Amherst school district’s levy sought an additional 3.95 mills112 for school 
operations coupled with a 2.3 mill addition for a construction bond and the 
continuation of a 0.5 mill permanent improvements levy.  The total request, had it 
been adopted, would have increased taxes on a $100,000 home by $17.22 per 
month, an amount comparable to the amount sought by the Parma school 
district.113  Passing the tax increase would have enabled the Amherst school 
district to use funds supplied by others to construct a new elementary school and 
a recreation center for which it anticipated a need in the future.  In endorsing the 
request, the Cleveland Plain Dealer called the plan “smart.”114  Steve Sayers, 
Amherst school district superintendent noted that if the levy failed, he would seek 
the “status quo option,” in which the district would be “asking for enough money 
to operate, but not to expand the district” in May and November of 2012.115  
According to Sayers, that would cost the owners of a home valued at $100,000 
an additional $14.80 per month instead of the $17.22 the May levy would cost.  In 
other words, for an additional $2.42 per month per $100,000 of assessed home 
value, not only would the school district have sufficient operating funds, but it 
would also get a new elementary school and a new recreation center.  Sayers 
thought the packages could help change the district from “good” to “great” and 
                                            
112For school tax elections, the tax rate is sometimes expressed in “mills,” which 
are equivalent to $1.00 per year for each $1,000.00 in assessed home value. A 
one mill increase on a home assessed at $200,000 would result in additional tax 
liability of $16.67 per month. 
113http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2011/05/the_plain_dealer_endorse





that the levy package would provide “tangible benefits to every resident in the 
Amherst Schools District.”116  Further, according to Sayers: 
We think this is a positive, proactive approach and we don't want to wait 
for things to happen and then react to them. We just feel like we have a 
tremendous opportunity here. . . .With Metro Parks partnership, with the 
OSFC partnership, we can really, really position ourselves for not only the 
short term, but long-term success. . . . It's one of those things we believe 
financially makes sense in the long term. It's a community investment. . . 
"117 
 Passing the school tax would have allowed the school district to improve 
on its educational offerings, which had already been rated as excellent by the 
Ohio Department of Education.  More operating revenue would have enabled the 
district to provide “all-day kindergarten, expanded high school electives, 
expanded Spanish to Nord Middle School, expanded music programs to grades 
five through 12,” to reduce “Amherst Jr. High's pay-to-participate fee to $200 
and . . .[to reduce] instructional fees to $20 for kindergarten through sixth grade 
and $30 for seventh through eighth grades.”118   
 The levy was defeated by a vote of 42.88% in favor and 57.12% opposed.  
As in the Parma school district, one possible explanation for the defeat is that 
voters in the district simply had a general reluctance to pay additional taxes on 
principle.  Another possibility is that the residents of the Amherst school district, 





though not necessarily opposed to all tax increases, thought the additional levy 
the school district proposed was too high in general.  A third possibility is that 
while the residents were willing to fund operating costs, they did not want to build 
another elementary school, since the district’s population had declined by over 
5% over the preceding five years.  A fourth possibility is that the residents of the 
district thought parents and not homeowners ought to bear the costs of all day 
kindergarten, expanded high school electives, Spanish instruction in the middle 
school, and instructional and pay-to-play fees. 
 The first possibility—that the vote tracks with political philosophy--does not 
seem likely.  In 2008, after finishing second to Hillary Clinton during the 
Democratic primaries, Barack Obama won over 56% of the vote in the Amherst 
school district, and most of its elected officials are Democrats.  It is therefore 
unlikely that the residents of this community hold the anti-tax views that are 
encompassed by orthodox Republican philosophy.  The correlation, on a 
precinct-by-precinct basis, between voting for the tax increase and voting for 
Barack Obama in the 2008 general election is positive, but small at r=0.07.  
Moreover, in 2012, the school district passed a smaller tax increase by a vote of 
52.28% to 47.72% in favor.  
 Instead, the “bread and butter” economic considerations that underlie the 
three other possibilities probably figured more prominently.  In Figure 5-3, I plot 
the percentage of the precinct vote in favor of the tax increase against average 
precinct home values (based on Zillow “Zestimates”), with precincts arranged 
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Figure 5- 3 Average Precinct Home Value and Voting in Favor of School Tax Increase 




















(Arranged by Ascending Average Precinct Home Values in $1000s)
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from lowest average precinct home value to highest.119  With the exception of 
Precinct 3-A, no precinct with a mean home value less than $170,000 had more 
than 45% of its voters in favor of the tax increase; the mean percentage in favor 
of the tax increase among these precincts was 40.63%.  On the other hand, all 
but two of the precincts with mean home values in excess of $170,000 voted in 
favor of the tax increase by 45% or more, averaging, as a group 47.06%.  The 
correlation between average precinct home value and precinct vote in favor of 
the tax increase is strong at r=0.59, more than five times greater than the 
correlation between precinct vote in favor of the tax increase and precinct vote 
for Barack Obama.  In the successful 2012 attempt to pass a tax increase, as 
shown in Figure 5-4, the pattern held: The correlation between home value and 
percent of the vote in favor of the tax increase was r=0.6 and the correlation 
between the two elections was r=0.66.120 
 Without individual level survey data, we cannot know exactly why this 
pattern exists, though we can make some reasonable guesses.  Several things 
changed or may have changed between 2011 and 2012.  First of all, the request 
in 2012 was smaller than it was in 2011.  Second, the economy may have 
improved in Amherst as it did nationally, giving the Amherst school district voters 
confidence in their own economic prospects for the future.  In this regard, 
whereas only about half of the precincts cast more than 50% of their votes in 
                                            
119 Precincts 1 and 3 have been excluded because Zillow provided no 
“Zestimates” for the dwellings within these precincts.  Precinct 1 is composed of 
rental units and Precinct 3 is a trailer park. 
120As the trend line equations show, the slopes and intercepts of the lines are 
highly similar. 
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Figure 5- 4 Votes in Favor of School Tax Increase in 2011 and 2012 
 
y = 0.0058x + 0.3889





















(Arranged by Ascending Average Precinct Home Values in $1000s)
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favor of the tax increase in 2011, all but two did in 2012.  Both of these economic 
factors may have combined to convince voters that the additional money the 
school district sought would not do significant damage to their individual family 
budgets. 
 The correlation between home value and precinct vote in both years is 
impressive.  This correlation provides strong evidence that the Homeowner 
Hypothesis had some explanatory power in the Amherst school district, and, 
presumably, in school districts like it.  That the likelihood of a precinct voting in 
favor of a tax increase improves as the mean precinct home value increases is 
evidence that voters with a greater financial stake in the community in the form of 
home value are probably voting to protect their investments when they vote yes. 
 Equally impressive is the weakness of the partisan link between the two 
issues.  In 2011, the correlation between voting for Barack Obama and the tax 
increase was only 0.07 and in 2012 it was -0.09.  In fact, there is reason to think 
that the relatively wealthier precincts that provided the most support for the tax 
increase in 2011 and 2012 in the Amherst school district may be Republican or 
conservative territory.  In 2011, the correlation between mean precinct home 
value and voting for Barack Obama was -0.2755 and -0.3728 in 2012, meaning 
that just as wealthier precincts were supporting the tax increase, they were also 
voting against the Democratic presidential candidate. 
Conclusion 
 
 All of this confirms that in Democratic below median home value school 
districts like the Parma school district and the Amherst school district, regardless 
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of whether the district is an Adopter or a Rejecter, economic considerations 
apparently take center stage in school tax elections and that ideological leanings 
don’t much matter.  Thus, in the Parma school district, we saw that there was a 
clear split along economic lines with respect to approving a tax increase; in the 
Amherst school district, there was a clear pattern of support for the tax increase 
based on economic considerations.  In neither community were the correlations 
between voting for the Democratic presidential candidate and in favor of a school 
tax increase nearly as strong as were the correlations between average precinct 
home values and voting for the tax increase.  And in both districts, there were 
substantial negative correlations between home value and voting for Barack 
Obama.  Both districts provide ample support for the idea that in these districts, 
and presumably those like them, economic conditions in general and the 
Homeowner Hypothesis in particular are better explanations for voting behavior 
than ideological ones.   
 The difference between the two districts, at least in 2011 may well have 
been that in the Parma school district, homeowners with higher home values may 
have been outvoted by renters and people who own more modestly priced 
homes.  The percentage of homeowners in the Amherst school district is greater 
than it is in the Parma school district and the vote in the Amherst school district 
can be interpreted as an evaluation by homeowners that the level of additional 
taxes requested would not enhance or support their home values.   
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 Republican districts have a different take on school tax elections than 
Democratic districts have.  In Chapter 6 I explore and explain this different take in 


























Educational Attainment 1.786 
(5.356) 
0.198 0.057 0.370 
Homeowners -16.417 
(4.1436) 
-0.916 -0.573 0.000 
Whites 7.951 
(1.956) 
0.657 0.408 0.000 
Children 18.265 
(11.655) 
0.88 0.305 0.059 
Total Population (log) -0.567 
(0.295) 
-0.626 0.236 0.028 
Constant     
N = 42     

























Educational Attainment .392 
(4.228) 
0.05 0.014 0.463 
Homeowners -4.972 
(0.803) 
-0.553 -0.269 0.000 
Seniors -8.162 
(5.107) 
-0.607 -0.200 0.055 
Children 4.801 
(6.872) 
0.419 0.095 0.243 
Total Population (log) -0.577 
(0.268) 
-0.684 -0.269 0.016 
Constant 10.366 
(5.329) 
   
N = 42     




























Educational Attainment 1.949 
(4.562) 
0.248 -0.073 0.335 
Whites 1.568 
(0.633) 
0.25 0.12 0.007 
Seniors -15.74 
(5.811) 
-0.884 -0.366 0.004 
Children -0.388 
(9.272) 
-0.036 -0.008 0.484 
Total Population (log) -0.344 
(0.281) 
-0.475 -0.171 0.111 
Constant 6.755 
(6.313) 
   
N = 42     

























Educational Attainment 3.793 
(3.97) 
0.41 -0.127 0.169 
Median Income -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.837 -0.389 0.001 
Seniors -7.756 
(4.161) 
-0.546 0.174 0.031 
Children 8.392 
(4.402) 
0.615 0.152 0.029 
Total Population (log) -0.708 
(0.329) 
-0.738 0.294 0.016 
Constant 10.14 
(5.616) 
   
N = 42     
































0.682 0.36 0.001 
Seniors -5.439 
(4.426) 
-0.411 0.127 0.110 
Children 6.415 
(5.33) 
0.513 0.121 0.115 
Total Population (log) -0.535 
(0.32) 
-0.634 0.241 0.048 
Constant 2.941 
(3.425) 
   
N = 42     






Republican Headwind Over Smallville 
 
 In Chapter 3, we saw that in 2011, it was much harder to pass a school 
tax increase in a Republican oriented school district than in a Democratic one.   
As a general matter, Republicans tend to be more wary of taxes than Democrats.  
The 2012 Republican platform explains the wariness as follows: 
Taxes, by their very nature, reduce a citizen’s freedom. Their proper role 
in a free society should be to fund services that are essential and 
authorized by the Constitution, such as national security, and the care of 
those who cannot care for themselves. We reject the use of taxation to 
redistribute income, fund unnecessary or ineffective programs, or foster 
the crony capitalism that corrupts both politicians and corporations. 
(“Restoring the American Dream,” 2012.) 
While this formulation focuses specifically on national taxes, much of the 
reasoning could apply equally to local taxes.  It has long been a tenet of 
Republican ideology that any tax reduces one’s freedom because, by reducing a 
citizen’s purchasing power, a tax reduces the citizen’s ability to go out into the 
marketplace of life and live as he or she sees fit (see, e.g. Coolidge, 1924; 
Goldwater, 1960, pp. 44–5).    
 As a corollary, taxes also increase the ability of the government (imagined 
as an outside force not under democratic control) to exert control over people by 
reducing their resources, by creating financial disincentives for certain purchases 
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and behaviors, and by allowing the government to create coercive tools like 
armies and police forces.  The most conservative Republicans oppose 
redistribution because it is an “objective that does violence both to the charter of 
the Republic and the laws of Nature” (Goldwater, 1960, p. 46) both because it  
depends upon discriminatory judgments favoring some groups and injuring 
others, (Hayek, 2009, p. 134) and because it fosters a culture of dependency 
where people feel entitled to “health care, to food, to housing, to you name it . . . 
and [they believe that] the government should give it to them” (Mother Jones 
News Team, 2012 quoting Mitt Romney).   
 And finally, Republicans see pools of tax money entrusted to the 
government as an enticing incentive for corruption: For some, it is far easier to 
strike a deal with a politician willing to trade public resources for personal power 
than to compete for wealth in the marketplace.  That is the essence of the 
Republican platform’s complaint against “crony capitalism.” (“Restoring the 
American Dream,” 2012.) 
 These are among the reasons that the Americans For Tax Reform Pledge, 
pursuant to which state and national politicians promise their constituents that 
they will “oppose and vote against all efforts to increase taxes,” finds such 
resonance with Republican voters.121 This general attitude creates what I shall 
refer to as a “ Republican Headwind.”  
 While I do not mean to imply that this attitude does not exist at all in the 
Googleplex group of districts I discussed in Chapter 4 or the Clintonland group of 




districts I discussed in Chapter 5, it is a strong factor in the Republican oriented 
districts I discuss in this chapter and the next, and it must be acknowledged as a 
background “fact on the ground” with which school district leaders must grapple 
when they propose to increase the number of dollars the school system will take 
from district residents if a proposed tax increase passes.  Because it is only a 
“headwind,” it does not prevent districts from passing tax increases; it only makes 
it harder.  It should be viewed as a prima facie reason that Republican oriented 
school districts defeated tax increases at a much higher rate than did Democratic 
ones. 
 This chapter and the next detail and explain the factors that seem to make 
it easier for some Republican oriented school districts to overcome the 
Republican Headwind and pass school tax increases.  In this chapter, I focus on 
the Republican oriented districts with home values below the dataset median that 
I have called the “Smallville districts.”  As a matter of continuity, I first compare 
and contrast them with the Googleplex and Clintonland districts, taking time to 
show how the factors at play in those two groups of school districts may influence 
the districts in this group as well.  At the same time, I will show that the Smallville 
districts are unique, responding to factors that were not important in the 
Googleplex and Clintonland districts.  I will also identify the demographic factors 
that distinguish Adopter Districts from Rejecter Districts in the Smallville group of 
districts and show how these differences may have assisted Adopter districts in 
overcoming the Republican Headwind. 
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 To do so, I use the general-purpose logistic regression model to test all of 
the hypotheses enumerated in Chapter 2 in the Smallville group of districts 
I show, first of all, that the Smallville districts are economically similar to the 
Clintonland districts discussed in Chapter 5, and I find that economic 
considerations are of great importance, just as they were in the Clintonland 
districts.   
 More importantly, though, I find that what distinguishes the Smallville 
group of districts from virtually all of the other districts in the dataset is the 
importance of community attachment to the outcome of school tax elections.  As 
defined in Chapter 2, the Community Affinity Hypothesis holds that people who 
feel a strong loyalty to their communities are more likely to be willing to “give 
back” to them by voting for school tax increases, even though such an action 
would be contrary to their material self-interest.  While direct evidence on this 
point would be ideal, public opinion data at the school district level is unavailable.  
Instead, I support my argument by relying on the interplay between the Total 
Population (log) variable and the Seniors variable. 
 The Seniors variable measures the percentage of households that have at 
least one member who is at least 60 years old.  Some scholars, using 
demographic data about communities and/or election turnout, infer, from the 
percentage of seniors or households with seniors either that (i) older voters voted 
against a school tax measure because they saw no benefit to themselves for 
agreeing to higher taxes (the “Gray Peril Hypothesis”); or (ii) older voters voted in 
favor of a tax increase as a way of signifying their loyalty to their community and 
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their willingness to give back to it (the “Gray Peril Revisited Hypothesis”) 
(Berkman & Plutzer, 2005; Lambert et al., 2009b).   
 The second variable is a measure of a school district’s population.  We 
should expect a negative relationship between district population size and the 
likelihood of adopting a tax increase.  As I noted in Chapter 3 small populations 
tend to encourage community engagement, help to foster positive feelings of 
political efficacy and are easier to mobilize than large populations. 
 I cannot assert that seniors in these communities are a key voting block 
because, for the most part, I do not have data that captures the extent to which 
they actually participated in their districts’ school tax elections or, if they did 
participate, how they may have voted.  Though I present case studies that 
address the participation of seniors in two particular school tax elections that tend 
to support the “Gray Peril Revisited Hypothesis,” my argument is somewhat 
broader.   
 Americans are internationally and historically famous (or infamous, 
depending on one’s point of view), for being nomadic.122  It is not unusual for 
Americans to spend a relatively short period of time living in one place only to 
pull up roots and move to someplace else if given a better job, economic 
circumstances change or if the neighborhood changes.  A recent Pew Social and 
                                            
122 Alexis de Tocqueville observed that 
 
In the United States a man builds a house in which to spend his old age, 
and he sells it before the roof is on; he plants a garden and lets it just as 
the trees are coming into bearing; he brings a field into tillage and leaves 
other men to gather the crops; he embraces a profession and gives it 
up; he settles in a place, which he soon afterwards leaves to carry his 
changeable longings elsewhere. (Tocqueville, 1945) 
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Demographic Trends survey tempers this generalization, though, by showing that 
the people who do tend to be nomadic and willing to move to pursue better 
employment opportunities are often younger and college educated, as are the 
people in the brain hubs of the Googleplex group (Cohn & Morin, 2008).  These 
kinds of people are not likely to constitute a large percentage of the residents of 
the Smallville group of districts, who tend to be somewhat older, less educated 
and more rooted. 
 The Pew Survey also shows that a sizable percentage of the public is 
significantly less mobile than the people living in the Googleplex Adopter districts.   
Since this group of people is not highly educated, it could be that they simply do 
not have good employment prospects elsewhere.  The Pew Survey implies that 
regardless of whether this is the case, this group of people has probably made a 
lifestyle decision not to look for new jobs out of the area, not to “trade up” upon 
gaining the means to do so and not to seek other ties to other communities.  
According to the Pew Survey, these people say they forgo mobility because they 
want to be geographically close to family and current friends, they want to stay in 
familiar surroundings and they feel a sense of belonging to the places they have 
chosen to live.  These people—“stayers” as the Pew Survey calls them—tend to 
be older, less educated, and live in small towns and rural settings.123   
                                            
123 We should expect Republicans to value rootedness and respond favorably to 
it.  As much as neophilia is a key psychological characteristic of liberals, 
neophobia is a psychological characteristic of conservatives: 
Conservatives . . . prefer to stick with what’s tried and true, and they care 
a lot more about guarding borders, boundaries and traditions. (Haidt, 2013, 
p. 142) 
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  My argument is that the Adopter school districts in the Smallville group 
are more likely to have a heavy proportion of stayers, people who value stability 
and community over mobility and economic advancement than the Rejecter 
districts and that this helps to create a political environment more conducive to 
passing tax increases for community school systems than Republican 
communities without large numbers of stayers.  When we encounter a small 
community in the Smallville group of districts with a large percentage of 
households with members who are at least 60 years old, we have probably 
encountered a community of stayers who feel loyal to the community and are 
willing to accept a call for higher taxes in order to support it.124   
 I support these claims by providing evidence that not only are the means 
for the Seniors variable and a variable that measure the length of time 
homeowners have spent living in the same homes both significantly greater in 
the Adopter districts than they are in the Rejecter districts (implying a larger 
number of stayers in the Adopter Districts), but high values for both variables 
significantly improve the chances that a district will adopt a tax increase; 
regardless of the ultimate outcome of a school tax election, both variables are 
positively and significantly related to the percentage of the district’s votes cast in 
favor of the tax increase.  I will also provide evidence that communities that have 
the largest percentage of seniors and whose populations have remained static 
                                            
124 My data will not allow me to say definitively whether households with seniors 
causes a Smallville group community to adopt a tax increase or whether stable 
communities that are likely to pass tax increases attract more seniors than 
communities that do not pass tax increases.  My argument is only that large 
percentages of seniors is a characteristic of places likely to pass tax increases. 
 190 
the longest are the districts in the Smallville group most likely to pass tax 
increases. 
 Overview of the Smallville Districts 
 
 The Smallville districts--the dataset’s smallest in terms of population, the 
most rural and the least educated125--evoke the fictional towns of Smallville, 
Kansas, where Clark Kent/Superman spent his childhood and teenage years and 
Mayberry, North Carolina, where Sheriff Andy Taylor kept order with his trusty 
deputy, Barney Fife.  Figure 6-1 shows the percentage of the Smallville Districts 
that are located in rural areas, suburban areas, urban areas and towns.    
The degree of urbanization does not appear to be a factor per se in whether a 
community adopted a tax increase because the percentage of Adopter districts in 
the group is distributed proportionately among the various locality types.126 
                                            
125With a mean population size of about 15,000 people, the Smallville districts 
have less than half the average population size of the next lowest quadrant.  
Measurements of educational attainment for each group of districts are as 
follows: 





Goldwater Country 0.486 
 
126  
District type Percent Adopters 
Rural 51.85 
Suburban 29.63 




 While the Clintonland and Smallville Districts can be distinguished from 
each other on the basis of locality type—the Smallville Districts are almost twice 
Figure 6- 1 Locale Type District Distribution 
 
as likely to be in rural or town settings--the two groups cannot be statistically 
distinguished from each other on the basis of economic factors.  Adjusted 
median home value, adjusted median income, the percentage of households 
living at or below the poverty level, the level of economic inequality, are about the 
same for both groups.  This probably stems from the fact that both district groups 
have about the same percentage of people in “blue-collar” jobs.127  We should 
therefore expect that the affordability of increased school taxes would matter just 
as much for the Smallville districts as it did in the Clintonland districts.  Instead of 
                                            
127 Using the American Community Survey’s job titles, I include “Management, 
Business, Science and Arts Occupations,” and “Sales and Related Occupations” 
as “white collar” occupations and all other occupations as “blue-collar” 
occupations.  I considered office work that does not necessarily require at least a 
college education to be “blue-collar” work.  This could also explain why there is 
less enthusiasm for education in the Clintonland and Smallville groups of districts 
than there is in the Googleplex Adopters group of districts. 59% of the work force 
in the Clintonland group and 62% of the work force in the Smallville group hold 











the relatively strong correlation between presidential vote choice and school tax 
voting that we saw in the Googleplex districts, we should see a much stronger 
correlation between home values and school tax voting than we saw in the 
Clintonland districts. 
 The Smallville districts are, however, distinguishable from the Clintonland 
districts on the basis of several social characteristics.  There are somewhat more 
children and older folks in the Smallville districts than there are in the Clintonland 
districts, but while those differences are statistically significant, they are less than 
two percentage points in both cases.  The level of educational attainment in the 
Clintonland districts is about four percentage points higher than in the Smallville 
districts, but the rate of home ownership in the Smallville Districts exceeds the 
rate of home ownership in the Clintonland Districts by about 3.4 percentage 
points.  In accordance with apparent Republican preferences for lower density 
and community homogeneity, we should expect to find that the Smallville districts 
have significantly fewer people, significantly smaller school systems with 
significantly fewer minority students, and significantly less diverse populations 
living on more land than in the Clintonland districts, and that is what we do find.   
 Adopter districts can be distinguished from Rejecter districts by population 
size, rates of home ownership and the percentage of households with seniors.  
The percentage of homeowners in the Adopter districts exceeds the percentage 
of homeowners in the Rejecter districts by over 3 percentage points,128 and the 
adjusted median home value for Adopter districts is $6,722 higher, an amount 
                                            
128 p=0.035 (one-tailed) 
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that just misses statistical significance.129  The Adopter districts also have about 
half as many people as the Rejecter districts do,130 and their school systems 
have, on average, about 1,161 fewer students.131   The percentage of 
households with seniors in the Adopter districts exceeds the percentage of 
households with seniors in the Rejecter districts by about 4 percentage points.132  
 While there are no differences in educational attainment between Adopter 
and Rejecter districts, and, consequently no major differences in the distribution 
of white-collar and blue-collar jobs between Adopter and Rejecter districts that 
can generally explain the differences in wealth between the two groups, people in 
the Adopter districts seem to be somewhat further along in life than the people in 
the Rejecter districts.  In the average Adopter district, the median age is more 
than two years greater than it is in the Rejecter districts,133 median homeowner 
tenure in the same home is about a year longer134 and the percentage of 
households with school-age children is smaller than in the Rejecter districts by 
about two percentage points.135  
 To determine which of these economic or demographic characteristics had 
any actual impact on the outcome of the various school tax elections, I begin with 
the general-purpose logistic regression model.  Since I argue that the Community 
Affinity Hypothesis has a lot of explanatory power in the Smallville quadrant, I am 
                                            
129 p=0.051 (one-tailed) 
130 p=0.000 (one-tailed) 
131p=0.000 (one-tailed) 





looking for significant coefficients and high probabilities on the population size 
variable.  And, since I have also argued that the presence of a large percentage 
of households with seniors signifies a school district where people have 
longstanding ties to the community, I am also looking for a significant coefficient 
and high probabilities of passage on the Seniors variable.  A significant 
coefficient for the Seniors variable cannot tell us what senior citizens thought 
about a tax increase or how they voted (if they did) when the question was 
presented to them on a ballot.  What it can tell us, though, is something about the 
character of the community itself.    
 The basic premise of the Gray Peril Hypothesis is that seniors prefer to 
avoid paying for services from which they do not generally benefit and that they 
will choose to live in communities that minimize the likelihood that they will be 
subjected to such a tax.  A significant negative coefficient will suggest that 
Smallville seniors have chosen to live in communities that protect their immediate 
economic interests.  This will, in turn, suggest that Smallville seniors value 
individual interests above communal ones, perhaps because the people living in 
such communities are not very attached to those communities (Berkman & 
Plutzer, 2005; Wong, 2010).  On the other hand, a significant positive coefficient 
on the variable will suggest that, with respect to the Smallville districts, seniors 
have chosen to live in places where the residents make a greater allowance for 
the communal good over that of the individual and that they are places where 
people have a greater connection to the community.  
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 Results from the general-purpose logistic regression model testing these 
hypotheses appear in Table 6-1.  These results generally confirm my 
 
 



















Educational Attainment 8.341 
(4.517) 
0.703 0.191 0.033 
Homeowners 3.461 
(5.094) 
0.326 0.111 0.249 
White 2.77 
(3.578) 
0.284 0.091 0.420 
Seniors 9.454 
(3.642) 
0.608 0.242 0.005 
Children136 -8.761 
(8.075) 
-0.568 -0.168 0.139 
Total Population (log) -0.74 
(0.342) 
-0.754 -0.316 0.016 
Constant -5.293 
(6.204) 
   
N 74    
Pseudo R2 0.1709    
 
expectations.137That the Seniors variable is significant and positive tells us that 
for this quadrant, the Gray Peril Revisited Hypothesis is likely to be in play since 
                                            
136 From the Alternative Specification.  See Table 6A-1 in the Appendix.  In the 
Alternative Specification, the Homeowners variable reaches statistical 
significance, but its impact on the probability of adopting a tax increase in that 
model is less than half as significant as the impact of population size in that 
model. 
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a relatively high percentage of households with seniors as members makes it 
24.2% more likely that the district will pass a tax increase, considering values for 
one standard deviation above and below the mean for the group.138  The fact that 
the Total Population (log) variable is negative and significant supports my claim 
that the Community Affinity Hypothesis has come into play: Moving from the 
district with a population size one standard deviation below the group mean to 
the district one standard deviation above the mean of the variable decreases the 
likelihood that a tax increase will be adopted by 31.6%.139140   
A Closer Look at the Districts That Attract and Retain Seniors 
 
 According to the model, the size of the community and the percentage of 
households with members who are at least 60 years old appear to be bellwethers 
of Smallville school districts likely to adopt tax increases.  As I have previously 
pointed out, the coefficient on the Seniors variable is positive, indicating that as 
the percentage of households with members at least 60 years old increases, so 
                                                                                                                                  
137 The results also include a surprise.  According to the model, increasing levels 
of education also seem to make a difference.  This result is difficult to explain in 
light of the fact that the Smallville group of districts has the lowest mean 
percentage of college graduates and the lowest mean score for educational 
attainment.  Adopter districts are statistically indistinguishable from Rejecter 
districts in their levels of educational attainment and their percentages of college 
graduates. 
138 Using the entire range of the variable, it becomes 60.8% more likely to pass a 
tax increase. 
139 Using the entire range of the variable, it becomes 75.4% less likely for the 
district with the largest population to pass a tax increase than the district with the 
smallest population. 
140While there is no statistically significant interaction between the Total 
Population (log) variable and the Seniors variable, 57.9% of the school districts 
that had below median population sizes and above median percentages of 
households with seniors adopted tax increases.  By contrast, only 15.9% of the 
school districts with above median populations and below median percentages of 
households with seniors did the same.  
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does the likelihood that a district will adopt a tax increase.  So dramatic is this 
effect that in the Smallville Districts (but not elsewhere), the percentage of 
households with seniors is actually a highly significant predictor of the vote, 
explaining, by itself 11.64% of the variation.141   
 The Gray Peril Revisited Hypothesis tells us that this might happen for two 
general reasons: Communities that attract and/or retain high percentages of 
households with seniors are either keenly interested in protecting home equity or 
else the presence of large percentages of households with seniors marks the 
district as the kind of place where loyalty to the community moderates self-
interest to a considerable extent. 
 We ought to be skeptical of the first possibility.  If the seniors themselves 
were making the difference, first of all, we should expect that in addition to having 
a greater percentage of households with seniors than do the Rejecter districts, 
we should find that Adopter districts have larger percentages of homeowners 
who are seniors.  This is not the case.  The percentage of seniors who own 
homes in Adopter districts is no greater than the percentage of seniors who own 
homes in the Rejecter districts,142 and the homeownership rate is less strongly 
correlated with the percentage of households with seniors than anywhere else in 
the typology.143  We therefore cannot say either that the seniors who live in the 
                                            
141 Regressing the percentage of the vote in favor of a tax increase on the 
Seniors variable suggests that for every 1% increase in the percentage of 
households with a least one member who is at least 60 years old, the percentage 
of the vote in favor of raising the tax increases by 0.814 percentage points with 
p= 0.0015 (one-tailed). 
142 The difference is .018, p=.0686 (one-tailed). 
143 The correlations for the various kinds of districts are as follow: 
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Smallville districts are likely to have accumulated much wealth and invested it in 
their homes or that they have systematically chosen to live in school districts that 
are scrupulous about protecting home equity by investing additional money in 
their school systems.    
 Given the likelihood that seniors in these districts probably do not have 
much home equity to protect, it is more reasonable to think that they are probably 
more concerned about day-to-day expenses than in the returns on home equity.  
In fact, every 1 percentage point increase in the percentage of households with 
seniors in the Smallville Districts (but not elsewhere in the typology) reduces 
adjusted median income there by almost $41,000,144 leading to the conclusion 
that districts with large percentages of households with seniors are poorer than 
districts where there are fewer such households and are less able to afford tax 
increases.   
 Despite this, though, it could be that the people who live in the Smallville 
Adopter districts are interested in protecting what little equity they do have in their 
homes.  We might be able to find evidence of this if we observe that the school 
systems in Adopter districts are significantly better or significantly worse than the 
school districts in the Rejecter districts.  If the schools are materially better in the 
Adopter districts than they are in the Rejecter districts, we could infer that this 
                                                                                                                                  
 a.  Googleplex     (Quadrant 1) r=0.55 
 b.  Clintonland     (Quadrant 2) r=0.53 
 c.  Smallville        (Quadrant 3) r=0.19 
 d. Goldwater Country (Quadrant 4) r=0.35 
    
144 This is the result of regressing adjusted median income on Seniors.  The 
equation yields an R2 of 0.0718 and a p value for the coefficient of 0.011 (one-
tailed). 
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difference flows from votes in favor of school tax increases that protect home 
equity by keeping school district quality high, thus preserving a home price 
advantage145 over other Smallville districts.146   If the schools are of materially 
worse quality in the Adopter districts than they are in the Rejecter districts, we 
could infer that voters are reacting to a perceived problem that might make it 
harder for them to realize any gains in their home equity.  Using a measure of 
school district quality provided by the George W. Bush Institute147 discloses that 
there is no statistical difference in the quality of school districts, and so while it is 
possible that these households are voting to protect or improve home equity, 
there is no evidence to support such an inference.148 
 Given available data, it makes more sense to think that the second 
rationale for the Gray Peril Revisited Hypothesis is the better explanation for the 
influence of households with seniors in the Smallville districts.  As I have 
previously noted, though the percentage of seniors who own homes is about the 
                                            
145 As previously noted, Adopter districts do have a $6,700 advantage in 
Adjusted Median Home value, which is about 6% higher than Adjusted Median 
Home Value in the Rejecter districts. 
146 Here, I accept Bishop’s premise that if given a choice, a Republican or a 
person who leans Republican is likely to prefer a Republican neighborhood like 
the ones in the Smallville districts over neighborhoods in districts that lean 
Democratic.  Such potential homeowners are likely to be price constrained, and 
so they are not likely to be home shopping in the Republican quadrant with 
above median home prices.  
147 http://globalreportcard.org/.  The measure I use averages, for each school 
district, mean math and reading standardized test scores scaled for national 
comparison.  
148 The ACS provides sufficient data to construct a variable that measures only 
the presence of homeowners who are at least 60 years of age. After swapping 
that variable for the one in the model that measures households with members 
older than 60, the model fails to produce significant results for that variable 
regardless of whether the Owners variable is present.  
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same in both Adopter and Rejecter districts, the overall percentage of 
households with seniors is a significant 4% higher in the Adopter districts than it 
is in the Rejecter districts.  As I have also previously noted, Adopter districts have 
a significantly greater percentage of homeowners.  While homeownership can be 
an economic variable that affects the likelihood of adopting an increased school 
tax, we ought to expect that in below average home value communities, high 
levels of homeownership should make it less likely that a district will adopt a tax 
increase.  Though everyone is affected by an increased real estate tax as it 
ripples through a community, homeowners are the most directly affected and are 
generally the first to feel its effects.  This is exactly what happened in the 
economically comparable Clintonland districts:  School districts with high 
percentages of homeowners were less likely to support tax increases for the 
school district.  
 According to Table 6-1, though, in the Smallville Districts, homeownership 
in and of itself does not have any substantial impact at all on the outcome of 
school tax elections.   It does, however have an impact on the percentage of 
households with seniors.  Regressing the percentage of households with seniors 
on the percentage of homeowners results in almost a 12 percentage point 
increase in the percentage of households with seniors for every 1 percentage 
point increase in the percentage of homeowners.   
 The reason for this does not appear to be that the ranks of homeowners in 
the Smallville districts are occupied by households with seniors.  If there were a 
disproportionate percentage of households with seniors in the Smallville districts, 
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we would expect that the two variables would be strongly correlated and the 
regression equation should explain a large portion of the variation.  Instead the 
correlation between the two variables and the R2 value for the regression 
equation are both low in comparison to the comparable ones for the other three 
quadrants reported below in Table 6-2. 
Table 6- 2 Correlations Between Households With Seniors and Homeowners Who are Seniors 
 r R2 Coefficient 
Googleplex 0.55 0.3019 0.3248 
Clintonland 0.53 0.2768 0.2019 
Smallville 0.19 0.0348 0.1181 
Goldwater Country 0.35 0.1236 0.2863 
 
These low values suggest that in the Smallville districts, the percentage of 
households with seniors increases with increased percentages of homeowners 
not because the percentage of senior homeowners increases, but because of 
some other factor. 
 The fairest inference about what that other factor might be is the same 
one that Wong and Berkman and Plutzer draw: Homeownership is an indicator of 
attachment to community.  According to Wong,  
People’s sense of community tends to grow with age and with ties in an 
area, either through home ownership or length of residence.  And, overall, 
these feelings of community are related to greater political trust, efficacy, 
the willingness to tax oneself, and civic participation. (Wong, 2010, p. 108) 
For the Smallville group of districts, the suggestion is that the Adopter districts 
have more households with seniors because seniors prefer to live in communities 
where the bonds of community are tighter.   
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 If this is so, then in addition to partisan and economic factors, community 
attachment is an important factor in explaining why relatively small Smallville 
school districts with high percentages of households with seniors are the most 
likely to pass school tax increases.  Even though there may be a Republican 
Headwind, community attachment in these communities is sometimes sufficient 
to withstand and overcome it. 
 We have already seen that there are significantly more households with 
seniors in the Adopter districts and that the Adopter district populations, on 
average, are significantly older,149 have significantly more homeowners150 and 
have lived in their homes for a significantly longer period of time.151  While home 
ownership and the presence of households with seniors have only a small 
correlation—in a principal components analysis, home ownership is an economic 
factor that loads with measures of income—the variable that measures the 
median tenure of homeowners in a school district (“Tenure”) and the Seniors 
variables load heavily on the same factor and they correlate strongly at r=0.58 
overall, r=0.70 in Adopter districts but only at r=0.40 in the Rejecter districts.   It is 
therefore not surprising that they exert a strong influence on each other.152 
                                            
149 The mean age in Adopter districts is 2.4 years greater than in Rejecter 
districts with p=0.007 (one-tailed). 
150 The mean percentage of homeowners in the Adopter districts is 3.1 
percentage points higher than in the Rejecter districts with p=0.035. 
151 Homeowners have owned their homes, on average, for almost 1 year longer 
than than have the homeowners in the Rejecter districts, with p=0.034. 
152While I found no formal interaction between the Tenure and Seniors variables, 
44.4% of the Smallville districts that passed tax increases had above quadrant 
median levels of households with seniors and years of tenure in the same home.  
No other combination of these two variables had a passage rate in excess of 
18.5%.  
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 In the Smallville Districts, a regression of Seniors on the Tenure variable 
suggests that each year of tenure in the same house increases the percentage of 
households with seniors in the district by 0.0119 percentage points.  The result is 
highly significant,153 and, by itself, median home tenure explains 34.2% of the 
variation in the percentage of households with seniors living in the school districts.  
In separate regression equations for Adopter districts and Rejecter districts we 
find 
a. In Adopter districts, each one year increase in tenure implies a 
0.013 percentage point increase in the percentage of households 
with seniors, with a p value for the coefficient of 0.001 (one-tailed), 
explaining, by itself, 49.3% of the variation in the percentage of 
district households with seniors; and  
b. In Rejecter districts, each one year increase in tenure implies a 
0.008 increase in the percentage of households with seniors, with a 
p value of 0.008 (one-tailed), explaining, by itself, 16.2% of the 
variation in the percentage of district households with seniors. 
 This is precisely what we would expect to find if attachment to community 
is particularly attractive to seniors who want to live in Smallville type school 
districts. Stable communities where people have lived in their homes longer tend 
to have more households with seniors.  This stability is so important that it 
accounts for almost half of the variation in the percentage of households with 
seniors in those districts. While the absolute differences between Adopter and 
                                            
153 p=0.002 
 204 
Rejecter districts in Tenure—0.979154 years when only homeowners are 
considered or 1.54155 years when both renters and owners are considered--are 
modest, regressing the percentage of the vote in favor of a tax increase on the 
median tenure of all Smallville school district residents yields a statistically 
significant156 result implying a 0.016 point increase in the percentage of votes in 
favor of a tax increase for every additional year of tenure, explaining 11.3% of the 
total variation. A logistic regression of election outcomes on median tenure of all 
school district residents suggests that moving from the fifth percentile (seven 
years) to the 95th percentile (16 years) improves the chances of passage by over 
43%.157  Even a small change such as moving from the median (11 years) to the 
75th percentile (13 years) improves the chances of passage by over 9%.  In low 
turnout elections like these, where the median number of votes cast in the 
Smallville districts was only 2,034, those additional months of tenure may mean 
the difference between adoption and rejection. 
 It is fair to infer from all of this that there is more to the Smallville group of 
districts than a basic concern for tax affordability.  More households with seniors 
in a district improve the chances that the district will be able to pass a tax 
increase, but the presence of high percentages of those households depends, in 
part, on the presence of a stable long-standing community.  A community with a 
high percentage of households with seniors signals a community without much 
                                            
154 p=0.034 (one-tailed) 
155 p=0.006 (one-tailed) 
156 p=0.0085 (one-tailed) 
157 Considering the entire range of the variable, moving from the shortest median 
tenure (5 years) to the largest (19 years) improves the chances of adopting a tax 
increase by over 59%. 
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turnover where “everybody knows your name.”  The deep community roots that 
tend to appear in long-standing communities influence not just the voting patterns 
of seniors, but of everyone there.  Community attachment helps to counter the 
Republican Headwind that blows across the Smallville districts. 
 I turn now to two illustrative cases of Smallville group communities:  the 
Advance R-IV School District  (the “Advance school district ”) located primarily in 
Stoddard County, Missouri and the Fairborn school district (the “Fairborn school 
district”) located mostly in Greene County, Ohio. 
Detailed Illustrations 
Advance R-IV School District, Missouri 
 
 The Advance school district is a small rural school district.  It has a 
population of about 3,200 people spread over about 88.5 square miles. It has the 
13th  smallest population in the Smallville district group.  It also has, with respect 
to the Smallville districts, the fourth highest median age, the third highest 
percentage of households with members who were at least 60 years old and only 
the ninth highest percentage of residents living at or below the poverty level. The 
Advance school district had no residential turnover during the year prior to the 
year ACS surveyed the community.  Median tenure in the Advance school district 
was about 13 years for owners and 10 years for all residents.   These factors are 
typical of the Adopter districts and are, no doubt, the reason the general-purpose 
logistic regression model predicted that the Advance school district would be 
among the Smallville school districts most likely to adopt a tax increase.   
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 The Advance school district is a relatively well-managed school district of 
which, according to Madeline DeJournett, 158 a long-standing school district 
resident, former teacher and reporter for the Dexter Daily Statesman, Advance’s 
community newspaper, the people in the community are “very supportive.” The 
Advance school district has an elementary/middle school serving about 240 
students and a high school serving about 200 students.  For its academic quality, 
it rates about in the middle of the Missouri school districts that considered tax 
increases in 2011.  It spends about $6,531 per student, which, according to 
Superintendent Stan Seiler, is the second lowest amount for the group of 21 
neighboring school districts.  Speaking of his predecessor, Superintendent Seiler 
remarked that “Superintendent Mike Redman was probably one of the best 
financial managers in the state. . . .He was extremely frugal in managing the 
schools’ budget.”159  
 Like so many other school districts in 2011, the Advance school district 
was facing a cash shortfall because of cuts in federal and state funding that were 
not likely to be made up in the future.  According to district Superintendent Seiler, 
“We’ve been told that the shortfalls in state funding will only worsen in the 
future.”160  Prior to asking the community to increase the existing levy by about 
$47.50 per year for homes valued at $100,000 and about $30.00 per year per 
$100,000 in assessed value for farmland, the school district made a number of 
cuts, including eliminating a school bus route, taking steps to become more 
                                            
158 Unless otherwise noted, all of Ms. DeJournett’s comments are contained in 




energy efficient, reducing field trips for students and eliminating two teaching 
positions.  The tax increase requested sought to raise about $72,000 per year, 
allowing the school district to “retain qualified staff, maintain [its] facilities and 
meet the operating expenses of the district.”161  
 The Advance school district is located in a solidly Republican area.  In 
2012, it cast about 79% of its votes for the Republican presidential ticket.  A 
comparison of the demographic characteristics of the district’s main population 
centers with the demographic characteristics of outlying areas disclosed no major 
differences in income, median age, racial characteristics or educational 
attainment, except that the main population center in the City of Advance has 
about 4% more seniors than the percentage of seniors in the district as a whole. 
There is little reason, therefore to think that any part of the school district differs 
systematically with respect to political orientation from any other part of the 
school district.   According to DeJournett, there is not much political dissent in the 
Advance school district. “If there are those of us who disagree,” she wrote, “we 
keep our mouths shut and work from the sidelines.” Given the small-government 
platform of the Republican Party in 2012, which included planks calling for low 
taxes and low government spending, and the margin of victory the ticket enjoyed 
in the Advance school district over the Democratic ticket, it is fair to assume that 
Advance school district residents probably initially brought, on general principles, 
a healthy resistance to additional taxation to the table, creating a Republican 
Headwind for school tax supporters to overcome.   
                                            
161 Ibid. 
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 As in the recent past, according to DeJournett, community leaders, 
including the owners of the Bank of Advance,162 organized a community team to 
spearhead the drive for passage. “The influential cadre of leaders was educated 
to go out and answer the questions that the community would ask,” said 
DeJournett.  According to DeJournett’s article in the Dexter Daily Statesman, by 
at least five weeks before the election, “supporters . . . [were] mobilizing for a 
registration drive for new voters and a fundraising program to pay for 
advertising.”163  In particular, the Dexter Daily Statesman article notes that one 
group specifically targeted was senior citizens.   
 DeJournett says that tax supporters worked hard to get the support of the 
district’s seniors.  
In all three issues that I’ve been a part of, specific seniors, known to be 
supportive, were specifically contacted to be a part of the tax study.  Mr. 
Stan Seiler, the current superintendent, went to specific groups to speak 
on the issue.  Advance doesn’t have many civic organizations anymore, 
but he hit the Senior Nutrition Center, the library board, and several 
church groups.  Even now, long after the issue passed, he makes a point 
to come occasionally and eat a meal with the seniors on Fridays at the 
senior center. 
                                            
162 Support from the bank owners was apparently crucial.  According to 
DeJournet, “The most influential organizers were the Miles family, who own the 
Bank of Advance.  Though they keep a very low profile, the community knows 
that when they support a cause, it succeeds.”   
163 http://www.dailystatesman.com/story/1705542.html 
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 To win voters over, DeJournett says tax increase proponents stressed two 
things.  First, many senior citizens were concerned about the physical condition 
of the elementary school, because many of them had grandchildren who 
attended it.  Second, they “appealed to their civic pride. . . When a project 
becomes a ‘patriotic duty,’ the opponents seldom have the courage to challenge 
it.”  Said DeJournett, “Most small town residents see what has happened to their 
communities. . . . when they lost their schools.  They know that if the school goes, 
the community dies—and no one is ready to give up on Advance.” 
 Voters in the Advance school district approved the tax increase by a vote 
of 66.41% in favor, which is about 4 percentage points higher than both the mean 
and median for the Smallville districts that approved tax increases and about 6 
percentage points higher than all of the districts in the dataset approving tax 
increases.  Part of what made the tax proponents in the Advance school district 
so successful in overcoming the Republican Headwind was that, given the fact 
that many of the voters had deep roots in this highly stable and racially 
homogeneous community, they were able to succeed in transforming the debate 
about the tax from a debate about pure economic self-interest and political 
ideology into a way of affirming an attachment to the community.  Said 
DeJournett: 
The identity of the town is wrapped up in the success of the school and 
the ball teams.  What else do we have?  All our factories are gone.  In the 
1970s and early 80s Advance had a shoe factory that employed 600 
people.  Hard to imagine that now.  Our last factory left for Cape 
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Girardeau (Missouri) about 4-5 years ago.  The rest went to Mexico. . . .  
Are small towns doomed to become ‘bedroom communities,’ relying on 
the commute to larger cities? . . . [I]f we lose our school, we lose ourselves.   
Fairborn City School District, Ohio 
 
 The Fairborn school district is an order of magnitude bigger than the 
Advance school district.  Located mostly in Greene County, Ohio, with small 
swatches in Montgomery and Clark Counties in southwestern Ohio, this 
suburban district has a population of over 42,000 people with four schools 
serving about 4,500 children.  The district is located between Springfield to the 
northeast and Dayton to the southwest.  It includes the Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base and Wright State University. 
 In its promotional video, “Fairborn, a Great Place to Live,”164 Fairborn touts 
itself as being diverse.  In fact, the school district is 83.5% white and 9.55% 
African-American with the remaining 7% of its population made up of Hispanics, 
Asians and people of mixed ancestry.  It is unclear what percentage of the non-
white population consists of people assigned to the Air Force base or students 
attending the university.  87.3% of the students enrolled in the school system are 
white.  Of all of the Smallville districts, Fairborn has the 7th lowest percentage of 
whites in its population. 
 Perhaps attributable to the presence of the university and the Air Force 
base, Fairborn school district’s age distribution skews extraordinarily low at 29.8 
years (the median for the dataset is 40 and for all of the districts in the Smallville 




group of districts, it about is 39.7), and the percentage of households with people 
at least 60 years old is only about 25.9% (by comparison, the median for the 
dataset is 34.1% and for the Smallville group of districts, it is 35.4%).  Only 
51.83% of the residents in the school district own their homes (by comparison the 
median for the dataset is 77.9% and for the Smallville districts, the median is 
76.6%).  The median amount of time Fairborn school district homeowners have 
lived in the same home is 13 years, which is the same as it was in the Advance 
school district, but median tenure for all residents, including renters, is only five 
years in the Fairborn school district compared to 10 years in the Advance school 
district.  Unlike the Advance school district where no one had moved in the year 
preceding the one in which the ACS survey was conducted, a third of the 
Fairborn school district’s residents were new in the year ACS surveyed it. 
 Speakers in Fairborn’s promotional video praise the town for its quality of 
life and sense of community. “Fairborn is the quintessential little town,” said one 
speaker, “It’s small enough and homey enough that you can know your 
neighbors.”  Said another “If you could look at a traditional Norman Rockwell 
town, housing, culture, the city government, the fire and police . . . Fairborn fits 
that picture.” “Our community bands together to support everything within this city 
from the July 3rd block party, the 4th of July parade, all the other events, the 
heritage days. It has a true sense of community.”   
 In 2011, though, this “true sense of community” was not strong enough to 
overcome the Republican Headwind so as to enable the Fairborn school district 
to pass a higher school tax.  Despite the fact that since 2003, it had cut 74 
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teachers, 10 administrators, 55 classified employees and 40 extra-curricular 
positions, the Fairborn school district was facing a financial emergency.  
According to a Power Point presentation prepared by Put Fairborn Kids First, the 
group spearheading the drive for a school tax hike,165 the district’s cash reserves 
would be depleted by November, 2011 unless the voters agreed to a tax increase 
costing homeowners about $19.70 per month for each $100,000 in assessed 
home value.  Failing to agree to a tax increase would result in cuts in busing and 
a reduction in or elimination of club activities, the high school marching band, 
extra-curricular sports for high school and middle school students, guidance 
counselors at the elementary schools and advanced placement courses for high 
school students. 
 The tax increase was solidly defeated by a vote of only 36% in favor and 
64% opposed.  “We’re a victim of the economy,” said Fairborn school district 
Superintendent Dave Scarberry.  “Overall, people support public education and 
support education as a whole, but right now they don’t have their own personal 
finances to be able to do that.”166  
 A comparison of the precinct-by-precint vote with average precinct home 
values,167 as depicted in Figure 6-2, yields a moderate correlation of r=0.29.  This 
confirms the Superintendent’s claim that economic considerations played a part 
in the defeat of the school tax. It should be noted that the correlation here is  




167Records of all assessed home values were available from the Green County 
Tax Assessor’s Office for a nominal fee. 
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Figure 6- 2 Fairborn Voting for School Tax and Home Value 
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positive, meaning that the percentage of people in a precinct willing to vote for a 
tax increase increases as the average home value in the precinct increases. We 
can gather from this that wealthier precincts were relatively more willing to 
support the tax increases than poorer ones. Regardless of that correlation, 
though, only one precinct—the precinct that includes the Air Force base—cast a 
majority of its votes in favor of the tax increase.168   
 Yet, economics is not the whole story.  First, though Fairborn voters were 
confident enough in the economy to renew an existing school tax in 2012, they 
refused to increase the tax on three separate occasions between May of 2011 
and 2013.  If they really did not “have their own personal finances to be able to 
do that” as the Superintendent argued, one might think that voters would refrain 
from voting to renew the tax in order to save on their property tax bills. 
 We can probably rule out ideology here as well.  If ideology (beyond the 
Republican Headwind) had been important in Fairborn, we might expect the kind 
of strong positive correlation between the school tax vote and the presidential 
election that we saw in the Portland, or even the St. Helens school districts.  
Instead we see an extremely weak negative correlation of r=-0.08169 overall.  
Having large percentages of registered Democrats in a precinct, surprisingly, was 
of little assistance in getting the tax increase passed.  In the Fairborn school 
district, there was a strong negative correlation (r=-.60) between a precinct’s 
                                            
168 Unfortunately for the proponents of the tax increase, that precinct contributed 
only 12 votes in favor and seven opposed. 
169As I pointed out in Chapter 4, we should expect a positive correlation between 
the school tax vote and the presidential vote when we expect less support for the 
tax as precincts grow relatively more conservative.  
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percentage vote in favor of the tax increase and the percentage of the precinct’s 
registered Democrats who participated on Election Day.  Perhaps these voters 
were affected by the same kinds of considerations that moved their co-partisans 
in the Clintonland districts: There is a moderate negative correlation (r=- 0.31) 
between average home values in a precinct and the percentage of people who 
participated in the election as registered Democrats.   
 An analysis of the current Greene County voter roll shows that a large part 
of the story was probably a tacit conflict between the district’s “old timers” and its 
more transient population.  Greene County maintains highly detailed records 
about its voters and their voting habits. 170  We can infer the fact that there is an 
“old timers” population that is politically distinct from a much larger “transients” 
population in Fairborn by comparing demographic data and voting habit data 
about the people who voted in the school tax election and the presidential 
election. 
  From the voting roll, we can determine, first of all, the average age of the 
people who voted in each election.  Second, since the voting roll tells us when 
the voter registered to vote in Fairborn, we can get a fair idea, for each election, 
                                            
170The voter roll can only give us a general idea of what happened because (i) 
the voter roll is current as of 2014, and so voters who were registered to vote as 
of the 2011 election date but are no longer registered to vote (because of death 
or relocation) are not on the list; (ii) since there were other questions on the ballot, 
we cannot know whether a voter actually cast a vote in the school tax election; 
(iii) the roll does not disclose how any particular voter voted; and (iv) since Ohio 
is an open primary state, many voters register as independents even though they 
may consistently vote for one party or the other.  We can have at least some 
confidence in our conclusions, though, because an analysis of voter turnout in 
Fairborn shows a consistent pattern of participation within each precinct. 
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of how long each voter who participated has lived in Fairborn.171  Third, we can 
determine the political orientations of the voters in each election.  The results of 
that analysis appear below as Table 6-3: 
Table 6- 3  School Tax and Presidential Electorate in Fairborn 
Trait School Tax Election Presidential Election 
Average Age in Years 57.72 47.12 
Years Registered 23.05 14.10 
% Republican Turnout 53.19172 27.19173 
 
 While the fact that the people who turned out to vote in the school tax 
election were older, more settled and more Republican than the people who 
turned out to vote in the presidential election is not surprising, what is notable is 
the how different the electorates were.  Aside the huge partisan difference 
between the two groups—the voting share of Republicans for the school tax 
election is double what it was in the presidential election--the school tax 
electorate was 22.5% older and had lived in Fairborn over 63% longer than the 
presidential electorate.  The percentage share of the vote contributed by each 
precinct in the school tax election has only a modest correlation with the 
percentage vote share of the vote contributed in the presidential election at 
r=0.31.  This modest correlation confirms the fact that the participation, by 
precinct, in the school tax election was not highly proportional to participation, by 
precinct, in the presidential election.   
                                            
171 Here, I assume that people will register to vote shortly after moving into the 
community. 
172 29.45% are Independents and 17.34% are registered Democrats 
173 64.75% are Independents and 8% are registered Democrats 
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 Further analysis of the voter roll discloses that in the school tax election, 
people over 60 years of age accounted for about 45% of all voters; in the 
presidential election, they accounted for only 28.5% of the voters.  Regressing 
the percentage of the vote in favor of the school tax on average precinct age, 
average precinct years registered to vote and precinct percentage of the 
population over 60 in three separate equations yields the results contained in 
Table 6-4: 
Table 6- 4 Regression of School Tax Vote on Average Age, Tenure and Percent Over 60 years old 




Average Age -0.008 0.021 0.1394 
Average Years Registered -0.01 0.006 0.2105 
Percentage of People 60 and 
older 
-0.007 0.017 0.1512 
  
 From the results reported in the last two paragraphs, a fair observation is 
that older voters with relatively long roots in the community had a negative 
impact on the school tax vote.  While it may seem to contradict the argument I 
have made in this chapter about the importance of community attachment to the 
success or failure of a school tax vote in Smallville group communities, a 
moment’s reflection reveals that instead, Fairborn’s voting behavior actually 
confirms it. 
 My argument concerns the characteristics of communities, not how 
particular individuals will vote on any particular proposal.  I assert that 
communities where there is a high degree of community attachment as 
evidenced by small population size and the presence of a large percentage of 
households with people who are at least 60 years old should be the most likely to 
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adopt school tax increases.  I do not claim that older people who have lived in a 
place for an extended period should be the most likely people to vote in favor of a 
school tax increase.      
 To understand why Fairborn’s voting behavior supports my theory, it is 
important to remember how I defined the word “community” in Chapter 2.  
“Community” is about the relationships people have with other people and though 
those relationships may be limited to people living in a particular place, a 
geographical component is not required for a community to exist.  The members 
of one’s “community” are the people with whom one shares as sense of similarity, 
belonging or fellowship (Wong, 2010, p 6).   
 Recall, now, that Fairborn is among the largest school districts in the 
Smallville group and that it is a highly transient place with the average resident 
having tenure in the same house of only about five years.  The percentage of 
people who have made a financial commitment to Fairborn by purchasing homes 
there is almost 10 percentage points lower than the median for both the dataset 
and the quadrant.  The size of its minority population is almost equal to that of 
the mean for the Clintonland group, which is about 10 percentage points higher 
than the mean for the Smallville group.  In addition to its racial diversity, its large 
population size signals that it is probably more economically and culturally mixed 
than is normal for Smallville districts. 
 In short, this is not a place like Missouri’s relatively small and 
homogeneous Advance School district where there had been no residential 
turnover in the year before the ACS survey.  While every community has its 
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share of “stayers”—and Fairborn is obviously no exception--it is not likely that a 
place the size of Fairborn, with its Air Force base and its university is the kind of 
place that attracts people looking to put down deep roots.  That is probably why it 
has one of the lowest percentages of households with seniors in the Smallville 
group of districts. 
 With the records we have, it is impossible to know exactly how anyone in 
Fairborn voted on the school tax or in any other election.  But given Fairborn’s 
demographics, it is a fair guess that Fairborn’s  “old timers” would be resistant to 
moves that would increase their individual tax burdens.  They probably do not 
know many families that are likely to benefit from the sacrifices they would make 
by voting for a tax increase.  In fact, with all the transience, the “old timers” may 
have had a deep concern that the beneficiaries of the tax increase are not really 
part of the their community at all.  The residents of Fairborn may be quite 
attached to their homes, their neighborhoods and even some of their neighbors, 
but they are not likely to have the same kind of attachment to the school district 
and its institutions as the people of Advance, Missouri had.  Under the 
circumstances, it would be rational both from an economic standpoint and an 
ideological one for the “old timers” to vote against increasing their own taxes.  
Despite the presence of some households with seniors and others with long 
tenures in the community, for the people of Fairborn, there was probably just not 
enough community attachment to withstand the Republican Headwind. 
Conclusion  
 Smallville school districts resemble Clintonland school districts in that 
political ideology beyond the Republican Headwind—at least as measured 
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against partisan support for candidates competing in a presidential election--does 
not seem to play a large role in the outcome of these elections.   Instead, 
economic self-interest and the general Republican aversion to taxes creates a 
headwind that must be overcome if a tax increase is to be adopted.   
 The evidence suggests that one way a school district can overcome the 
Republican Headwind is by fostering a strong sense of attachment to the 
community.   All other things being equal, smaller communities that are able to 
attract or retain relatively larger proportions of households with people who are at 
least 60 years old and that are not beset with a lot of poverty seemed to be best 
able to pass school tax increases in the Smallville group of districts during 2011.  
Strong feelings of community attachment, as evidenced by large proportions of 
households with seniors and the presence of residents with long tenure in the 
community helped Smallville Adopter districts such as Advance overcome the 
Republican Headwind and pass the school tax.  Lacking these qualities, the 
Republican Headwind kept Smallville school districts such as Fairborn from 
voting to give their school districts the additional funds the school district had 
requested. 
 Not all Republican oriented districts work this way.  In Chapter 7 we will 
explore the last cell of the proffered typology where we find Republican oriented 

























Educational Attainment 10.321 
(6.0.5) 
0.784 0.233 0.044 
Homeowners 5.37 
(2.486) 
0.266 0.174 0.016 
White 1.811 
(3.196) 
0.329 0.060 0.286 
Children -8.762 
(8.075) 
0.522 0.168 0.139 
Total Population (log) -0.844 
(0.309) 
-0.753 -0.363 0.003 
Constant 0.669 
(4.686) 
   
N 74    




Gold Standards in Goldwater Country 
 
 If the Republican Headwind is, for the Smallville districts, like a breeze that 
makes it necessary to wear a jacket for comfort on an autumn day, in the 
Goldwater Country districts, the Republican Headwind is like the gales from 
which people are urged to stay indoors in the run-up to a nor’easter in the winter.  
This strong Republican Headwind is a key reason that the Goldwater Country 
districts passed tax increases at the lowest rate by far—30.65%--of the four 
groups in the typology. 
 Why should the Republican Headwind have greater force in the Goldwater 
Country Districts than in the Smallville districts?  Two factors explain it.  First, as I 
have previously noted, political conservatives tend to prefer living in smaller 
venues.  According to the Pew Research Center’s Political Polarization in the 
American Public report of 2014, as a person becomes more consistently 
conservative, the more likely it is that he or she will say that he or she prefers to 
live in a setting where “the houses are larger and farther apart but schools, stores 
and restaurants are several miles away (Dimock, Kiley, Keeter, & Doherty, 2014).”  
While this speaks directly to population density preferences, it also speaks 
indirectly about preferences for jurisdiction size.  Lower population density 
generally implies lower population sizes.174   
                                            
174 Tor this dataset, the correlation between the log of population size and the log 
of population density is r=0.72. 
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 Larger population sizes, though, tend to have a negative impact on 
individual political efficacy (Lassen & Serritzlew, 2011) as well as on satisfaction 
with local governmental services (Mouritzen, 1989).  While the mean population 
size of the Goldwater Country group of districts is much lower than those of the 
two Democratic groups, it is more than twice as high as that of the Smallville 
Group and so if satisfaction with local services is inversely related to population 
size, absent some countervailing factor, we should expect that as school districts 
get larger, there may be higher levels of dissatisfaction with the services they 
provide and less incentive for rewarding them with more tax revenue. 
 The second factor that can account for the strength of the Republican 
Headwind in the Goldwater Country districts is education.  For the Goldwater 
Country districts, increasing levels of educational attainment should cut two ways.  
First, as I noted in Chapter 3, the Goldwater Country districts are second only to 
the Googleplex districts in levels of educational attainment, probably because 
they have the second highest percentage of college graduates in the dataset.  In 
accordance with the Educational Attainment Hypothesis, we should see an 
upward pressure on school tax passage rates in districts where educational 
attainment is high. 
 But, on the other hand, It has long been known that high levels of 
education tend to make a voter more ideological (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; 
P. E. Converse, 2006a, 2006b, 2006b; Fiorina et al., 2010; Jacoby, 1988).  As 
Jacoby argues: 
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Formal schooling provides individuals with exposure to information, and 
training in the use of conceptual knowledge.  Both of these factors should 
facilitate the application of general abstract principles like the liberal-
conservative continuum, to specific events, people and situations. . . .The 
reasonable expectation is that liberal-conservative considerations should 
have a more prominent role among people who have attained higher 
levels of education (Jacoby, 1988). 
Perhaps more to the point, Gelman has pointed out that that highly educated 
whites, precisely like the ones that live in the Goldwater Country districts, are the 
Republicans who “are driving political polarization (Gelman, 2014).”  Because 
they are better educated, these kinds of people can be expected to know or to be 
able to discover what “good Republicans” believe about government services in 
general and public education in particular.  Higher levels of education should also 
make it easier for people to be able to adopt arguments about whether their local 
school systems conform to Republican notions of good government.   
 In this Chapter, I argue that the demographic circumstances of these 
districts make it extremely difficult to pass tax increases.   The general 
Republican ideology that powers the Republican Headwind gains strength from 
high levels of educational attainment as well as from the increasing levels of 
dissatisfaction that may come with increasing population size.  Because 
educational attainment is a double-edged sword in this group of districts, though, 
it sometimes also helps to moderate some of that dissatisfaction, enabling 
districts in Goldwater Country to pass school tax increases. 
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 I begin my argument by providing a more detailed discussion of elite 
Republican attitudes on the scope and role of government in general and on 
public education in particular than I provided in Chapter 6.  I do so, first because 
these elite attitudes are more likely to be relevant to the way people who live in 
Goldwater Country school districts think about their public school systems than 
they were in the less well educated, less ideological Smallville districts, and 
second, because it is possible that those attitudes may shape the demographics 
of these districts.  Those demographics may, in turn influence levels of 
satisfaction with school district services and thereby affect the general 
willingness of a community to pay more in school taxes, Next, I use the general-
purpose logistic regression model I developed in Chapter 3 to provide evidence 
that educational attainment and population size do, in fact, affect the outcome of 
Goldwater Country school tax elections.  
  Finally, I provide case studies of the Madeira School District in Ohio and 
the Cave Creek School District in Arizona, respectively an Adopter district and a 
Rejecter district.  I show, first of all, that the votes on the respective school tax 
measures were strongly influenced by ideological thinking.  I do this by providing 
evidence of a strong correlation between the precinct-by-precinct vote for 
president in 2012 and the precinct-by-precinct vote on the ostensibly nonpartisan 
tax increase measures in both the Madeira school district and the Cave Creek 
district respectively.  This correlation supports my claim that the two votes are 
related to each other and that voters in each precinct or polling place probably 
evaluated the ostensibly nonpartisan school tax issue by the same criteria they 
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used to evaluate the presidential candidates in 2012.  I then show that, 
consistent with my argument,  (i) the voters in the Madeira had good reason to be 
pleased by the achievements of its school district, and this helped in passing the 
tax; while (ii) the voters in the Cave Creek school district were probably 
disappointed with the quality of the schools in their district, and to punish the 
system for poor performance, they voted against the requested tax increase. 
A More Nuanced Look at the Republican Headwind 
Elite Republican Ideology 
 
 In describing Republican values and beliefs to the world at large, the 
current GOP website says that: 
[T]oday’s Republicans believe individuals, not government, make the best 
decisions; all people are entitled to equal rights; any decisions are best 
made close to home. . . . Our party works to give Americans more 
choices—in healthcare, in education, in energy, and in the economy—and 
to free individuals and families from the intrusive overreach of federal 
bureaucrats. . . .We believe in the power and opportunity of America’s 
free-market economy. . . .We oppose interventionist policies that put the 
federal government in control of industry and allow it to pick winners and 
losers in the marketplace.175 
 These general values--individualism, self-reliance and free market 
capitalism-- inform Republican approaches to government in general.  They 
make Republicans such as those in the Madeira and Cave Creek school districts, 
                                            
175 http://www.gop.com/our-party/our-history/ 
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who may be more influenced by ideology than personal economic considerations, 
quite wary of the idea that governments are generally competent to accomplish 
their objectives.  In 2012, for example, the Pew Research Center for the People 
and the Press found that over three-quarters of their Republican respondents 
agreed that government is “usually inefficient and wasteful” while only 41% of the 
Democratic respondents thought the same thing (Pew Research Center for the 
People and the Press, 2012).  
 Republicans who are influenced more by ideology than personal economic 
considerations may well carry this general attitude about government into their 
views of government-provided public education.   The 2012 Republican Platform 
insisted that “enormous amounts of money are being spent for K-12 public 
education with overall results that do not justify that spending.”176  The 
formulation of this statement implies that money should only be spent on 
educational programs that produce results.  Said Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-TN), 
in introducing the “Scholarship for Kids Act,”177 “money is sent directly to schools.  
Local government monopolies run most schools and tell most students which 
school to attend.  There is little choice and no K-12 marketplace as there is in 
                                            
176 http://www.gop.com/2012-republican-platform_Renewing/ 
177 The “Scholarship for Kids Act” would allow low income children and their 
parents to use a per capita share of federal money spent to pay for alternate 
education at a school of their choice.  Sen. Tim Scott  (R-S.C.) introduced 
another bill that would allow children with special needs to use a per capita 
amount of federal money set aside for special education to pay for tuition at an 
educational facility of their choice.  Both bills are consistent with the 2012 
Republican platform which provides: “The bulk of the federal money through Title 
I for low-income children and through IDEA for disabled youngsters should follow 
the students to whatever school they choose so that eligible pupils, through open 
enrollment, can bring their share of the funding with them.” 
http://www.gop.com/2012-republican-platform_Renewing/ 
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higher education.”178  Most of the “victims” of this ineffective spending are poor 
people who are often “trapped in failing schools.” 179  Republican elites consider 
getting children out of those environments to be “the greatest civil rights 
challenge of our time.”180 
 For Republicans such as Sen. Alexander, the reason governmental 
agencies perform so poorly is that governments are state funded monopolies that 
generally do not have to face competition or turn a profit, and so they can provide 
substandard services at high cost. When it comes to education, Republican elites 
tend to be skeptical that democracy will hold government to account.  They 
believe that powerful teachers’ unions have “captured” Democratic politicians, 
who are willing to put the economic needs of school personnel ahead of the 
needs of students.181  They object to compensation and retention systems that 
reward teachers for seniority and earning educational credentials instead of for 
getting better educational results.182  For this reason, their solutions tend to focus, 
on creating alternatives to governmental monopolies and empowering individuals 
to get what they, in their own judgment, believe is in the best interests of 
themselves and their families.  This, in part, explains why Republican elites tend 
                                            
178 http://www.chattanoogan.com/2014/1/28/268393/Alexander-Proposes-11-
Million-2100.aspx 
179 http://www.gop.com/2012-republican-platform_Renewing/.  The quoted 






to view “school choice” programs like the one introduced by Sen. Alexander more 
favorably than do Democrats.183  
 We ought to find that this attitude is reflected in public opinion surveys 
differently by Republican respondents depending on their level of educational 
attainment, and that, in fact is, what we do find.  In a NBC News/Wall Street 
Journal poll conducted September 22-26 in 2010, survey respondents were 
asked how willing they would be to “pay higher federal taxes to improve our 
country’s public schools.”  The results, broken down by level of educational 
attainment and party orientation184 appear below as Figure 7-1 and Figure 7-2.  
                                            
183 In the same NBC/Wall Street Journal poll upon which Figures 7-1 and 7-2 are 
based, Republicans in the two highest levels of educational attainment were, by 
a wide margin, more likely than their Democratic counterparts to believe that 
allowing parents greater flexibility in choosing the schools their children attend 
and increasing the number of public charter schools would improve the public 
educational system.  Similarly, more Republicans than Democrats in the two 
highest educational attainment groups believed that increasing the number of 
public charter schools would be a big improvement for the public educational 
system.  
184 The survey divided party orientation into seven categories and a “Not sure” 
group.  For purposes of Figures 7-1 and 7-2, I have collapsed respondents who 
said that they were “Strong Democrat,” “Not Very Strong Democrat” and 
“Independent/lean Democrat” into a single Democrats group and respondents 
who said that they were “Strong Republican,” “Not Very Strong Republican” and 
“Independent/lean Republican” into a single Republican group; “Strictly 
Independents” and “Not sure” have been excluded.  
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Figure 7- 1 Willingness to Pay Higher School Taxes by Political Orientation and Educational 
Attainment 
 
Figure 7-1 shows the percentages of Democrats and Republicans at each level 
of educational attainment who indicated any willingness to pay more in federal 
taxes to support public education while Figure 7-2 shows the percentages of 
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Figure 7- 2 Enthusiasm for Higher School Taxes by Political Orientation and Educational Attainment 
 
indicated that they were very willing to pay more in federal taxes to support public 
education. 
 It is, of course, difficult to know whether respondents would have reacted 
differently to a question that focused on state and/or local taxes, but for present 
purposes, it does not matter.  What is important here are the general trends and 
the contrast between Democrats and Republicans at each level of educational 
attainment.  Figure 7-1 shows that Republicans become less willing to pay more 
in taxes as educational attainment levels increase; as we should expect from our 
examination of the Googleplex districts, we would otherwise have expected 
educational attainment to increase a community’s willingness to pay additional 
taxes.  If we assume that the level of educational attainment is a reasonably 
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have strong evidence that highly educated Republicans such as those who live in 
the Madeira and Cave Creek school districts may have adopted elite Republican 
attitudes toward federal taxes and public education. 
 The downward trend that appears in Figure 7-1 is not apparent with 
respect to the most highly educated group of Republicans in Figure 7-2, which 
gauges Democratic and Republican enthusiasm for higher taxes devoted to 
public education.  What is important here is the absolute level of Republican 
enthusiasm, particularly in comparison to that of the Democrats.  The lowest level 
of enthusiasm for higher taxes devoted to public education for Democrats, which 
comes from Democrats who have never graduated from high school, is equal to 
the highest level of enthusiasm for Republicans, which comes from the 
Republicans who have the highest level of education.  Even here, the level of 
enthusiasm for higher taxes is only about a third as high as that expressed by the 
Democrats with the highest level of education.   
 The main message of Figures 7-1 and 7-2 together is that (i) the higher a 
Republican individual’s level of educational attainment, the more likely it is that 
he or she will express opinions consistent with the Republican party line on taxes 
and public education; and (ii) higher educational attainment provides a small 
edge in enthusiasm for additional taxes supporting education relative to other 
Republicans at lower levels of educational attainment.  In the next sections, I will 
provide evidence that in Goldwater Country, all other things being equal, better 
educated communities do in fact have a slight advantage when it comes to 




 Why conservatives should want to live in areas with smaller populations 
than do people with more liberal political leanings is an interesting question for 
which the existing literature provides few empirical answers.  I have discovered 
no individual level data on point, and that probably accounts for the fact that I 
have discovered no empirical research on the topic.  It is, nevertheless fair to 
take the Republican Party platform’s language, which focuses on individual 
autonomy, the importance of decisions being made “close to home,” and 
individual choice, as being at least expressive of the values of those who drafted 
it, ratified and supported it, regardless of whether they have actually and 
intentionally located themselves in smaller communities so as to “practice what 
they preach.” 
 There is good reason to think that smaller communities are more 
conducive to the values expressed by the Republican platform than are larger 
ones.  Smaller communities tend to be more homogeneous than larger ones 
(Dahl & Tufte, 1973; Denters, 2002; Lassen & Serritzlew, 2011; Verba & Nie, 
1972).185 With fewer people, there is less need for complex rules or institutions 
designed to manage and direct conflict, and hence, less need for government 
and all of its attendant costs. 
 In a September, 2014 poll, the Gallup organization noted that since 1997, 
Republicans have increasingly reported greater trust and confidence in state and 
                                            
185 In this dataset, the variable used to measure diversity has an overall 
correlation of r= -0.40 meaning that as a jurisdiction gets smaller, its population 
gets less racially diverse. 
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local government than have Democrats.  While majorities of Republicans and 
Democrats say that they have “a great deal or a fair amount of trust in their state 
governments,” the gap in the way that Republicans and Democrats responded to 
the question was 14 percentage points.  Similarly, whereas 81% of Republicans 
say that they have “a great deal or a fair amount” of trust and confidence in their 
local governments, only 71% of Democrats said the same thing.186   Though 
Gallup had no data on why the trend or the gap exists, it remarked: 
Though Americans' current confidence ratings in state and local 
governments are nothing out of the ordinary, Republicans' trust in each is 
increasing. Republicans have typically expressed the most trust in these 
levels of government in the past, but the widening gap between 
Democrats and Republicans could have several significant explanations 
and implications. . . For one, the GOP's mantra of smaller government 
could translate literally to higher levels of trust in governments that are 
both smaller and closer to the citizens they are designed to serve.  
 While there is no data specifically on Republicans, there is some research 
on the political implications of community size on internal political efficacy187 
(“IPE”), trust in government and satisfaction with the level and quality of services 
provided by government.  All of these factors are likely to influence a voter’s 
willingness to agree to pay more in taxes to the level of government responsible 
for providing those services.   
 The best studies we have on the topic rely on quasi-experiments where 
there is data on levels of efficacy, trust and satisfaction both before and after 
                                            
186 http://www.gallup.com/poll/176846/americans-trust-local-government-
state.aspx 
187 Internal political efficacy refers to “individual citizens’ beliefs that they are 
competent to understand and take part in politics.”  It is “a psychological 
condition that many see as necessary for high-quality participatory democracy 
(Lassen & Serritzlew, 2011, p. 238).”   
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various jurisdictions have been consolidated.  Lassen and Serritzlew report that 
citizens in municipalities that had been merged together into larger municipalities 
have significantly and substantially lower IPE after the merger than they had 
before it and that the larger the increase in population, the larger the decline in 
IPE (Lassen & Serritzlew, 2011).  They worry that “citizens in large jurisdictions 
are less likely than citizens in small jurisdictions to believe that” they have 
“adequate and equal access to influencing political decisions (Lassen & 
Serritzlew, 2011, p. 255).”  This could, in turn, lead to the feelings of alienation I 
discussed in Chapter 2 that discourage people from participating in elections or 
supporting projects for the benefit of the community at large. 
 Though not focused on jurisdiction size, Newton and Norris use World 
Values Survey data to show that trust in government is not the result of individual 
psychology but that it is, instead, “primarily government performance that 
determines the level of citizens’ confidence in public institutions (Newton & Norris, 
2000, p. 12).” According to other studies, though, population size has a 
substantial effect on levels of satisfaction with governmentally provided services.  
Studying the consolidation of Danish jurisdictions, Mouritzen found that because 
smaller jurisdictional units are more homogeneous and provide services more 
efficiently than larger jurisdictions, citizen satisfaction with public services 
increases as population size decreases.  This, in turn, leads citizens to be more 
willing to participate in local politics and to hold more favorable views of local 
democracy (Mouritzen, 1989). Studying survey data from Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom, Denters found that a 
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municipality’s population size modestly reduces the level of political trust and that 
population size exerts this impact through its impact on the level of satisfaction 
the population has with the quality of services provided by the municipality 
(Denters, 2002). 
 According to this work, then, population size is linked with important 
determinants of political participation.  Because the findings reach the same 
general conclusions using different data sources, it is fair to generalize the 
finding to other settings and to conclude that larger population sizes lead to 
decreased levels of IPE, political trust and satisfaction with publicly provided 
services in other settings.  With low levels of all of these qualities, it is also fair to 
conclude that, in accordance with the Community Affinity Hypothesis described in 
Chapter 2, residents of the Goldwater Country districts should become more 
alienated from their school districts and less satisfied with the services that they 
provide as those districts become larger, in turn making voters less willing to 
agree to school tax increases. 
 Though I have just cited the Community Affinity Hypothesis as a possible 
explanation of the voting behavior in Goldwater Country districts, it is important to 
understand that I am not making the same kind of argument with respect to the 
Goldwater Country districts that I made with respect to the Smallville districts.  In 
the Smallville group of districts, the mean population size was only about 15,000 
residents.  The Goldwater Country districts have a mean population size of over 
32,000 people, and it is therefore hard to imagine that people living in these 
communities have developed the same kinds of long-standing relationships with 
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these places or with the other people in their school districts that seem to be 
present in Adopter districts in the Smallville group.188  What I am arguing is that 
the basic demography of these districts should have a number of adverse affects 
that should intensify the Republican Headwind, making people who are already 
ideologically wary of government less willing to pass tax increases as their 
districts grow in population.   
 In the next section, I provide a brief overview of the demographic 
differences between the Goldwater Country Adopter districts and Rejecter 
districts.  I provide empirical evidence both that Adopter districts have higher 
levels of educational attainment and smaller populations than do Rejecter 
districts and that these two factors significantly improve the probability that a 
district will adopt a tax increase.   The way in which these factors affect school 
tax election results in the Goldwater Country group of districts is complex, though, 
and through case studies of the Madeira City School District in Ohio and the 
Cave Creek Unified School District #93 in Arizona, I suggest that population size, 
educational attainment and the Republican Headwind interact so as to make 
satisfaction with the educational services provided by the school district a key 




                                            
188 Owners in the Smallville group of districts have lived in the same home for 
almost three years longer than the homeowners in the Goldwater Country group 
of districts. 
 238 
 Goldwater Country Adopter and Rejecter Districts 
 
 Goldwater Country Adopter districts can be distinguished from Rejecter 
districts by two basic characteristics.189  First, on average, the Adopter districts 
rate about 6 percentage points higher in educational attainment than the Rejecter 
districts, 190 apparently because in Adopter districts, the percentage of college 
graduates is 6.7 percentage points higher.191 Second, the schools in Adopter 
districts have populations that are, on average, about 15,000 people smaller,192 
than were the Rejecter districts.  
 Do these factors actually play a role in the outcome of school tax elections 
in the Goldwater Country group of districts?  The results of the general-purpose 
logistic regression model applied to the Goldwater Country districts reported in 
Table 7-1 suggests that they do.   Table 7-1 shows that the districts in Goldwater 
Country are affected by population size and, as were the districts in the 
Googleplex group, by the level of a school district’s educational attainment.   
None of the variables that tap into material self-interest—percent homeowners, 
percent white, percent households with seniors--reach conventional levels of 
statistical significance.  This should suggest to us that the votes on these taxes 
 
                                            
189 I highlight here only the differences that my theory suggests should be 
relevant.  In addition to educational attainment and population size, compared to 
the Rejecter districts, Adopter districts have adjusted median home values that 
are, on average about $61,000 higher (p=0.046, one-tailed), adjusted median 
income on average about $5,000.00 higher (p=0.043 one-tailed), and somewhat 
more than half as many students (p=0.025 one-tail).  
190 p=0.012 (one-tailed) 
191 p=0.019 (one-tailed) 
192 p=0.02 (one-tailed) 
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0.768 0.345 0.000 
Homeowners 0.825 
(4.697) 
0.084 0.029 0.431 
Whites 2.153 
(4.423) 
0.234 0.043 0.313 
Seniors -2.09 
(5.417) 
-0.143 -0.063 0.350 
Children193 4.015    
(0.151) 





-0.541 -0.22 0.047 
Constant -2.17 
(4.042) 
  0.295 
N 62    
Pseudo R2 0.0914    
 
did not involve economic concerns such as preserving or improving home values.  
Instead, the results contained in Table 7-1 imply that more intangible values were 
at stake. 
 Table 7-1 confirms my insights that in affluent, Republican oriented school 
districts, the chances of passing a school tax increase are much better in districts 
where the level of educational attainment is high.  School districts with 
educational attainment scores one standard deviation above the mean were at 
least 34.5% more likely to adopt school tax increases than districts where the 
                                            
193 From the Alternative Specification.  See Table 7A-1 in the Appendix. 
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general level of educational attainment was one standard deviation below the 
mean.194  The results are also consistent with my observations regarding 
population size; School districts with smaller populations are more likely to adopt 
tax increases even after controlling for education, race and homeownership.  
School districts with populations one standard deviation below the mean were 
over 22%195 more likely to pass school tax increases than districts where school 
quality is lower. 
 Behind this relatively straightforward presentation of logistic regression 
results lurks something far more complex.  In Figure 7.3, I provide a crosstab   
Figure 7- 3  Educational Attainment and Population Size for Goldwater Country Adopters 



































showing the percentage of observations matching each cell description that 
adopted tax increases.  As my theory expects, Low Educational Attainment-High 
Population size districts faired worst of all: not a single one adopted a tax 
increase.  Districts that had low educational attainment and low population size 
had the next highest passage rate, and that seems reasonable.  With one 
positive factor—low population size—and one negative factor—low educational 
                                            
194 Using the full range of the variable, moving from the lowest value for 
educational attainment to the highest improves the chances for passage by 
76.8%. 
195 Using the full range of the variable, moving from the lowest value for school 
district quality to the highest improves the chances for passage by  50.9%. 
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attainment—we should expect those districts to have a higher rate of passage 
than the cases with no positive factors but worse than the cases with both 
positive factors.  In particular, it would not be implausible to infer that because 
the key positive factor was low population size, the districts that adopted tax 
increases were more satisfied with their school district performances than the 
districts that rejected them.   
 More puzzling, though, are the cases in the two high educational 
attainment cells.  Theory would suggest that there should be more cases in the 
high educational attainment-low population cell than there are in the high 
educational attainment – high population cell.  Even more puzzling, though, is the 
fact that 10 of the 19 cases in Goldwater Country that passed the tax increase 
are in the in the high educational attainment-high population cell.  
 Figure 7.4 helps to solve the puzzle.  In Figure 7.4, I plot the predicted 
probabilities of a Goldwater Country district passing a tax increase by level of 
educational attainment and district population size.  The lines represents 
Goldwater Country school districts at the 5th, 50th and 95th percentiles of 
educational attainment for Goldwater Country; a dotted blue line marks the point 
where the probability of adopting a tax increase and rejecting one is equal.  
 All three lines have approximately the same downward trajectory, implying 
lower probabilities of passage as district population sizes increase. The portion of 
the lines above and below the 50% point, though, for any of the lines. are not the 
same.  As we might expect in an affluent Republican area, the Republican  
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Figure 7- 4 Impact of Education and Population Size on Likelihood of Adoption 
 
Headwind is strong.   For the communities with the lowest level of educational 
attainment, even the smallest population sizes are not sufficient to raise the 
probability of adopting a tax increase above 40%.  At this level of educational 
attainment, on average, only about 10% of the people who live in these districts 
have earned college degrees, and it is therefore not likely that they have much 
appreciation for what counts as top quality education nor any experience with the 
benefits that excellent education provides.   
 The line representing the school districts at the 50th percentile of 
educational attainment for Goldwater Country tells a similar story.  Most of that 
line is below the 50% probability line.  These communities achieve a better than 
even chance of adopting a tax increase when their populations are relatively 
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small.  If the analysis provided above is correct, we can infer that here, education 
moderates the Republican Headwind, but beginning at a relatively low level, 
increased population sizes begin to reduce levels of satisfaction with the services 
the school district is providing to such an extent that it becomes extremely 
difficult to turn out a majority favoring a tax increase. 
 Communities at the 95th percentile, depicted by the red line on the graph, 
are quite different than the two lower educational attainment groups.  In school 
districts like these, about 45% of the adults have earned college degrees. Like 
their peers in the Googleplex group, high levels of educational attainment do a 
good job of countering the Republican Headwind, particularly in places below 
about 40,000 people.  After that point though, even these highly educated 
communities cannot displace enough of the dissatisfaction that appears to be 
inherent in places with larger populations in order to muster enough voters to 
pass a tax increase. 
 One reasonable inference that can be drawn from results presented in 
Table 7-1 and Figures 7-3 and 7-4—and the one I do draw—is that no less than 
their affluent Democratic counterparts in the Googleplex group of districts, 
affluent Republicans with good educations probably place the quality of an area’s 
school district at the top of the list when given a choice of where to live. (Warren 
& Tyagi, 2004)  We will see strong evidence of this in both the Madeira and Cave 
Creek school districts.  Despite the anti-government, anti-tax political ideology 
prevalent in the Republican world during 2011 and the bad economic times, the 
people in the districts with the highest levels of education may well have been in 
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a better position to understand the importance of quality primary and secondary 
education and so, provided that they were not dissatisfied with the services being 
provided by the school district, they may have been more willing to provide the 




Madeira City School District, Ohio 
 
 The Madeira school district in Hamilton County, Ohio is the school district the 
model identified as being the Goldwater Country school district most likely to 
pass a school tax increase in 2011.  This is probably because of its highly 
educated, affluent population and its excellent school system.  The school district 
is home to about 8,500 people clustered together on 3.37 square miles in a 
suburban area about 10 miles northeast of Cincinnati, Ohio.  The school district 
operates a high school, a middle school and an elementary school, which, 
together, educate about 2,000 students.  
 Over 54% of the adults who live in the Madeira school district are college 
graduates.  The district has the sixth highest educational attainment score of all 
Republican districts in the dataset and the highest score for the Ohio districts in 
Goldwater Country.  Close to 80% of the working adults in the Madeira school 
district work as professionals or managers while fewer than 10% earn their 
livings through manual labor.  It is not surprising that a large number of well-
known national and international business organizations, including Procter & 
Gamble, Macy’s, Inc., Wellpoint, GE Aviation, Citigroup, Duke Energy, Turner 
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Construction Company, Carestar and Humana are located nearby and can take 
advantage of Greater Cincinnati’s highly educated workforce.  
 The quality of the school district is a point of local pride for the Madeira 
community and a selling point for attracting people relocating to the Greater 
Cincinnati area.  Anyone looking for information about Madeira learns this 
immediately from the city’s official website: 
Cincy Magazine has ranked Madeira second only to Terrace Park for sales 
value of housing, low crime rate, high quality of award winning schools and 
many other variables. To read more follow the link: . . . .  Madeira was also 
recognized in 2009 by Business Week magazine as the 40th best place to 
raise kids in the U.S, and a Silver Medal was awarded by US News and 
World Report to the Madeira City School District for being one of the top 
public high schools in the country.  And as of October 2013, the City of 
Madeira has one of the highest residential recycling rates in the state. 
There's more! Forbes has ranked Madeira Schools number one in Ohio and 
two in the entire midwest! Read the article . . .  Come and see why Madeira is 
The Friendly Town!196 
Of the four sentences in this description of the City of Madeira that make claims 
about the quality of life there, three make reference to the Madeira school district; 
one of the four sentences is devoted entirely to the Madeira school district, and 
instead of providing a link to local attractions, Madeira City provides a link to an 
article in Forbes Magazine that merely confirms the school district’s standing. 
                                            
196 http://www.madeiracity.com/ 
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 There appears to be a lot about the Madeira school system of which the 
residents of the Madeira school district can be proud.  For the 2011-2012 school 
year, the Ohio Department of Education ranked the Madeira school district 
second in the state in terms of academic performance,197 up from fifth place the 
year before.198  Using the data from the George W. Bush Institutie on school 
district quality, Madeira was 1 point below the cutoff for the 99th percentile in 
school district quality for all of the districts in the dataset.  In addition, the Madeira 
school district, to “characterize the overall educational value of  . . . [the] school 
district in areas that matter most in our community” noted in its “Madeira City 
Schools Quality Profile”199 that 
• Mean SAT Scores for 2012 were 579 for reading, 576 for math and 557 
for writing while the comparable national scores were 496, 514 and 488 
respectively; 
• 43% of the high school’s student body had taken at least one of the 15 
advanced placement (AP) courses offered by the high school and 77% of 
the students who took an advanced placement class had earned at least a 
3, qualifying them to receive college credit; 
• 75 Madeira High School students (out of approximately 450) had been 
inducted into the National Honor Society; 










• 33 eighth grade students had been inducted in to the National Junior 
Honor Society; 
• The State of Ohio, in 2013, had recognized Madeira High School for its 
excellent Marching Band and Choir programs; 
• 85% of the teachers had a master’s degree; 
• The district had 7 National Board Certified Teachers; 
• 26 teachers had been certified by the Ohio Department of Education as 
“Master Teachers”;  
• 5 Coaches had been cited as Cincinnati Hills League “Coach of the Year”; 
and 
• Madeira High School had 6 Cincinnati Hills League championship athletic 
teams. 
 It is important to note here that in addition to tax revenue, the Madeira school 
district has access to private sources of funding.  This well-educated community 
has been willing to provide private avenues for the “extras” that enhance the 
educational experience of the Madeira school district’s students.  Residents of 
the district who “recognized the need to assist the [high] school in achieving its 
goals for quality education” formed the Madeira Schools Foundation in 1984.200 
Since then, it has raised over $2 million to “enrich the Madeira City School’s 
programs and ensure the financial future of the schools.”   Specifically, it has 
established an endowment fund to support “seven areas where additional 
resources are essential to ensure the promise” of the future, including 
                                            
200 http://www.madeiracityschools.org/content_page2.aspx?cid=228 
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• Enhancement of all academic, performing and visual arts and athletic 
programs; 
• Computer or teaching technologies for classroom and labs; 
• Scholarships; 
• Enhancement of library, math and science materials; 
• Supplemental funding of capital projects; and 
• Professional development of staff. 
 In addition, the Madeira City Schools Quality Profile notes that “booster 
organizations” for athletic and music programs had raised over $150,000 for 
materials, equipment and programming and that over $25,000 had been received 
from anonymous community donors for improvements to the high school’s 
auditorium.  The Madeira school district can also point to “partnerships with 
leading business companies and service organizations” that have given Madeira 
school district students “real world experiences and the ability to apply concepts 
they have learned in the classroom.”201 
 What is remarkable about all of this is that despite the fact that, while there 
are obviously people who have strong positive feelings about the school system 
and are willing, voluntarily, to provide for the Madeira school district above and 
beyond their obligations to pay their school taxes, this high degree of private 
generosity has not created what Oliver calls  “bystander effects,” in which 
residents of a community shirk their public responsibilities because they feel that 






somebody else in the community should and will assume those responsibilities. 
(Oliver, 2001, pp. 56–58)  Given the results of the 2011 school tax election, and 
despite the relatively large sums of money raised over the years, residents of 
Madeira seem to understand that the private resources being provided are for 
“extras,” supplementing the basic services that must be paid for with tax dollars. 
 We have already encountered several other Ohio school districts, and so it is 
unnecessary to restate the economic and political situation Ohio school districts 
encountered in 2011.  According to a slide presentation prepared by district 
Superintendent Steve Kramer, the Madeira school district found itself facing the 
loss of $1.1 million in state and federal funding.202  To address this shortfall, the 
school district needed to have the voters approve a new levy that would increase 
the school tax by $210 per year or $17.50 per month for each $100,000 in 
assessed home value.203  In defense of the tax increase, Kramer pointed out that 
the last tax increase had been granted in 2006 and that the district had, through 
judicious management, been able to make those funds last for two years longer 
than they had been projected to last at the time of adoption. “A successful 
community depends, in great part, on a successful school system,” he said.204 
 The Madeira school district adopted the tax increase with a vote of 57% in 
favor and 43% opposed.  Figure 7-5 confirms my claim that Republican 










ideological predilections played a prominent role in the election.   Figure 7-5 
shows that the Madeira school district followed the same basic pattern we have 
seen before in the Portland school district (Figure 4-2).  The red line on Figure 7-
5 represents the precinct-by-precinct percentage of the Madeira school district 
vote in favor of the tax increase and the green line represents the precinct- by-
precinct percentage of the two-party Madeira school district vote for President 
Obama in the 2012 election, the latter of which I offer as an approximation of the 
political ideology of the community.  The precincts have been arranged by 
ascending percentage vote for President Obama.  The concordance of the vote 
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Figure 7- 5 School Tax and Presidential Vote for Madeira 
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Madeira Voting on School  Tax in 2011 and 






on the tax increase represented by the green line with the precinct-by-precinct 
vote for President Obama represented by the red line is remarkable: They 
correlate at r=0.81, meaning that the precincts that were more supportive of the 
Democratic president were also more supportive of the tax increase.  Thus, even 
though this is a Republican leaning district where the vote in favor of President 
Obama never exceeds 41% and amounts to only a 34.7% vote in his favor, 
precinct level support for the Democratic candidate strongly implies a 
proportionate level of support for a tax increase.205 
 If ideological considerations were in play as Figure 7-5 suggests they were, 
then the results of the school tax election are consistent with my explanation of 
how affluent, Republican oriented school districts approach school tax increases.  
On the one hand, we should expect high levels of educational attainment to 
improve the likelihood of passing a tax increase while, on the other, we should 
expect high levels of educational attainment simultaneously to exert a downward 
ideological pressure that can be countered with evidence of good district 
performance.   The regression line superimposed on the green line on Figure 7-5 
can be thought of as the baseline for Republican ideology and therefore a 
hypothetical representation of where the school tax election might have come out 
had the Madeira district been only mediocre.    The regression line superimposed 
on Figure 7-5’s red line (which is almost parallel to the green line’s regression 
line) shows where the election did come out.  The 17.41 percentage point gap 
                                            
205The correlation between Average Precinct Home Value and the vote on the 
school tax increase is only r=0.13.  The correlation between Average Precinct 
Home value and the vote for Obama is even smaller in absolute terms at r=-0.10.   
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between the intercepts of the two regression lines can be attributed to community 
satisfaction with the school district’s performance.  In this regard, I have 
presented ample evidence that the Madeira school district was at least meeting 
the community’s quality standards, and this may ultimately have been the reason 
that the community was willing to increase its own taxes to meet the school 
district’s stated need.    Madeira is therefore consistent with the implications of 
Table 7-1:  For Highly educated Republican school districts with high levels of 
school district quality, the obstacle created by the Republican Headwind can be 
overcome by good performance. 
Cave Creek Unified School District #93, Arizona 
 
 The Cave Creek school district is a moderately large suburban school 
district located about 30 miles north of Phoenix and Scottsdale.  It is a typical, 
affluent Republican oriented district with a population that is over 94% white and 
where over 91% of the homes are owned by the people who reside in them.  This 
is staunchly conservative territory where Barack Obama could muster only 
28.37% of the vote against Mitt Romney in 2012. 
 The Cave Creek district serves about 6,000 students.  It has four 
elementary schools, a middle school and a high school.  Arizona is a “school 
choice” state, and though, theoretically, students may attend any Arizona school, 
regardless of its location, the Cave Creek district’s attendance base draws 
children mainly from the communities of Cave Creek, Carefree and Rio Verde. 
The three main communities can account for about 18% of all school district 
residents; the remainder are scattered throughout the rest of the district.   While 
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the district’s population of about 51,300 people is the 12th largest in Goldwater 
Country, the Cave Creek district’s theoretical population density is about 271 
people per square mile, exactly the quadrant median, but well below the 
quadrant mean of 508 people per square mile.  In part, because the district is so 
sparsely populated, it is not surprising that, unlike the Madeira school district, 
there are no large employers in the immediate vicinity and, consequently, over 
15% of the work force works from home. 
 As in the Madeira school district, the general level of educational 
attainment in the Cave Creek district is high, with almost 58% of its residents 
older than 25 holding at least a bachelor’s degree.  The district is highly affluent, 
with an adjusted median home value of $684,969, about triple what it is in the 
Madeira school district. The Cave Creek school district’s adjusted median 
household income is in excess of $110,000, which is about $30,000 higher than it 
is in the Madeira school district. While it rates at about the 75th percentile for 
district quality (based on data from the George W. Bush Institute), considering all 
districts in the dataset, it rates between the 50th and 75th percentile for the 
Goldwater Country districts, well below the Madeira school district that rates 
above the 95th percentile for all Goldwater Country districts and just a point below 
the 99th percentile cutoff for all districts in the dataset.  The Fitch Rating Agency, 
in 2012, confirmed the school district’s AA bond rating,206 noting that the district 
                                            
206 Fitch’s highest bond rating is AAA. 
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had a “sound financial position” and that its “proactive financial management” 
had done a good job in addressing the recent funding shortfall.207   
 Despite a vigorous campaign by Learn Yes.org, a citizen group that 
argued that a “no” vote might have an adverse impact on property values,208 and 
warnings from the district’s superintendent that failure to adopt a tax increase 
could result in the loss of almost 100 teaching and teacher’s aid positions 
together with cuts in all-day kindergarten, art, music, band and the world 
language program the school system had recently adopted,209 the voters rejected 
the tax increase by a vote of 44.18% in favor to 55.82% opposed.   
 In Figure 7-6, I present the results of the Cave Creek school tax election 
and the 2012 presidential election by Cave Creek polling location.210   Figure 7-6 
provides additional support for my claim that in affluent, Republican school 
districts, ostensibly nonpartisan school tax elections are, in fact, heavily 
influenced by political ideology.  We see the same evidence of ideological voting 
that we saw in Portland (Figure 4-3), and Madeira (Figure 7-5).  The correlation 
between the school tax vote and the presidential vote is r=0.68.  Higher levels of 
support for President Obama generally imply higher levels of support for the tax 
                                            
207 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/23/idUSWNA176620120723 
208 http://www.learnyes.org/index2011.html.  According to the same flyer, the 




210 Maricopa County does not report school tax election results by precinct and 
so to make a valid comparison, I aggregated the results of the 2012 presidential 
election by polling place as well. 
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Figure 7- 6 School Tax and Presidential Voting for Cave Creek 
y = 0.0278x + 0.2855




















(Arranged by Ascending Percentage Vote for Obama)
Percent Voting for School Tax and Obama
Percent Voting Yes
% Obama
Linear (Percent Voting Yes)
Linear (% Obama)
 257 
increase while lower levels of support for the president imply lower levels of support for 
the tax increase.211  Just as in Figure 7-5, the regression lines for the two elections are 
nearly parallel with a gap between their intercepts.  Just as, in Figure 7-5, the 
regression line for the school tax has a higher intercept than the regression line for the 
presidential election, the regression line for the school tax has a higher intercept than 
the one for the presidential election.  The gap between the intercepts can likewise be 
thought of as the impact of the level of the community’s satisfaction with the school 
district’s performance.  Figure 7-6 implies that the community’s level of satisfaction was 
low and insufficient to move the intercept high enough to pass the tax increase. 
 While the Cave Creek school district had a relatively high district ranking score 
compared with other Arizona school districts, the community’s residents had good 
reason to believe that Cave Creek school district was not providing a high quality 
education, at least compared to national standards.   Arizona schools, in general, are 
among the worst performing public schools in the country.  The “Kids Count Data 
Center,” sponsored by the Annie E. Casey Foundation, for example, rated Arizona’s 
educational performance the fifth worst in the country in both 2012 and 2013, ahead of 
only Nevada, New Mexico, Mississippi and West Virginia.212  While these kinds of 
                                            
211Wealth was also apparently played a large role in the school tax vote.  The 
correlation between Average Precinct Home Price and the School tax vote was066. 
Wealth did not play a role in the presidential election.  The correlation  
between the vote for president and Average Precinct Home Value was only r=-0.07.  
212 http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/Tables/7247-education-
rank?loc=1&loct=2#detailed/2/11-19,2,20-29,3,30-39,4,40-49,5,50-52,6-
9/false/36,868/any/14341.  The Kids Count Data Center derived its rankings as follows:  
The Education Rank for each state was obtained in the following manner. First, 
we converted the 2011 (or 2009/2010, depending on the indicator) state 
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rankings are probably not the kinds of materials voters take into the voting booth with 
them, it is likely that they did know that the quality of the education the district was 
providing was not top-notch.  The residents of the Cave Creek district, after all, have the 
third highest level of level of educational attainment in the Goldwater Country group of 
districts, ranking between the 90th and 95th percentile for educational attainment in the 
dataset, and this fact makes it likely that they could appreciate what counts as excellent 
education and what does not.   As the CCUSD Watch, a blog which identifies itself as 
“an advocacy organization focused on Cave Creek Unified School District No. 93,”213 
put it: 
As we have stated before, these  . . .[in-state grades] are a low bar and in no way 
represent the levels where we want and need our students to perform at [sic].  
We all know how poorly Arizona does in comparison with the rest of the U.S., so 
being the best in Arizona does not prove much. One of the Cave Creek Unified 
[School District] board members said it best… 
“We can no longer pride ourselves on our performance in the past nor can 
we count on state standards to be accurate judges of our future 
                                                                                                                                             
numerical values for each of the 4 key indicators within each domain into 
standard scores. We summed those standard scores in each domain to get a 
total standard score for each state. Finally, we ranked the states on the basis of 
their total standard score by domain in sequential order from highest/best (1) to 
lowest/worst (50). Standard scores were derived by subtracting the mean score 
from the observed score and dividing the amount by the standard deviation for 
that distribution of scores. All measures were given the same weight in 
calculating the domain standard score. 
213 https://www.blogger.com/profile/12372440689945085075.  In the years leading up to 
the 2011 tax increase, the CCUSD Watch was often highly critical of the school district.  
It did, however, end up endorsing the tax increase. 
http://ccusdwatch.blogspot.com/2011/10/once-again-cave-creek-unified-students.html 
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performance…We should be looking nationally and globally to find the 
standards we should set…If we set our expectations higher than what 
Arizona thinks is acceptable, we can better equip our students for the 
future and better prepare them for the world beyond Cave Creek” (quoting 
Mark Warren, Cave Creek Unified Governing Board Member)214 
(emphasis original).   
 Among the disappointments the CCUSD Watch pointed to in the year leading up 
to the school tax vote were: 
• 35% of the 6th graders at the district’s middle school could not pass the state’s 
standardized math test; 
• The district’s high school, Cactus Shadows High School, was no longer being 
recognized on the Washington Post’s Challenge Index list for Arizona High 
Schools;215 
• Cactus Shadows High School had also failed to make Newsweek’s Best High 
Schools List as it had in 2010; 
• Three of its seven schools were no longer performing at the “Excelling Level” 
based on standardized Arizona Achievement test scores; 
                                            
214 http://ccusdwatch.blogspot.com/2011/10/cave-creek-unified-versus-nation-and.html 
215 America's Most Challenging High Schools ranks schools through an index formula 
that's a simple ratio: the number of Advanced Placement, International Baccalaureate 
and Advanced International Certificate of Education tests given at a school each year, 
divided by the number of seniors who graduated that year. A ratio of 1.000 means the 
school had as many tests as graduates. 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/local/highschoolchallenge/ 
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• Cactus Shadows High School underperformed all of the high schools in adjacent 
districts in math; 
• Throughout the district, writing test scores had dropped after a similar drop in the 
preceding year; 
• The middle school and the high school had failed to make “Adequate Yearly 
Progress,” a key benchmark measurement under the federal “No Child Left 
Behind” Act; 
• The District had failed to offer advanced placement (AP) courses in basic fields 
such as computer science, statistics, chemistry and physics; and 
• The George W. Bush Institute’s Report Card for Cave Creek showed that Cave 
Creek district was at the 57th percentile for math and the 68th percentile in 
reading compared to students in 25 other developed countries.216 
“It is not good enough to be near the top [of the State],” complained the CCUSD Watch.  
“CCUSD should be the top district in the state.  Educators would kill for the 
demographics like our children have [sic], and instead of trying to push our kids to be 
the best and compete with the top schools in the US or the world, the district and 
governing board are satisfied teaching our children to the state standards”217 (emphasis 
original).   
 The Sonoran News made precisely this same point about a month before the 
election by publishing what appears as Figure 7-7.  Focusing on 8th grade  
                                            
216 By comparison, the Madeira school district rated at the 72nd and 84th percentiles for 




Figure 7- 7 Educational Spending and Math Achievement Scores in Cave Creek 
 
 
math scores, the graph shows that despite an eight-fold increase in school spending 
over 10 years, 8th grade math scores had actually declined.  Far more damning than this 
for the Sonoran News and the CCUSD Watch, though, was the fact that the district’s 
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capture rate—total district enrollment divided by the total number of children living within 
the school district’s boundaries—had fallen from 80.7% in 2000 to 68.4% in 2011.218  
That meant that over 2,500 children living within the Cave Creek district had gone to 
private schools or taken advantage of the state’s school choice law to seek education 
elsewhere.  Said the CCUSD Watch: 
According to Applied Economics, the district’s demographer, most districts in the 
metropolitan area have a capture rate of 75 to 80%. . . . So it is clear that all the 
policies, programs, and governing board members over the past 12 years have 
done nothing to stop the decline of the district. Sure, our students have “world 
languages,” can use iPads in the classroom, experience differentiated instruction 
and flipped classrooms, but this window dressing has done little to stop the 
outflow of families voting with their feet.  Parents do not want this window 
dressing, they want real substance so our children will be able to compete 
globally.  Other schools and districts are providing it so they are leaving.  
 When confronted with a government agency that is not providing the services to 
which they feel entitled, voters can express their displeasure at the ballot box either by 
voting to replace the elected officials with others who will do what the voters want, or by 
voting to withhold the resources the agency says it needs to do the job properly.  
Despite its tough criticism of the school district, the CCUSD Watch, in supporting the tax 
                                            
218 http://ccusdwatch.blogspot.com/2012/11/cave-creek-unified-and-
enrollment.html#more.  According to the same chart, in 2012, it had fallen further to 
64.8%. 
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increase, urged Cave Creek district voters to focus their attention on the elected officials 
and not on the funding: 
This override isn’t about new buildings or laptops or swimming pools, this is 
about the classroom. This override money goes directly to support the students 
and our teachers. With the passage of this override, there will be no excuse for 
the district to make cuts that affect our students. . . . Keep your powder dry for 
the governing board elections in 2012 where we can effect real change. 
 Instead of “keeping . . . [their] powder dry for the governing board elections in 
2012 where . . .[they could] effect real change,” voters chose to express their 
displeasure with the state of affairs in the school district, as we might expect many other 




 Goldwater Country school districts share some important characteristics with the 
affluent Democratic districts in the Googleplex group and the less affluent Republican 
districts in the Smallville group.  Just as in the Googleplex group of districts, educational 
attainment matters.  Highly educated districts in Goldwater Country were much more 
likely to pass tax increases than were districts that had a lower level of educational 
attainment overall.  The model and the two case studies suggest that highly educated 
people in these districts are pragmatic, understand, perhaps from personal experience, 
that their children will be competing against workers from all over the world and that 
whereas, “in the past, workers with average skills, doing an average job, could earn an 
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average lifestyle . . . . Being average [today and in the future] just won’t earn you what it 
used to”  (Friedman, 2012a; Cowen, 2013).  For these kinds of parents, an average 
education for their children is simply unacceptable.   
 Higher levels of educational attainment may be a double-edged sword in these 
districts.  Despite the fact that, ordinarily, better-educated communities are more likely 
to adopt tax increases than communities with lower levels of educational attainment,219 
higher levels of educational attainment also intensifies partisan commitment, making 
liberals more liberal and conservatives more conservative. (Abramowitz & Saunders, 
2008; Converse, 2006; Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2010; Jacoby, 1988; Zaller, 1992).  
We saw evidence in both the Madeira school district and the Cave Creek school district, 
both of which had high levels of educational attainment, that ideological predilections 
appeared to influence the votes on the school tax increase.  It appears that, consistent 
with the Republican National Committee’s self-description and with the general ideology 
of Republican elites such as Sen. Alexander, in districts where highly educated 
residents believe that the school system is doing a good job, voters are sometimes 
willing to look past any pre-existing ideological doubts about the efficacy of government 
and reward the school district with a “yes” vote.  But, in districts where the highly 
educated residents perceive that the school district is not doing a good job, again in 
accordance with Republican ideology, voters may see that poor performance as 
                                            
219 The model shows that moving from the district with the lowest level of educational 
attainment to the highest increases the odds of adopting a tax increase by 34.47% if 
districts below one standard deviation from the mean and one standard deviation above 
the mean are excluded.  Using the entire range of the variable, moving from the district 
with the lowest level of educational attainment to the highest increases the likelihood of 
adopting a tax increase by 76.84%. 
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confirmation of a pre-existing Republican perception that government is generally inept 
and wasteful, and, therefore, that the school district’s request for additional revenue 
should be denied.  
 In support of this argument, I have offered the fact that the model’s Educational 
Attainment variable is positive, significant and substantial while the Total Population 
(log) variable is negative, significant and substantial.  None of the other variables in the 
model reach statistical significance.  Because voters in Goldwater Country districts are 
likely to be skeptical of governmental authority, they demand proof that their tax dollars 
are actually buying the services they believe they are paying for.  Well educated school 
districts in small communities such as the Madeira school district that are doing a good 
job in providing high quality education compared to other school districts in Goldwater 
Country do significantly better at the polls then do districts, such as the Cave Creek 
district where the the size of the population is likely adversely to affect levels of 
satisfaction with school district services. 
 While there is nothing a school district can do, at least in the short term, that can 
raise its surrounding community’s level of educational attainment from low to high, nor is 
it likely that a school district can moderate the Republican Headwind that blows steadily 
through its neighborhoods, Goldwater Country school districts that wish to be taken 
seriously at the polls should do everything possible to demonstrate that they are 
competently providing the value the surrounding community expects.   Failure to do so, 
in a well-educated, affluent Republican community, is likely to result in electoral defeat, 
and it might trigger a “vicious cycle” as appears to be happening in the Cave Creek 
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district:  Dissatisfied families could begin fleeing the local public school system to enroll 
in better performing neighboring schools, private schools, or the charter schools for 
which Republican leaders such as Sen. Alexander seem to have a great affinity.  Once 
residents pull their children out of the local public school system, they will have reason 
to believe that they are not receiving anything in return for school taxes paid.  They may 
then begin refusing to support school tax increases, and insist, instead, on lower school 
taxes, leaving behind a poorly funded public school system for those who lack the 

























Educational Attainment 8.147 
(1.839) 
0.775 0.35 0.000 
Homeowners 0.05 
(4.772) 
0.005 0.002 0.596 
Whites 2.492 
(4.928) 
0.257 0.049 0.307 
Children 4.015 
(0.151) 
0.319 0.098 0.136 
Total Population (log) -0.515 
(0.151) 
-0.574 -0.236 0.000 
Constant -3.612 
(3.966) 
   
N 62    






Summary of Key Findings 
 
 The key finding of my research is that, consistent with Lentz (Lentz, 1999) 
and  Gimpel and Schuknecht, (Gimpel & Schuknecht, 2004), the willingness of 
American school districts to raise taxes depends on economic and political 
context.  With respect to each of the four types of communities I identified for this 
project, the main factors that maximize the chance that a school district will pass 
a tax increase are as follows: 
(i) Affluent Democratically oriented districts are more favorably 
disposed to tax themselves for the benefit of their school systems 
than any of the others, but whether a community will adopt a tax 
increase depends on the level of educational attainment that 
prevails there. When an affluent Democratically oriented community 
is highly educated, there is a much greater chance that it will pass a 
tax increase than if it is not.   
(ii) In downscale Democratically oriented school districts, the presence 
of high percentages of renters, poor people and others who do not 
expect to have to pay much more in new taxes immediately tends 
to maximize the likelihood that the community will pass a tax 
increase.  Large percentages of homeowners in these districts can 
be problematic.    
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(iii) In downscale Republican oriented districts, strong attachments to 
the community marked by small population sizes and a high 
percentage of households with seniors maximize the chances that 
the district will pass a school tax increase.   
(iv) Educational Attainment and population size are the most influential 
factors affecting school tax elections in affluent Republican districts. 
Low levels of educational attainment virtually guaranty that a tax 
increase proposal will be defeated.  Higher levels of educational 
attainment improve the likelihood that a tax increase will be 
adopted, but as population size increases, the likelihood of 
adopting a school tax increase decreases even for districts with 
relatively high levels of educational attainment.  High levels of 
educational attainment moderate the impact of population size on 
the probability of adopting a tax increase. 
 These findings reflect the different ways political ideology and wealth 
affect voters in each community type.  Democrats generally favor educational 
spending and are willing to pay more if the proposed increase is affordable. 
Republican communities prefer to keep taxes low, but will agree to higher taxes if 
they are convinced that those taxes are going to do some good, either by 
bolstering institutions that help define and unify the community or by rewarding 





Discussion of Findings 
 Building on Bishop and Moretti, I have argued that communities are now 
defined by dimensions of wealth and political ideology.  I used those dimensions 
to construct a typology with a high affluence Democratic cell, a low affluence 
Democratic cell, a high affluence Republican cell and a low affluence Republican 
cell.  I have shown that identifying and understanding the factors that improve or 
reduce the chances that a school district will adopt a proposed tax increase 
require a recognition of where that school district would be located within the 
typology.  
 The literature suggests, for example, that the level of educational 
attainment in a community can be an important factor in determining whether a 
community will adopt a tax increase for the benefit of its school system (Piele & 
Hall, 1973, pp. 117–18 and studies cited therein).  According to the literature, 
people living in areas with high educational attainment generally appreciate the 
tangible and intangible benefits a good education can bring to life  (Berkman & 
Plutzer, 2005, p. 44).  In my dataset, moving from the school districts one 
standard deviation below the mean to the districts one standard deviation above 
the mean improved the chances of adopting a tax increase by more than 16.7%; 
considering the full range of the variable, moving from the school district with the 
lowest level of educational attainment to the highest improved the probability of 
adopting a tax increase by over 60%.  This result, though, was largely driven by 
the highly educated school districts in the affluent Googleplex and Goldwater 
Country districts.  Considering the Clintonland and Smallville districts together 
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without the Googleplex and Goldwater Country districts, educational attainment 
had no statistical effect on the likelihood of adopting a tax increase.    
 For affluent communities such as the Googleplex Adopters and the 
Goldwater Country districts, high levels of educational attainment significantly 
improved the chances that school districts would adopt school tax increases.  
This statement is true, as far as it goes.  What is missing in this analysis is the 
powerful role that political ideology plays in shaping the results of the school tax 
elections in both Democratic and Republican communities.   
 Educational attainment was a double-edged sword in the Republican 
oriented school districts of the Goldwater Country quadrant.  In addition to 
making people more likely to appreciate the value of good education, higher 
levels of education also seemed to make people more ideological.    Republican 
ideology tends to stress the ineffectiveness of government, the importance of 
individual choice and the market-based value of rewarding success.  Laden with 
this view of governmental services, voters in affluent Republican oriented 
communities appear to be skeptical of government officials who ask for higher 
taxes, particularly if their districts had large populations.  In this dataset, affluent 
Republican oriented communities with large populations, places where theory 
tells us that people are the most likely be the most dissatisfied with the services 
government provides or to feel the least internal political efficacy, were the least 
likely districts to adopt tax increases.  Even so, in the Goldwater Country districts, 
small populations and/or high levels of educational did not guarantee that the 
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community would adopt the requested tax increase.  This is what we should 
expect to happen, given the Republican worldview just described. 
 The Democratic Googleplex and Clintonland districts, places not as deeply 
affected by the Republican ideology described in the preceding paragraph, by 
contrast, were much better able to adopt tax increases.  This is also what we 
should expect, given the fact that Democrats customarily tend to look more 
favorably on education than do Republicans and the fact that Democrats tend to 
favor redistributionist policies more than Republicans do.220   In the Googleplex 
group of districts, high levels of educational attainment were positively correlated 
with wealth, suggesting that in addition to making good primary and secondary 
education widely available for its own sake, the people living in these districts 
had experienced the benefits good education can bring and wanted to ensure 
that the advantages of education would be available to the next generation. The 
high correlation between education and wealth also explains why some 
Googleplex districts rejected the tax: Communities with lower levels of education 
are also less wealthy and therefore less able to afford tax increases. 
 While educational attainment did not play an important role in the 
Clintonland or Smallville group of districts, what did seem to matter in the 
Clintonland districts was wealth.  As I demonstrated in Chapter 5, when voters 
are worried about their home values and their family budgets, they have little 
sympathy for higher taxes unless they are likely to benefit (or don’t expect to 
experience any economic hardship) from it.  Personal economic factors were 





much more important in shaping the outcome of school tax elections in these 
districts than the more abstract concerns about the value and quality of education 
apparently at play in the Adopter districts of the Googleplex group and in the 
Goldwater Country districts.  That is probably why Clintonland districts with more 
renters (who would not be affected immediately by a property tax increase), more 
people living in poverty and lower median income were more likely to adopt tax 
increases than the other districts in the group.   
 School districts with a large percentage of seniors should have difficulty 
passing tax increases, particularly if we accept the Gray Peril hypothesis.  People 
of limited means, such as seniors, who are living on fixed incomes, should be 
loath to contribute to the purchase of public goods from which they receive no 
direct benefit.  But that is not what happened in the Smallville group of districts.  
We know from Chapter 3 that Republicans tend to prefer smaller communities 
than do Democrats (see also Dimock et al., 2014), and one possible explanation 
for that preference could be that Republicans prefer to live in communities where 
they have a higher degree of political efficacy (Dahl & Tufte, 1973; Oliver, 2001; 
Verba & Nie, 1972).  In the Smallville districts, but not elsewhere, we saw that 
attachment to the community—evidenced by small population sizes, deep roots 
and low transience--tended to encourage and facilitate the kinds of communal 
norms that Wong says make people more willing to contribute to the common 





Study Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
Replication and Expansion 
 
 One of the key objectives of this project was to provide findings that are 
more easily generalizable than are those of earlier research based on case 
studies of one school district, a handful of school districts or even all of the 
school districts in a single state.  By using a relatively large number of school 
districts from multiple states that placed increased school taxes on the ballot, I 
believe that I have accomplished this objective.  As a group, these districts 
appear to possess a varied selection of demographic attributes, which should 
make them fairly representative of the country as a whole.   
 On the other hand my dataset, does not include any school districts from 
the states east of Ohio or from the states in the Old Confederacy.  This is due to 
the fact that data from these states were not available, either because some 
school districts place school budgets (and the power to tax) in the hands of 
county or city councils or because the school districts are not required by law to 
post details about school tax elections on a website or on any reasonably 
complete and easily accessible registry.   My study therefore does not take 
distinctive regional factors into account.  In particular, I note that there are only 9 
school districts in my dataset where the white population is not a majority, and 6 
of those jurisdictions come from California.  This means that my dataset probably 
does not include any school districts that may have been affected by racial 
segregation or the racial discrimination addressed by Brown v. Board of 
Education and its progeny or the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  Given more time 
and more resources, the database could be expanded to include school districts 
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that were otherwise unavailable to me.  This would improve the generalizability of 
my findings. 
 Finding a way to add more school districts to the dataset would also 
improve the power and reliability of the statistical analysis.  Though most of the 
variables upon which I relied are highly significant even using two-tailed tests of 
statistical significance, more cases would have allowed me to add variables to 
the general-purpose logistic regression model in order to test or to control for 
other factors that might have added depth to my arguments.  Variables that I 
could not include due to concerns about statistical power included measures of 
poverty, school district quality, tenure in a community, population density and the 
use of private school as an alternative to public schools.  
Other Kinds of Taxes 
 
 I have focused my efforts in this study on school taxes.  I did this because 
school taxes are relatively ubiquitous, and focusing on them assured me of 
finding a reasonably large number of cases to analyze.  School taxes, though, 
are not the only kinds of taxes localities place on the ballot.  Throughout the 
United States, voters consider taxes for roads, libraries, police and fire 
departments and other public amenities and services.  Future research could tell 
us whether there is something unique about the way that communities vote with 
respect to funding educational services or whether the same kinds of factors 
come into play when other kinds of public goods are on the ballot.  It might also 
be interesting to find out whether people think differently about taxes dedicated to 
general operating costs such as salaries, small tools, small-scale equipment and 
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deferred compensation than they do about taxes dedicated to the creation of 
larger, more permanent communal assets such as schools, fire stations and 
parks.  
Adding Temporal Context 
 This project focused on school tax elections that took place during a single 
year.   Using school tax elections that occurred during a single year enabled me 
to produce a reasonably clear snapshot of a moment in time.  The procedure 
allowed me to focus on a time when there were difficult financial and political 
circumstances that placed the choice of adopting a tax or potentially degrading a 
community asset into sharp focus. Using another year during which the need was 
less pressing or the pressure on family budgets was less intense might have 
resulted in a smaller, less diverse database. With a growing economy and 
increasing real estate values, cash flow to school districts can more easily keep 
pace with school district needs, making appeals to voters for more operating 
cash less necessary.  I chose to use elections that took place in 2011 because I 
assume that if a community was willing to adopt a tax increase in hard economic 
times when family budgets are tight, it should also be willing to adopt tax 
increases in better times when it is easier for taxpayers to make ends meet.  
 However, just as elections take place within economic and political 
contexts, they take place in a temporal context as well.  My research does not 
account for the fact that it is not unusual for school districts to ask voters for tax 
increases multiple times within 12 month periods if their first requests are 
rejected at the polls.  There were several school districts in the dataset that 
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placed the same or a similar tax increase proposal before the voters more than 
once in 2011, but to avoid statistical complications, I did not consider these 
additional attempts.  There were also some school tax elections in 2011 that 
were follow-ups to unsuccessful 2010 tax increase elections, and there may have 
been some unsuccessful attempts in 2011 that were followed by successful 
attempts in 2012.   Adding a temporal context might enable scholars to gain 
better insight into whether there is anything a school district saddled with 
“unfavorable” demographic traits can do to convert likely failure into success. 
  Future research might consider a school district’s history of voting on tax 
increases over multiple attempts and over multiple years.   It could be important 
to know how school districts that easily adopt tax increases most of the times 
they are presented on the ballot differ from school districts that have significantly 
more difficulty in adopting them.  In particular, it might be useful to know how 
demographic changes in communities affect the probabilities of a tax increase 
and how bad things have to get in a school district before voters grant the school 
district a tax increase. 
 Incorporating a temporal context into this research could also begin to 
address a much bigger and more important question: Does a community’s 
willingness to increase taxes for its school district produce any long term 
advantages for its students?  It could be that school districts that easily and 
reliably raise tax revenues when those tax increases are requested are better 
able to attract teachers who are more effective at preparing children for work or 
college than their counterpart districts that have a more difficult time raising 
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revenue.   Ohio’s Madeira City School District is and will likely remain an 
academic powerhouse that probably improves the chances that its alumni will 
become successful students at good colleges.  But, would that continue to be 
true if the surrounding community determined either that some lower level of 
educational services were acceptable or if the community occasionally refused to 
adopt tax increases when requested?  Is it more likely that students graduating 
from the Advance school district in rural Missouri (an Adopter district) will get into 
good colleges and be successful students than those who graduate from the 
Fairborn City, Ohio school district (a Rejecter district)?  Perhaps, as Amanda 
Ripley suggests, instead of money, what really matters in shaping the education 
of children is the determination of a community to take education seriously and to 
communicate that seriousness to students. (Ripley, 2013) That seriousness is 
surely evidenced by a community’s willingness to adopt tax increases, but 







Class is in Session 
 
 I began this project because I was interested in leaning about when and 
why people are willing to place communal interests over personal ones.  I 
believed that concepts like trust, social capital or even altruism were part of the 
answer.  My research led me away from my initial abstract interest and toward 
something much more complicated and nuanced.  Hamlet was right when he 
advised Horatio that there “ are more things in heaven and earth . . . than are 
dreamt of in your philosophy.” 
 I now know that, at least with respect to school taxes, the level of 
affluence and the political orientation of a community make a profound difference.  
Through the last 8 chapters, I have demonstrated that Bishop, Moretti and 
Florida are largely correct:  American communities are becoming increasingly 
segregated by affluence and political orientation. This segregation extends to 
some of the smallest communal units for which we have data and affects they 
way they deal with even ostensibly non-partisan policy matters such as school 
finance.   
 Within this observation lurks a series of important and troubling questions: 
Is the patchwork system of local control we, as a nation, use to provide education 
to our children sensible, effective and fair? Will it leave our children with a more 
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secure and prosperous country poised to face the uncertain future of the 21st 
century? 
 Though I have focused on matters of educational finance, the questions I 
have just raised are far bigger than that.  Education finance is bound up in beliefs 
about who “we” are, where “we” are going and what “we” believe “our” children 
need to prepare themselves for what is to come.  The initial problem, from a 
policy standpoint, is whether “we” are members of discrete and independent 
communities and whether “our” children are the kids who attend our local schools, 
or whether “we” are members of single nation committed to the idea of equal 
opportunity for all of the children who live under the guarantees of the federal 
Constitution. 
 Our system of public education is a path dependent product that grew up 
when local economies mattered more and the national and global economies 
mattered less (Berkman & Plutzer, 2005).  The education of children was never 
an object of the national government described in the Constitution.  Instead, 
elementary and secondary education has traditionally been the responsibility, 
first of individual parents or small communities, and then later, the responsibility 
of the states.  Parents, then smaller communities, then progressively larger ones 
shouldered the responsibility of paying for the cost of educating children, and 
with the burden of paying for education came the prerogative of deciding what 
ought to be taught.  Even when states took the legal responsibility for providing 
education to children, the tradition of local control of public education was strong, 
and the states left a healthy share of discretion in the hands of local communities 
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together with a substantial portion of the responsibility for paying for it (Berkman 
& Plutzer, 2005).  
 For much of our history, none of this was problematic.  Most of our 
children remained tied to the communities where they were raised, and their 
educations prepared them for jobs located in the area.  A “three R’s” education 
was often more than sufficient for most people to become productive members of 
their communities, to make a living and to participate intelligently in civic life. 
 None of this is true today.  Over the last 75 years, we have become an 
increasingly mobile society (Putnam, 2000).  It is less likely today that people will 
be employed in the same localities in which they were born, raised and educated 
than ever before. (Moretti, 2013, pp. 155–156)  What a child needs to know or 
must be able to do in order to get a job and become self-supporting in today’s 
knowledge based economy is quite different from what he or she needed to know 
50 years ago in a manufacturing based economy or over 100 years ago in an 
economy based on agriculture. (Friedman, 2012a)  As the Supreme Court said in 
the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments.  Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society.  It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces.  It is the very foundation of good citizenship.  Today it is a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing 
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him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to 
his environment.  In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of 
education.221 
 Children today are not only competing with other children in the 
neighborhood or even in the extended community for jobs; instead, they are 
competing with children from all over the country and from all over the world.  
Businesses seeking to get or maintain an edge in what has become a global 
economy are not shy about importing the talent they need or even relocating 
themselves to areas where that talent is abundant and relatively inexpensive.  
(Friedman, 2012b; Moretti, 2013)  Even if a person’s skills make him or her “one 
in a million,” on a planet with 7 billion people, that means that there are likely to 
be at least 70 million people with the same skills. 
 We continue to trust parents and local politicians to decide what students 
learn and how they learn it.  This is not to say that parents and local politicians 
cannot do a good job with this, but the gross results of their efforts are not 
encouraging.  The Programme for International Student Assessment for 2012 
(PISA), for example, shows the U.S. lagging behind its peer countries that are 
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (the 
“OECD”).  Compared to the other 33 OECD countries, U.S. students were 26th in 
                                            
221Despite this language, a more conservative Supreme Court, in 1973, ruled that 
the Constitution did not require even rough parity in educational funding. San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. (1973).  
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math, 17th in reading and 21st in science222 (J. Ryan, 2013).  Even in creative 
problem solving, an area in which U.S. students were thought to excel, 
Americans now score in the middle of the pack, behind Singapore, South Korea, 
Japan, several provinces of China, Canada, Australia, Finland and Britain (Rich, 
2014). 
 Some of this may be a reflection of the values of those parents and local 
politicians.  According to a recent Pew study on climate change, for example 
(Pew Research Center, 2013), there is a pronounced divergence of opinion when 
a respondent’s religious and political party affiliations are taken into account.  As 
Colby College Professor Jenny Finney Boylan, commenting on resistance to the 
Common Core State Education Standards,223 put it: 
What we’re arguing about is what we want from our children’s education, 
and what, in fact, “getting an education” actually means. For some 
parents, the primary desire is for our sons and daughters to wind up, more 
                                            
222 Growth in PISA scores apparently presages national economic growth. 
(Khaopa, 2011)  
223 The Common Core State Education Standards were developed by a group of 
states to improve and regularize education standards throughout the country.  Of 
its project, the Common Core State Standards Initiative’s web site says: “For 
years, the academic progress of our nation’s students has been stagnant, and 
we have lost ground to our international peers. Particularly in subjects such as 
math, college remediation rates have been high. One root cause has been an 
uneven patchwork of academic standards that vary from state to state and do not 
agree on what students should know and be able to do at each grade level. . . 
The Common Core is a set of high-quality academic standards in mathematics 
and English language arts/literacy (ELA). These learning goals outline what a 
student should know and be able to do at the end of each grade. The standards 
were created to ensure that all students graduate from high school with the skills 
and knowledge necessary to succeed in college, career, and life, regardless of 
where they live.” http://www.corestandards.org/about-the-standards/  It is telling 
that that there should even be any dispute that such an initiative is needed. 
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or less, like ourselves.  Education, in this model, means handing down 
shared values of the community to the next generation. Sometimes it can 
also mean shielding children from aspects of the culture we do not 
approve of, or fear.  
For others, education means enlightening our children’s minds with the 
uncensored scientific and artistic truth of the world. If that means making 
our own sons and daughters strangers to us, then so be it. (Boylan, 2014) 
 Boylan’s first model is consistent with a conservative worldview while the 
second is consistent with a liberal one.  In a country where these diametrically 
opposed opinions are evenly distributed over space, it might be possible—in fact, 
it would be imperative—for the two sides to work out a compromise where all 
children get exposure to a curriculum that values both tradition and 
enlightenment.  But my research, confirming that of Moretti, Bishop and Florida, 
underscores the fact that opinion on these questions is not evenly distributed on 
a geographic basis.  Instead of being forced to accommodate each other, people 
holding one of these views or the other are simply relocating to places where the 
community largely agrees with them.  Our self-segregation along lines of political 
ideology and affluence affects how and what we teach our children, and we are 
in danger of creating parallel societies with parallel school systems where some 
people are better able to reap the rewards of the 21st century economy than are 
others.   
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 Consider, for example, what is happening in two Louisiana communities 
currently combined into a single school district.  The Village of St. George and 
several other nearby areas (collectively “St. George”) constitute an affluent 
Republican enclave within the boundaries of the East Baton Rouge Parish 
School System (the “EBRPS”) in Louisiana.  The struggle between St. George 
and the EBRPS provides a fitting illustration of several of the principles discussed 
in previous chapters, and, it may be the face of things to come.224   
 In late 2013, residents of St. George began an effort to secede from the 
EBRPS by incorporating St. George as a new Louisiana city.  According to the 
proponents:  
Incorporating the city of St. George was not the original intention of our 
grassroots group. Originally, we were attempting to provide local schools 
for local children through the creation of an independent school district in 
the southern part of the parish225. . . We want to create an outstanding 
community based, public city school system with a challenging learning 
environment that encourages high expectations for success through 
development-appropriate instruction and classroom discipline that allows 
for individual differences and learning styles. We strive to have our 
parents, alumni, teachers, and community members actively involved in 
                                            
224 St. George is not an isolated example.  Similar things have begun to happen 






our students’ learning. Our vision is to be the state’s leading school 
system.226 
 The problems with the EBRPS, according to proponents of the proposed 
city of St. George, were legion.  They noted that some of the schools in the 
EBRPS had been taken over by the State of Louisiana and that 60% of the 
district’s students had attended a school the state had regarded as “failing.”  In 
2009 about 30% of the children living in the EBRPS had opted out of the public 
school system to attend private schools.227  A recent audit of the EBRPS by the 
Louisiana State Department of Education disclosed that at least 6 students from 
one of its high schools had been allowed to graduate without meeting all of the 
school’s requirements, 11 students had been made eligible for state scholarship 
money without having met the applicable requirements, and between 2010 and 
2013, about 25% of the transcripts of a random sample of graduating seniors had 
“significant errors,” such as unearned credits, unearned grades and missing 
documentation.228  Proponents of secession posted an article on their web site 
describing the EBRPS as “a criminal conspiracy disguised as a school system,” 
and “an effort to steal taxpayer money.”229   










 According to a study performed for the Baton Rouge Area Chamber of 
Commerce and the Baton Rouge Foundation, the new proposed City of St. 
George would look very different demographically from the remaining EBRPS.   
As currently configured, the EBRPS would be a Clintonland district with a large 
population of African-Americans.  After the proposed split, the EBRPS would 
continue to be a Clintonland-type district with an African-American population of   
55%.  St. George, with an African-American population of only about 24%, would 
become one of the wealthiest cities in the state with average income about 
$30,000 higher than in the EBRPS.  The number of people receiving assistance 
from the federal Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (better known as 
“food stamps”) in the EBRPS would exceed the number of people receiving 
similar assistance in St. George by 10 percentage points. (Richardson, Llorens, 
& Heidelberg, 2013). 
  St. George would have an extremely well educated population: in the four 
key areas of the new city, the Village of St. George, Oak Hills, Shenandoah and 
Westminster, the percentage of the population holding at least a bachelor’s 
degree is 47.05%, 56.36%, 46.65% and 62.75% respectively.  While East Baton 
Rouge is a Democratic leaning school district, only Republicans represent the zip 
codes that serve the proposed City of St. George in the lower house of the 
Louisiana State Legislature.  The proposed City of St. George would be a 
Goldwater Country district, and in light of that, it is hardly surprising that the 
proponents of the secession movement want to “take their business elsewhere,” 
a sentiment that seems to echo the problems of the Cave Creek School District 
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discussed in Chapter 7.  The project in St. George, at least with respect to the 
school system, is to move from Clintonland to Goldwater Country, and, once 
there, to create a school system as effective as the one in Madeira City, Ohio, 
also discussed in Chapter 7. 
 If St. George succeeds in seceding from the EBRPS, the older district’s 
per pupil spending would fall from $9,635 to $8,870.  Per pupil spending in the 
new school district, on the other hand, is projected to be about $11,686.  This is, 
in part because a major portion of the school system’s operating budget comes 
from sales taxes generated by retail businesses that would be located in the 
proposed new municipality. (Richardson, Llorens, & Heidelberg, 2013)  As we 
saw in Chapter 5, for these kinds of communities, economic considerations are 
highly influential in determining whether a tax increase will be adopted.  Here, not 
only will the residents of the remaining EBRPS continue paying the sales tax if 
they continue to shop at the stores located in St. George, they would receive no 
benefit for those taxes, which would be paid to the new municipality.  They would 
have to replace that lost revenue by imposing a brand new tax.  As in the 
Amherst Exempted Village School District in Ohio, that is likely to be a difficult 
thing to do for a community not blessed with affluence. “It’s going to devastate 
us,” said an EBRPS parent with 2 elementary school aged children.230  Said 
Carnell Washington, president of the EBRPS Federation of Teachers, if St. 





George manages to secede from the EBRPS, “every affluent community in the 
state will want to create their own little school system.”231   
 Whether proposing to secede from the EBRPS was a reasonable 
response to the school system’s problems or, whether, as some have suggested, 
the proposal flows from concerns about issues of race and class232 is a 
discussion for another day.  What is important here is that, if successful, the 
community of St. George will have been able to segregate itself and its children 
from an educational system destined to leave other people’s children behind, just 
as the parents who had “voted with their feet” in the Cave Creek school district 
had apparently done.  St. George’s children will then be more likely than their 
former classmates in the EBRPS to get into good colleges, graduate and find 
jobs in an economy that rewards the skills and thinking abilities a college 
education makes possible. 
 And what will happen in the next generation?  Surely it will be even more 
obvious to those children whose communities had seceded from the EBRPS than 
it was to people in the previous generation that a good education brings vast 
advantages in life.  They will seek out communities where their children can be 
guaranteed the same opportunities that their elders gave them.  They will surely 
choose to locate themselves in affluent communities that can control the quality 
of public education.  But, what will they know about the lives of the others who 






have been left behind; and what will the “left behinds” think of their former 
classmates, their education, their values and their sensibilities? 
 They might decide to raise families in communities that value education as 
they probably will value it.  Consider, in this regard, the 24 California school 
districts included in this study.   In 2011, California required a 2/3 vote in order to 
pass a tax increase.  Only 6 of the California school districts could not surmount 
that hurdle.  In the California cases, the average percentage of voters in favor of 
increased taxes for the school districts that adopted tax increases was almost 
70% compared to about 60% elsewhere in the country where the bar is set at 
only a bare majority.  For these districts scattered randomly around California, to 
have been able to muster supermajorities in favor of increasing taxes for schools 
in such an economically difficult year implies that at least part of what attracted 
people to the school districts of which they were residents was the confidence 
that their neighbors would also be willing to make sacrifices for the sake of 
improving the chances of the next generation.  It’s not surprising that, on average, 
(i) all of the districts had above median home values, (ii) all but 2 were 
Democratic districts and (iii) about 50% of the people living in the California 
districts that passed tax increases had college degrees compared to 38% of the 
people in the other California districts and 27% of the people in the dataset as a 
whole. 
 Segregation, whether based on educational attainment, wealth or political 
ideology, which together are elements of social class, cannot be a good thing for 
 
 291 
our country, if for no other reason than the corrosive effect it is likely to have on 
the generalized trust required to help a society function (see Uslaner, 2012).  
Among its many problems, segregation has the potential to create divergent 
societies, perhaps not unlike the American factions that fought the Civil War, 
whose economies were different, whose societies were different and, ultimately, 
whose values were different. 
 But an educationally segregated country that reinforces segregation by 
class is not our only possible future.  A system that arose out of a confluence of 
constitutional theory, ideology, practicality and the vagaries of American history 
can be replaced with something more efficient and more fair, assuming the 
presence of an appropriate amount of political will.  Given the ability to start from 
scratch, would any country entrust a task as important to national survival as the 
education of its children to a patchwork system of school governance and finance 
that cannot guaranty that all of its children get the tools they need to become 
productive contributors to its future prosperity and security?  
 In the end, we probably cannot do much about the fact that some children 
are born to parents who are better able to nurture them than are other children, 
nor can we do much about the likelihood that these lucky children will have a 
better chance in the world of the 21st century.  But by making education a 
national responsibility, we can minimize those differences.  In the process, we 
might be able to avoid the social estrangement and national disintegration that 
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